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ABSTRACT
Gas flaring is categorized as one of the important contributors to greenhouse gases, which
increases the risk of global warming and climate change. The overdependence of the modern
economy and most industrial technologies on fossil fuels has created a situation in countries where
fossil fuels are exploited. The governments rely majorly on the revenue from exporting oil. The
IOCs that are engaged in the mining of oil and gas have been able to influence policy and law
enforcement on gas flaring to such an extent that the National laws are not enforced, or the
stipulated fines are abysmally low that they sound ridiculous when compared to the damage to the
environment and the effect of this gas flaring and environmental degradation on the unborn
generation.
International law is a system of rules and principles that govern the relations and dealings of
nations with each other, a has a role to play where the actions of a nation affect other nations.
Climate change and global warming affect the whole planet therefore, the treaties relating to global
warming and climate change should be applied in a way that makes it effective to curtail
unnecessary and harmful gas flaring from Nigeria.
The UNFCCC and the subsequent Kyoto protocol, and the Paris agreement have all been lenient
with the responsibilities placed on developing nations because of the need for development and
the negligible contributions to global warming but unfortunately developing nations are usually
disproportionately affected by global crises and that is the more reason why there needs to be a
system to help develop the gas exploration technology in Africa to reduce the global warm, and
also reduce the over-reliance of Europe energy market on one source.
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The CDM system developed in the Paris agreement can be used as a reliable tool to achieve the
necessary incentives to reduce gas flaring in Nigeria if there is the political will by interested
nations and the Nigerian Government
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CHAPTER 1
1.0 EXAMINATION OF THE MENACE OF GAS FLARING IN NIGERIA
1.1 General Introduction
Nigeria has a distinguished seat among countries rich in natural resources because different
resources can be found in the different parts of Nigeria. They include but are not limited to gold,
tin, coal, bitumen, iron ore, limestone, oil, natural gas, etc. The nation is also blessed with very
fertile soil and conducive tropical weather that make agricultural activities thrive, such that the
production of commercial crops like cocoa, oil palm, coffee, and cotton were major foreign
exchange-earners before the discovery and development of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.
Since the discovery of crude oil in the town of Oloibiri in the Delta region of River Niger in 1956,
there has been a major shift in the major commodities that earn foreign exchange and contribute
to government revenue, leading to a neglect of the commercial agricultural sector of the Nigerian
economy, and a steady decline in exploration and mining activities of other natural resources such
as coal, tin, and bitumen. This decline can be attributed to the following factors which include but
are not limited to; relative abundance of oil and gas; relatively less stringent rules governing the
oil exploration in Nigeria; the available technology needed for mining and refining; the availability
of ready market for crude oil in Europe, China, India, and North America and the relatively high
income generated when compared to the exploration and mining of other natural resources1.

1

Venables, Anthony J., 2016 Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult? Journal of

Economic Perspectives. 30 (1): 161–184. doi:10.1257/jep.30.1.161

9

Nigeria is still a developing economy according to most modern economists, although a country
rich in different natural resources and human capital, the over-reliance on one particular source of
revenue to form the mainstay of the economy at the expense of generating wealth from a variety
of revenue source has plagued the nation with the resource curse, otherwise known as the paradox
of plenty. This refers to the paradox that; countries with an abundance of natural resources (such
as fossil fuels and certain minerals) tend to have less economic growth, lesser democratic
government, and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources2.
Over the years, the discovery and exploration of oil and gas in Nigeria have led to the decline in
government assistance and effort geared to boost agricultural activities. Successive governments
have continued to pay lip service to their willingness to boost the agricultural sector over the years,
and this has led to Nigeria becoming a major importer of agricultural goods that were being
exported from the country before the discovery of oil and gas. An example is a fact that Nigeria
remains the highest importer of rice and dairy products in Africa and the 3rd highest in the world
after China and the Philippines in 2017.3 Before 1960, rice was not imported into Nigeria rather
there was a stable production sufficient to meet the needs of the nation4. Unfortunately, this decline

2
3

Venables Supra note 1
Ademola Asunloye., 2019 https://businessday.ng/research-reports/article/nigeria-still-the-largest-rice-importing-

country-in-africa/
4

*The graph shows the trend of rice import in Nigeria since the commencement of commercial oil exploration in
Nigeria
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in productive agricultural activity has not been limited to rice production but has been observed to
be spread across all economic activity.

4

Sunday Brownson Akpan., 2015. Roles of Political and Economic Environments on Agricultural Commodity Import
This graph shows the shares of world oil reserves as at 2020 published by www.statista.com

Demand in Developing Economy: A Case Study of Rice Sub-Sector in Nigeria. International Journal of Economics
and Finance 7(12):84 DOI: 10.5539/ijef. v7n12p84
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The intense environmental degradation that characterizes all major oil extraction sites in the oilrich Niger-Delta region of Nigeria is also a validation of the resource curse theory. The majority
of the cities, towns, and villages close to oil and gas mining sites in Nigeria have been known to
suffer from periodic oil spillage, destruction of the forests and natural habitats of wild animals,
pollution of surrounding water bodies, gas flaring, acid rain and air pollution attributed to oil
mining activities, all of which open the host community to various health hazards, impact their
environmental condition, hampers commercial and agricultural activities, etc. In an environmental
assessment sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2011, it was
revealed that over 2,000,000 barrels of oil had been spilled in over 2,976 separate oil spills in
Ogoniland, Rivers State which is just a small fraction of the oil mining sites in Nigeria. The
assessment exposed the extensive oil pollution and severe health risks posed by continuous spillage
of crude oil to the residents5.
In 2010, the New York Times in its June 16 publication wrote that; “The Niger Delta, where the
wealth underground is out of all proportion with the poverty on the surface, has endured the
equivalent of the Exxon Valdez spill every year for 50 years by some estimates. The oil pours out
nearly every week, and some swamps are long since lifeless. Perhaps no place on earth has been
as battered by oil, experts say, leaving residents here astonished at the nonstop attention paid to
the gusher half a world away in the Gulf of Mexico…As many as 546 million gallons of oil spilled
into the Niger Delta over the last five decades, or nearly 11 million gallons a year, a team of

5

Friends of the Earth International., 2019. A journey through the oil spills of Ogoniland. Retrieved

https://www.foei.org/news/oil-spills-ogoniland-nigeria-shell
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experts for the Nigerian government and international and local environmental groups concluded
in a 2006 report...”6
Also, the huge earnings and lack of financial transparency have been linked to the high rate of
corruption and fiscal irresponsibility in the Nigerian government and this has, in turn, affected the
development of critical infrastructure and decay in existing public infrastructure. Also, the gradual
loss of value of the Naira in comparison to other currencies over the years has been linked to
corruption in government parastatals and fiscal irresponsibility which are all not unconnected to
the discovery and development of the oil and gas sector in Nigeria.7
The most significant negative effect of oil and gas mining in Nigeria which validates the resource
curse and forms the basis for this dissertation is the recurrent anomaly of gas flaring in Nigeria.
Gas flaring is a major source of air pollution, and it generates a significant amount of greenhouse
gases which contributes to the overall burden of global warming and ultimately climate change.
The problem of gas flaring in Nigeria and its overall global consequence would form the focus of
this dissertation.
The dissertation would also summarize the significant history of oil and gas exploration in Nigeria
while highlighting the major milestones of oil and gas mining development. A section of this
dissertation would be dedicated to the legal framework regulating Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.

6

Nossiter, A., 2010. Half a World from the Gulf, A Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old. The New York Times, [online]

section A page 1. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html> [Accessed 20
October 2020].
7

Solina Kennedy, M. B.-T., 2021. Nigeria`s Petroleum Industry Bill: A missed opportunity to prepare for the Zero-

carbon future. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 5.
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Also, a section of this dissertation would focus on the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. Nigeria is a signatory to this convention; therefore, this research would be
exploring ways by which the convention can be enforced to incentivize the Nigerian state to
regulate or completely stop gas flaring on its oil exploration sites. The Kyoto Protocol 8 and the
Paris agreement which are the accompanying treaties to the UNFCCC9 would be explored in detail
along with gas flaring management and its intersection with deforestation.
The final section of this dissertation would focus on possible efforts that can aid and encourage
the reduction in the volume of greenhouse gases that are flared during oil and gas extraction
activities in Nigeria.
1.2 General Discussion on Gas Flaring.
Oil has been used for thousands of years before the development of the combustion engine. In
areas where oil is found in shallow reservoirs, crude oil or gas seeps may naturally develop, and
some oil could be collected from seepage or tar ponds. Historically, there have been tales of eternal
fires which are now known to be locations where oil and gas escaped from the earth and ignited.

8

The Kyoto Protocol is an offshoot agreement that operationalizes the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change by committing industrialized countries and economies in transition to limit and reduce greenhouse
gases (GHG) emissions in accordance with agreed individual targets. It was adopted on 11 December 1997, and it
entered into force on 16 February 2005. Currently, there are 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
9

The United Nations Convention on climate change is a convention that entered into force on 21 March 1994. it has

197 countries as members that have ratified the Convention and are called Parties to the Convention. The main
objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations "at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic (human-induced) interference with the climate system." And preventing “dangerous” human
interference with the climate system is the sole aim of the UNFCCC It states that "such a level should be achieved
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."
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In 1859, “Colonel” Edwin Drake drilled the first successful oil well on a farm in northwestern
Pennsylvania and this led to the international development of the oil and gas industry10.
Today, oil and gas are produced on almost every continent, though the volume of production
differs as they range from the small 100 barrels per day private wells to the offshore 3000-meterdeep wells in large water bodies that produce up to 4000 barrels of oil per day accompanied by
huge gas release. In 2002 the World Bank estimated that 108 billion cubic meters of natural gas
are flared annually and that this was on the same level as consumption in France and Germany. It
also noted that gas flared in Africa is estimated to be around 37 billion cubic meters and can be
used to produce 200 Terawatt hours (TWh), which is about 50 percent of the current power
consumption of the African continent, and more than twice the level of power consumption in subSaharan Africa (excluding the Republic of South Africa). However, these estimates are
conservative and the current estimates for global gas11. A significant volume of gas produced with
crude oil is flared and Nigeria is the seventh-highest gas flaring nation in the world, with a daily
flare of about an 800million standard cubic feet12
Natural gas that comes from oil wells is typically termed “associated gas.” This gas can exist
separately from oil (free gas) or dissolved in crude oil (dissolved gas). Natural gas from gas and
condensate wells in which there is little or no crude oil is termed “non-associated gas.” Gas wells

10

Devold, H., 2013. Oil and Gas production handbook: An introduction to oil and gas production, transport, refining,

and petrochemical. Oslo: ABB Oil and Gas.
11

Nkem-Obi, A. A., 2021. Impact of gas flaring on communities in Delta region of Nigeria, narrative review part 1:

environmental health perspective. International Journal of Scientific Report, 186-193.
12

Id
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typically produce only raw natural gas. However, condensate wells produce free natural gas along
with semi-liquid hydrocarbon condensate. Whatever the source of the natural gas, once separated
from crude oil (if present), it commonly exists in mixtures with other hydrocarbons, principally
ethane, propane, butane, and pentanes. In addition, raw natural gas contains water vapor, hydrogen
sulfide (H2S), carbon dioxide, helium, nitrogen, and other compounds13.
In gravity separation, the good flow is fed into a horizontal vessel. The retention period is typically
five minutes, allowing gas to bubble out, water to settle at the bottom and oil to be taken out in the
middle. The pressure is often reduced in several stages (high-pressure separator, low-pressure
separator, etc.) to allow controlled separation of volatile components. A sudden pressure reduction
might allow flash vaporization leading to instability and safety hazards14.
The first method is to reinject the gas to the ground for future reuse which is the most
environmentally friendly method for separating crude oil from the associated gases.15 Fortunately,
re-injection helps effectively recover oil in oil wells and compensates for reduced production due
to reservoir depletion. The second method is the conversion of the natural gas content of the
associated gases for domestic and commercial use, which involves acquiring technological
infrastructures for the liquification process and transportation of the liquified natural gas 16. The

13

NaturalGas.org. 2013. Processing Natural Gas. [online] Available at: <http://naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processing-

ng/> [Accessed 19 August 2020].
14
15

Devold Supra note 8
Sadiq J.Z, M. K., 2019. Geothermal Well Test Analysis Fundamentals, Applications, and Advanced Techniques.

Academic Press.
16

Oil and Gas Business |petroleum Online. 2022. Oil & Gas Business | Petroleum. [online] Available at:

<https://ihrdc.com/e-learning-solutions/oil-and-gas-business/> [Accessed 16 September 2021].
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third which is more commonly used and referred to as the easiest method of separating associated
gases from crude oil is to flare the associated gases into the atmosphere. Under this third method,
a controlled system burns the gas or associated gas.17 This is what is known as gas flaring, and this
process takes place at the extreme of a flare stack18.
To put it simply, gas flaring is the practice of burning off natural gas when it is brought to the
surface in a place where there is no infrastructure to make use of it. It is the disposal of natural gas
or associated gas that comes with crude oil during oil exploitation and exploration activities. This
means that gas flaring is an operational waste of energy resources that encourages greenhouse gas
emissions in the petroleum sector.19
Although flaring is more common than venting, both activities routinely occur during oil and
natural gas development as part of drilling, production, gathering, processing, and transportation
operations. Flaring is the process of combusting natural gas and oxygen at the wellhead using a
dedicated flame, which converts methane (and other combustible gases) to carbon dioxide, water,
and heat. Combustible gases are flared most often due to emergency relief, overpressure, process
upsets, startups, shutdowns, and other operational safety reasons. Venting refers to the direct
release of natural gas into the atmosphere, to maintain safe conditions during the different phases
of the treatment process. According to the United States Department of Energy, technically,
venting is more harmful from a greenhouse gas perspective because the methane that is vented is

17

18

IHRDC Id
IOGP Publications library., 2022. Flaring and venting in the oil and gas exploration and production industry |

IOGP Publications library. [online] Available at: <https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/flaring-and-venting-inthe-oil-and-gas-exploration-and-production-industry/> [Accessed 10 November 2020].
19

Oil and gas producers Id
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a more potent greenhouse gas than the carbon dioxide that results from flaring20. It should be noted
that venting is less frequent in oil exploration fields when compared to flaring of gas which is a
constant activity in most oil and gas fields. Venting and flaring infrastructure vary by location and
typically gases are piped to a remote location, usually elevated structures, and released or burned
in an open flame in the open air using a specially designed burner tip, auxiliary fuel, steam, or air
system. Developed countries have however moved away from the practice of flaring and venting
due to the waste of resources it occasions and the provision of the requisite infrastructures required
to utilize the gas in situ. On the contrary, developing countries still have difficulties with the
provision of such infrastructures at the place of production coupled with the high costs of
transportation making flaring and venting a prevalent practice.
Over the past two decades and especially during the last five years, flaring has become more
common, with the rapid development of unconventional, tight oil and shale gas resources. As crude
oil production has outpaced the buildout of gathering and transportation infrastructure to move the
natural gas to market, gas associated with oil production, but that is undeliverable to a market, has
been increasingly vented or flared. This is a particular challenge in hydrocarbon gas liquids-rich
areas, and the economics of any given oil field situation can dictate that the more valuable oil
produced where gas delivery infrastructure is inadequate, the more the associated gas would be
flared.21

20

U.S Department of Energy., 2021. Flaring and Venting Reduction Research and Development Activities.

Washington D.C: United States Department of Energy.
21

Id
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To offer context to this paper, it is best to consider the definition or meaning of gas flaring. To
start with, gas flaring has been defined to mean a combustion device to burn associated, unwanted,
or excess gases and liquids released during normal or unplanned over-pressuring operations in
many industrial processes, such as oil-gas extraction, refineries, chemical plants, coal extraction,
and burning, and from landfills. Gas flaring is a significant source of greenhouse gases emissions.
Gas flaring has also been defined as the process through which associated natural gas is flared
during oil production when barriers to the development of gas markets and gas infrastructure
prevent it from being used. It is a practice in which the natural gas associated with petroleum
extraction is burned off in the atmosphere rather than being removed by alternative means such as
subterranean re-injection or confinement to storage tanks for eventual sale.
According to Eniscuola Energy and Environment, the term gas flaring indicates the combustion of
gas (without energy recovery) in an open flame that burns unceasingly at the top of flare stacks in
oil production sites . In much simpler terms, flaring mainly happens when gas is produced as a
byproduct of oil extraction. If there is no infrastructure to put this “associated gas” to productive
use, it is simply burned off.
From these definitions, it is discernable that gas flaring is a worrisome practice that results in the
waste of gas that could have been converted to more profitable uses. Also, toxic pollutants such as
sulfur dioxide are released into the air, with damning consequences on both the environment and
the health of humans. On top of that, revenue is lost to the practice.
According to World Bank reports, between 150 to 170 billion m3 of gases are flared or vented
annually, amounting to about $ 30.6 billion, which is equivalent to one-quarter of the United
States’ gas consumption or 30 % of the European Union’s gas consumption annually . In the same

19

vein, there are hotspot countries or regions where the level of flaring spikes high, thus contributing
much more to the global gas flaring emission. Nigeria falls under this category.
It has been argued that the problem of developing nations such as Nigeria is the absence of
resources and a substructure to revitalize such gases. Therefore, the option of gas flaring is favored.
As long as these countries possess limited financial resources to undertake gas flaring reduction
projects, there is no end in sight to the problem of gas flaring
1.2.1

Gas Flaring in Nigeria

The history of gas flaring in Nigeria is inextricably linked to the development of the Nigerian oil
and gas industry, particularly exploration and production. Precisely, exploration of oil and gas in
Nigeria began in 1908 with the very first discovery made in the Niger Delta Region in 1956. The
discovery was made by Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell) at Oloibiri village in
present-day Bayelsa State located in the Niger Delta.
It is worth noting that the British government is convinced of the prospects of oil exploration in
Nigeria had introduced the 1946 oil mineral ordinance22 which stated that:
“The entire property in and control of all mineral oils, on under or upon any lands in Nigeria, and
of all rivers, streams, and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in the crown.
Save in so far as such rights may, in any case, have been limited by any express grant made before
the commencement of the Act”
Gas flaring in Nigeria could be traced to the first efforts to prospect and find oil in Nigeria in 1906.
With the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in 1956 and the first-ever crude oil export from

22

Oil mineral ordinance. 1946 Legislated for the former British colony of Nigeria.
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Nigeria taking place in 1958, gas flaring also started officially in the country23 and has been on the
rise ever since. Asides from containing oil, the numerous delta region oil wells also contain large
quantities of natural gas. The reserves have been estimated at 1422 billion cubic meters. 24 Over
75% of the separated solution gases (mostly methane) from oil fields are burnt off. Even more, of
the 115 billion cubic meters of gas flared globally every year as previously highlighted, Nigeria
alone accounts for flaring about 23 billion cubic meters.25 When compared to the total according
to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the volume of U.S. natural gas that was
reported as vented and flared in 2019 reached the highest average annual level of 1.48 billion cubic
feet per day (Bcf/d) since 1961.26 Some other sources opine that Nigeria accounts for about 12.5
percent of the gases flared annually.
The 1946 Oil Mineral Ordinance was said to have completed a process begun by the 1914
Ordinance by presenting a situation whereby the Nigerian petroleum resources became British
owned, to be produced by British petroleum companies in the interest of British industry
Moving forward, natural gas emerged in Nigeria as a key energy resource during exploration for
crude oil. Gas reserves in Nigeria grew as the government gave incentives to increase the nation’s
oil reserve base. To be precise, the development of natural gas started in 1963 with the sale of gas
to industries around the gas fields in Ughelli and Aba. The volume of gas produced more than the

23

Osuoka, A A., 2005. Gas Flaring in Nigeria. A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic Monstrosity.

Amsterdam (Netherlands); Friends of the Earth International.
24

Odeyemi. O, O. A., 1985. Petroleum industry and its pollution potential in Nigeria. Oil and Petrochemical

pollution 2, 223-229.
25

Olukoya, S., 2008. Climate-Nigeria: Inefficient Gas Flaring Remains Unchecked. http://www.ipsnews.net/news.

(Accessed, 15 February 2009)
26

US department of energy supra note 18
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industry requirement was consequently flared. This was the genesis of the practice of gas flaring
in the country.
Oil companies have since then continued this trajectory of flaring large volumes of gas. So much
so that a company such as Agip, an Italian oil company had by 2002, flared gas continuously and
consistently for 30 years in Akaraolu, a small fishing village situated in the Niger Delta.
Interestingly, just as is the case in Akaraolu, most of the other gas flare sites in the country are
located in local communities where rural people live.
Another prime example is Rumuola, a community in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, where Shell
Company flares gas just about 300 meters from the nearest dwelling house. The preponderance of
evidence available suggests that gas flaring takes place primarily in the Niger Delta where all or
most of the flare sites in the country are situated27.
In the succeeding paragraphs, the existing legal regime that regulates gas flaring in the Nigerian
oil and gas industry would be exhaustively discussed.
Nigeria exemplifies a country engaged in the ‘race to the bottom’ theory to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI), especially in the oil and gas industry. It is argued that by having a weak
regulatory regime in the oil and gas sector, the Nigerian government is attracting FDI via the
instrumentality of the foreign oil multinational corporations (MNCs) that operate in the oil and gas
sector through investments in refineries, chemical plants, oil rigs, and landfills that permits gas
flaring with limited regulation and extremely low fines for environmental pollution that occurs
through the burning of flammable gas. Most of the gas flaring that occurs in Nigeria is linked to
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the burn-off that occurs when the extra gas escapes from associated gas in condensate wells during
oil drilling and other oil-related activities in the sector.28 In Nigeria, the extra cost of maintaining
expatriates and the need for private security personnel to protect the expatriates, indigenous staff
and the oil exploring facilities located in volatile riverine areas where the indigenous youths are
constantly trying to force the oil companies to pay them before any crude oil exploration has been
linked to the presumption gas flaring and oil spillage that would probably occur and this is seen as
a social waiver that permits the environmental pollution29 Today, over 115 billion cubic meters of
gas are flared or vented into the atmosphere annually.3031
According to a paper published by the Environmental Rights Action/ Friends of the Earth in
conjunction with the Climate Justice Programme, it is believed that roughly 2.5 billion cubic feet
of gas associated with crude oil is wasted in this way every day. This is equal to 40% of all Africa’s
natural gas consumption in 2001, and the annual financial loss to Nigeria is about US $2.5 billion.
The paper concludes that these flares have contributed more greenhouse gases than all of sub-
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Saharan Africa combined.32 According to the World Bank, Nigeria and six other countries
including the United States, Russia, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria produce have together
produced some 40 percent of the world’s oil each year, they have also accounted for roughly twothirds (65 percent) of global gas flaring33 and this shows a troubling trend which needs to be
addressed.
The necessary infrastructure needed to avoid gas flaring is summarized below to properly
contextualize why gas flaring is prevalent in the Nigerian oil and gas extraction industry.
1. Compressing natural gas and trucking it short distances for use as a fuel
Natural gas can be captured and compressed (CNG) at the Well-pad and trucked to a gas
processing plant or to a location where it is used as a fuel. This approach may be
economically feasible at wells relatively close to a processing plant or other location where
gas can enter the pipeline system (20 to 25 miles, or fewer). It may also be economically
feasible if the compressed gas can be used to power equipment within the producing field.34
2. Extracting natural gas liquids from the pre-flare gas stream
Natural gas liquids can be removed from associated gas using mobile equipment located at
the well pad and trucked away for sale. Such systems work best with associated or wet
natural gas streams, which are rich in gas liquids. Once separated, the remaining light
hydrocarbons— methane (C1), ethane (C2), and other volatile organics—or gas are
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otherwise flared. Commercial systems that can capture pentane (C5) and heavier
hydrocarbons (C5+) are simple and inexpensive, and only reduce flaring volumes by a
limited amount. Technologies that also capture propane (C3) and butane (C4) recover a
larger portion of the input gas and result in less flaring and do require a larger initial
investment. Higher rates of flare reduction can be achieved by coupling NGL recovery with
other technologies where the residual dry gas remaining can be captured and trucked offsite
as CNG or used for onsite power generation. This approach only makes economic sense in
niche situations where gas composition and nearby NGL market conditions align.35
3. Small-scale, gas-to-methanol, or gas-to-liquids conversion plants systems are available to
convert natural gas to chemicals or fuels and some of them have been marketed toward
flaring reduction. Some aspects of these systems have not been adapted, sized, or optimized
for application to U.S. flaring situations as evidenced by their lack of widespread
application. Novel combinations of existing technology elements must be conceived and
tested to prove technical and economic capabilities. Researchers will develop technologies
to upgrade flared gas into industrially relevant chemicals. There may also be an opportunity
to leverage solid oxide fuel cell technology research in combination with chemical
upgrading.36
4. Converting natural gas to electric power using small-scale generators: A variety of
technologies are available for local power generation, including the use of reciprocating
engines and gas turbines to generate electricity. Local load systems work best when using
lean associated gas (e.g., the residual gas after NGL recovery). To make economic sense,
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all these approaches require a constant nearby demand for electric power or the option of
selling power to the local grid.37
5. Utilizing gas that would otherwise be flared for beneficial use within the field Captured
natural gas can be used for onsite power generation, space heating, or for other purposes
through small-scale combined heat and power systems. The disparity between the volumes
of gas being flared and the volumes required for such end uses makes this solution unlikely
to be economic. While onsite technology solutions have been tested and found to work,
many have not been widely deployed, generally due to unfavorable economics when
compared to the alternative of flaring. The capital cost of installation (or the rental cost),
plus the costs of operation, currently do not appear to justify the widespread application of
these solutions.3839
6. Converting captured gas to liquefied natural gas and trucking it short distances for use as a
fuel Natural gas can also be liquefied and trucked to a location where it can be used as a
fuel. This may be appropriate when the gas does not require extensive conditioning
(cleaning and treating of gas). Small LNG plants can produce up to 100,000 gallons of
LNG daily which can then be transported to power plants and other markets. Gas-to-liquids
conversion systems are operating in some parts of the United States; however, these
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applications are not widely used within producing shale plays where the gas flaring
occurs.40
“The cost implication for the above methods can be seen in the scene at play in the article
published by Reuters on Nigeria`s gas flaring predicament “Although Nigeria’s Department
of Petroleum Resources (DPR) approved 200 bidders in February, it said in June, when the
sites should have been awarded, that the process was delayed by six weeks due to coronavirusrelated restrictions…….If this bidding round doesn’t succeed, that’s the end of it,” said `Gbite
Adeniji, a lawyer who helped design the programme as a technical advisor at Nigeria’s
Ministry of Petroleum, adding that roughly $3 billion is needed to commercialize the
remaining flares, with site costs ranging from $20 million to $100 million”41.
The reason for Nigeria’s significant role in gas flaring globally is not difficult to see. Like most
developing nations that double as oil and gas producing nations, the inadequate infrastructure to
collect, treat, transport, and utilize the associated gases, as well as the location of the production
site being remote from the market demand (such as offshore sites), makes gas flaring the viable
option for a country such as Nigeria42. To put it simply, the wastage of gases through flaring is
carried out in Nigeria due to the infrastructure deficit associated with processing, storing, and
transporting.

40

Id

41

George, L., 2020, Nigeria's pioneering gas flaring plan risks going down in flames. Retrieved from Thomson

Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-oil-gasflaring-insight/nigerias-pioneering-gas-flaring-plan-risksgoing-down-in-flames-idUSKBN26L195
42

Soltanieh, M., Zohrabian, A., Gholipour, M. and Kalnay, E., 2016. A review of global gas flaring and venting and

impact on the environment: Case study of Iran. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 49, pp.488-509.

27

Although the gas flared can be converted into several downstream applications including
electricity which is a major bottleneck in Nigeria or cooking gas which is beginning to overtake
kerosene and coal in terms of domestic or household application, oil and gas companies instead
flare the gases owing to the inadequate resources for the conversion and utilization of gases43.
Technological deployment necessary for capturing flared and vented gases varies across producing
regions and some solutions currently exist to capture gas that would otherwise be flared. This
technology can convert it into useful products or for onsite use to facilitate the production of other
petroleum products. While there are commercially available technologies for capturing and
monetizing flared gas, these options are not yet employed in Nigeria due to the current market
conditions which have failed to provide a viable economic alternative to the cheap cost of flaring
and venting during routine field production. Commercial alternatives to flaring include
compressing the natural gas and trucking it short distances for use as a fuel for oilfield activities,
extracting natural gas liquids from the flare gas stream to reduce the flared volume, and converting
the gas to electricity using small-scale generators, among others. Presently Nigeria has the Nigeria
Liquefied Natural Gas company which is involved in the production of and distribution of
domestic liquified gas but unfortunately, produces at a cost that is too low for other companies to
compete commercially. While concentrated infrastructure and technologies exist to capture and
monetize natural gas at various petroleum refineries and chemical plants, a distributed network of
technologies and infrastructure are needed to effectively reduce daily venting and flaring
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marketable volumes in oil mining fields and on the sea. These distributed technology alternatives
to reduce flared volumes are often not currently cost-competitive44.
1.2.2

Impact of Gas Flaring in Nigeria

As noted earlier, gas flaring involves the combustion of associated gas generated during various
processes including oil and gas recovery, coalbed methane production, petrochemical process, and
landfill gas extraction; all of which leave lasting negative impacts on the environment. The
implications of this infamous act range from air pollution to climate change occasioned by
greenhouse emissions, health complications for inhabitants, acid rain, and water pollution,
amongst others. A common feature of the above-listed is the adverse effect on both humans,
animals, and the environment. Being a practice that is widespread throughout the Niger Delta,
including areas close to the local population, the identified consequences are unsurprising and can
only be the direct outcomes of such damaging practice. In effect, gas flaring does not only pose a
revenue loss for the Federal Government of Nigeria, but it is also a major contributor to social,
medical, and environmental degradation.
The categories of each impact will be examined in the ensuing paragraphs.
a) Air Quality
With the release of noxious fumes into the atmosphere during the flaring process, gas flaring has
become a major source of air pollution, especially in the Niger Delta region and the other flare
sites across the country. The local effect of this pollution is hardly mentioned, rather, the effect of
gas flaring on climate change seems to be the only effect that is emphasized, and thus limited
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studies are done in this direction in the region. Specifically, the environment is polluted by sulfur
oxides and carbon dioxide which are released at levels that oftentimes exceed both national and
international guidelines. Apart from compromising the quality of the atmosphere, most of the air
pollution in the region is observed to have local and regional effects such as the formation of acid
rain, water pollution, soil pollution, impacts on plants and wildlife, effects on materials and
artifacts and recently contributing to the global warming effects. In a study carried out in the NigerDelta region of Nigeria by Obia, Ajah Ekpeni et.al, on the “role of Sulphur dioxide and gas flare
particulates on the corrosion of galvanized iron roof sheets in the south-south region of Nigeria”,
it was discovered that gas flaring that yields Sulphur dioxide that mixes with an aerosol of other
pollutants in the atmosphere and these pollutant mixtures are mostly responsible for galvanized
iron roof corrosion in the region and it, therefore, would have a long-lasting effect on the health
condition of the citizenry in the region.45
b) Emission of Greenhouse Gases/Climate Change
Aside from the immediate challenge of air pollution, there is also the long-term problem of climate
change accelerated by the greenhouse (GHG) emissions caused by the gas flaring process. The
gases released contain methane (CH4) with ethane as well as carbon dioxide are considered the
principal greenhouse gases. Together, they contribute about 80% to global warming today.46
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An estimated 35 million tons of carbon dioxide and 12 million tons of methane are released into
the environment in the Niger Delta47.
Asides from these major elements, gas flaring also releases about 250 other toxins inclusive of
carcinogens such as benzopyrene, benzene, carbon disulfide (CS2), and carbonyl sulfide (COS);
metals like mercury, arsenic, and chromium; sour gas with hydrogen sulfide H2S and sulfur dioxide
(SO2); as well as nitrogen oxides (NOx)48
These gases are known to have increased the average global temperature by about 0.5 degrees
centigrade in the last 100 years.49 The impact of this has been felt in the increased flooding in cities
along Nigeria’s coastal lines with Lagos being the most severely hit in recent years, as well as
rising sea levels and tidal waves in the country. This impact would be the focus of this study and
would be looked.
c) Acid Rain
Progressively, another impact of gas flaring is acid rain or precipitation which is a term used to
describe overly acidic precipitation of all kinds - sleet, frost, dew, mist, and fog - as well as dry
particles that fall to the earth and form acids when they come in contact with moisture. 50. While
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acid rain can be a natural phenomenon, the primary cause is human.

51

. This perhaps validates

claims made by the Friends of the Earth (FOE) when they linked acid rains to gas flaring activities.
This is because the primary causes of acid rain are emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen
oxides (NO) which combine with atmospheric moisture for the formation of sulfuric acid and nitric
acid, respectively.

52

From being toxic to the human body to condemning the water body and

making it unfit for use, to increasing the pH levels of the soil and environment, it is clear that acid
rain is a danger to both humans and the environment.
Driving the point closer home, the concentration of acid in rainwater appears to be higher in the
Niger Delta region in Nigeria and begins to decrease further away from the region. 53 This is due
to the high volume of gas flaring carried out in this region combined with the presence of crude
oil and gas reserves. Studies on the impacts of gas flaring on rainwater quality for domestic use in
certain Niger Delta states revealed that the temperature, taste, color, conductivity, total dissolved,
salts, and alkalinity were altered when compared to the permissible limits specified by National
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control and other related agencies.54
d) Vegetation
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Closely related to the impact of gas flaring on the water is its impact on vegetation. It has been
submitted that gas flaring tends to affect several plants species55, especially their productivity and
growth.56 The impact weighs more on food crops necessary for the survival of the residents of
indigenous people resident in the surrounding towns and villages. By way of illustration, it has
been discovered that gas flaring decreases the length and weight of cassava.57 Based on a survey
study in the Niger Delta region, 77% of the residents believe that gas flaring affects vegetation and
agricultural activities.58 This is substantiated by studies that reveal that gas flaring affects the
nutritional and bioactive components of vegetation, such as vegetables and similar consumables
such as the bitter leaf, waterleaf, scent leaf, fluted pumpkin leaf, etc.59
e) Health Risks
Gas flaring has also been linked to health complications for the population exposed to gas flaring
sites. According to a preliminary survey carried out by Akoroda60, there has been an emergent
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trend of carcinogenic diseases in the Niger Delta, traceable to the exposure of these people to the
radioactive elements of gas flaring.
Properties of gas flaring such as carbon dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide benzene, xylene,
toluene, and carcinogen compounds (dioxin and benzopyrene) have been linked with leukemia,
chronic bronchitis, asthma as well as infertility. Even more, bone marrow damage, anemia, severe
nervous system damage, kidney and lungs damage, memory loss, vision, and hearing disabilities
are some of the health complications associated with prolonged and sustained exposure to gas
flaring.61
f)

Economy

Finally, gas flaring in Nigeria is not without economic implications. According to a report by PWC
Nigeria, the Nigerian economy lost NGN233 billion (US$761.6 million) to gas flaring in 2018
alone. This figure translates to 3.8% of the total global cost of US$20billion in the same year.62
Statistics from the Africa Energy Portal are even grimmer. While the organization asserts that the
country is currently losing over $2.5billion per annum (N954 trillion) because of severe gas flaring
from 178 flare sites nationwide, these statistics are expected to hit $9 trillion in the next 10 years.63
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The country loses substantial funds which could have been injected into the economy to gas flaring
every year and there seems to be no end in sight to this financial rut.
1.3 Literature Review on Gas Flaring in Nigeria
The Nigerian oil and gas industry, being a major sector of the economy has been the subject of
numerous debates and scholarly discussions amongst economists and environmentalists, which
has created several reactions that have impacted other dependent sectors in the economy.
Environmentalists seem to be at the front of this discourse - decrying the harmful impact of gas
flaring, not only on humans but also on the environment. Scholars such as Farina argue that gas
flaring is among the most challenging and critical environmental and climatic issues the world has
had to grapple with in recent times64, even more in Nigeria. Some of the existing literature on gas
flaring is considered in the succeeding paragraphs.
Gas flaring has adverse effects on health, properties, and the economy
The emissions of air pollutants as by-products of gas flaring in the Niger Delta, for instance, at
high concentrations of fine particulate matter cause respiratory problems, cerebrovascular disease,
ischemic heart disease, and lung cancer.
It is important to note that most of the comprehensive studies conducted in different parts of the
world have entailed monitoring air pollution levels and the health of inhabitants over considerable
periods. Though no large-scale comprehensive research on the impact of air pollution on health
has been carried out in the Niger Delta, however, several short-term studies have been carried out
in the Niger Delta, where it was discovered that there is a relationship between air pollutants from
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gas flaring and associated human health problems. It was found that there are higher chances of
residents who live close to gas flaring sites developing respiratory diseases, eye, and skin irritation
over time in areas with long gas glaring history when compared to areas with no gas flaring.
Various researchers such as Anslem O. Ajugwo, in his article titled “Negative Effects of Gas
Flaring: The Nigerian Experience”65, have established the direct negative effects of gas flaring on
the environment and human health including contamination of the atmosphere and deformities in
children. But what about the indirect risks—deforestation being a major one—which are already
at play, and whose larger-scale effects are not only prevalent in the Niger Delta region.
Further on deforestation, about 95 percent of Mubi’s population depends on fuel sourced from
forests in the form of firewood for cooking (typically for use by bakeries, rice processing outlets,
as well as eateries, and/or restaurants). This is so because most people get this fuel either for free
or at a very low price, leading to hundreds of trees going down every month. Now, this happens
not just in Mubi, but virtually everywhere in Nigeria. In other words, forests in Nigeria are
continuously pushed to the brink of extinction even though the country is blessed with an abundant
gas deposit that is, however, wasted. This fiasco is hardly ever spoken about, and it often leaves
hanging the question, “what if the gas being wasted was refined and converted into cooking gas
set at a price so low that ordinary Nigerians would only have to worry about buying a gas
cylinder?”
Some literature on gas flaring also referenced the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). The objective of
the foregoing principle is to compel the polluter to internalize environmental externalities from
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economic activities.66 According to (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011)67 in the article
“Evaluation of The Commodification of Ecosystem Services”, the principle states that the
economic agent causing environmental damage should bear the economic costs of the negative
externality. In Nigeria, the natural gas flaring penalty and the carbon tax have been identified as
the vehicle for operating the PPP in the country. Both the flaring penalty and the carbon tax have
been grossly inefficient in tackling the gas flaring in the country and stimulating the required
technological innovation.
Corruption at nearly all tiers of the Nigerian government also seems to contribute to this
inefficiency. Fredriksson and Sevesson have shown in their paper, “Political Instability,
Corruption and Policy Formation: The Case of Environmental Policy”, that a higher corruption
level in an economy inhibits the effectiveness of environmental regulations. 68 Linking government
efficiency with environmental quality, Sanglimsuwan has posited that government efficiency
affects the quality of the environment because it enhances the effectiveness of policies
implementation.69 Sundstrom in his article, “Corruption in the Commons: Why Bribery Hampers
Enforcement of Environmental Regulations in South Africa Fisheries” in fact posited that the
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curbing of corruption increases the performance of environmental regulations in natural resources
management which also extends to the context of gas flaring. 70
More so, Evans and Farina in their paper, “The Age of Gas & The Power of Networks” have also
highlighted the need for Nigeria to have a large technological investment program to be able to
optimize its natural gas resource and induce growth because technology is important for the
expansion of the natural gas market.71 Indeed, different researchers have concluded that in most
industrialized oil-producing nations such as Norway, companies that extract petroleum products
process the natural gas or re-inject the same into the field, and only 1% of the gas is flared. This is
unlike Nigeria where over 60% of the associated gas is flared.72 With more demand for natural gas
in the country and the availability of the required technology to capture and utilize the gas,
companies would be more predisposed towards gas utilization instead of flaring it.
Beyond the technology, it has also been argued that carbon pricing can catalyze natural gas flaring
abatement. Speaking on how to facilitate this, Stepp and Atkinson have submitted that the carbon
pricing regime must be multilayered, predictable, and transparent.73 On the other hand, there has
also been agitation from multinational companies on why strict (unreasonably high) environmental
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penalties are often ineffective if there are institutional constraints, such as subsidies on competing
energy sources in developing outlets for associated natural gas.
Bringing it home, Odionu74 in his thesis titled “Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Gas
Flaring in Nigeria: Perspectives on Law and Regulation” asserted that while Nigeria has
demonstrated its commitment toward climate change mitigation by signing the Paris Agreement,
Nigeria is yet to enact any law on climate change that could also impact the flaring of natural gas.
Oluduro75 in his article, “The Legal Implications of Gas Flaring on Climate Change in Nigeria”
he has argued that the extant environmental laws and constitutional provisions on environmental
protection, relating to climate change in Nigeria are inadequate, especially in comparison with
countries such as Ecuador, Dominican Republic, and Bolivia.
Notwithstanding the known fact that gas flaring in Nigeria is a long-standing problem that has
defied government regulatory orders, the above-cited literary works have examined the economic
implications of gas flaring and the onus on the government to find a way to curb it by all legal and
harmless means possible. Gas flaring is a menace that must be addressed, its impact on climate
change and humans is a cause for concern. While gas flaring might have been permissible decades
ago owing to the level of technology available at the time, today, there ought to be no tolerance
for gas flaring based on the sophistication of the technology to capture and utilize gas available
today, hence what is lacking is not the know-how but the political will and effort by political and
industry leaders.
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Also on solution lines, as will be fleshed out in the course of the work, a key policy available for
Nigeria to mitigate natural gas flaring is carbon pricing. This is because carbon pricing can
stimulate technological innovation and natural gas flaring abatement. It has been shown that
carbon pricing and innovation have a positive effect on productivity. This is because carbon pricing
has been proven to drive innovation in technologies and business models promoting resource
efficiency and productivity growth. The required condition for these to occur is that the carbon
pricing regime must be multilayered, predictable, and transparent. Specifically, a significantly
higher CO2 emission tax compared to Pigouvian levels could act as the catalyst for the
development of emission reduction technologies76. Stepp and Atkinson also described carbon tax
as a straightforward method of increasing productivity, innovation, and economic growth.
If nothing, the visible impact of gas flaring on the water body, the vegetation and agricultural life,
the atmospheric condition as well as the health of people resident in the Niger Delta where gas
flaring is most practiced since the region hosts the country’s crude oil and natural gas reserves
should be enough to spur and drive key players in the Nigeria oil and gas industry to begin to
become intolerant of gas flaring in the country.
The foregoing concerns have often soiled the relationship between oil and gas host communities
in Nigeria. Thankfully the Petroleum Industry Act 2021 (PIA)77 has taken steps to address this
problem by creating the Host Community Development Trust Fund (the “HCDTF”) whose
purpose will be to among others, foster sustainable prosperity, provide social and economic
benefits from petroleum to host communities and nurture pleasant co-existence between licensees
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or lessees, and host communities. Specifically, the law stipulates that existing host community
projects must be transferred to the HCDTF, and each settler must make an annual contribution of
an amount equal to 3 percent of its operating expenditure for the relevant operations from the
previous year. In addition, the PIA stipulates a penalty for failure to comply with host community
obligations, including revocation of license. Further, a licensee or lessee shall be liable to pay a
penalty prescribed according to the Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations78
and it is interesting to note that the Commission shall have the right to take free of charge, natural
gas that is destined for flaring at the flare stack.79 The consequence of the above provisions of the
PIA is that the legislature is desirous of eliminating gas flaring as a concept that has been a major
source of concern to the environment.80 The above effects of gas flaring on the Nigerian citizens
and the lackluster effort to tackle this menace by the government of Nigeria have propelled this
research, using the United Nations mechanisms to address climate change and recommending
measures that can be put in place from a policy and legal standpoint.
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CHAPTER 2
2.0 The Legal and Regulatory Framework of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry
While oil exploration and prospecting can be traced as far back as the early 1900s, with prospecting
activities of Shell BP in Northern Nigeria, the discovery of oil in commercial quantity was made
in 1956 near Oloibiri Village in Rivers State. The discovery is credited to Shell D’Arcy, an English
oil company that was granted the first concession for the exploration and mining of oil in Nigeria.
Production followed in just two years after discovery, with the company recording an average
production of 6000 barrels of oil per day (Bopd).
Presently in Nigeria, the Federal government owns and retains the ownership of all mineral
resources situated on land and water bodies, while the land use act vests ownership of lands in
urban areas to the State government to hold in trust for the citizens of each state and the lands in
rural areas are held in trust by the Local government for the indigenous people of each local
government. Meanwhile, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria81, the Land Use Act,82
and the Petroleum Act83, amongst others, vest the total ownership and control of mineral resources
in the Federal government, to the detriment of the States, Local Governments, and the local
communities wherein the mineral resources are situated.
On the 29th of March 1978, the Land Use Act was enacted to have effect over all the 923,768
sq/km of land that makes up Nigeria. Before the enactment, there were varying land laws that
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governed land tenure systems in different parts of Nigeria. These laws were not uniform and varied
depending on the region and prevailing customs of the different ethnic tribes, despite the existence
of the varying laws, the problems of land tenure were prevalent in every region of the nation. One
major problem was the difficulty in obtaining land by the government in major urban centers for
national development because of land speculations, racketeering, and the high cost of
compensation usually demanded by the landowners whenever the government acquired land to
execute its projects. Consequently, the Federal Government made the move to unify the land tenure
system that would be applicable throughout the nation, streamline and simplify ownership of land
in Nigeria, and set up the Land Use Panel in 1977 with certain terms of reference. The references
were considered and adopted by the government which promulgated the Land Use Act of 197884
In the decades to follow, Nigeria’s oil and gas industry would overtake traditional industries like
agriculture and tourism to become the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. Successive Nigerian
governments have become heavily dependent on the sector for funding the country’s budget and
sadly, the frivolous living of government officials. As of September 2020, over 90 percent of
Nigeria's export value was generated by the mineral fuels, oils, and distillation products sector,
accounting for approximately 58 billion U.S. dollars. The sector also contributed to about nine
percent of the country’s GDP85

84

Opafunso Z.O., 2015. Effects of the 1978 Land Use Act on Sustainable Mining and Petroleum Industries in

Nigeria. Arts Social Sciences Journal, 106.
85

Varrela, S., 2020. Statistica. Retrieved from Statistica.com:

Statista. 2021. Nigeria: contribution oil sector to GDP 2018-2021 | Statista. [online] Available at:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1165865/contribution-of-oil-sector-to-gdp-innigeria/#:~:text=Nigeria's%20oil%20sector%20contributes%20to,the%20same%20period%20of%202019

43

With the role that the petroleum industry plays in Nigeria’s economy and overall existence, it is
not hard to see why the sector is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the country. To be
precise, Nigeria operates a command-and-control regulatory framework in the oil and gas sector86.
Through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Nigerian government is directly
involved both in the upstream and downstream sectors of the country’s oil and gas industry while
regulation is carried out through the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.
This paper will examine the antecedents of the numerous developments in the Nigerian oil and gas
industry, ranging from the legal framework to the policy documents, and the ultimate impact on
gas flaring within the region. As mentioned earlier, Nigeria is replete with a plethora of laws and
regulations governing its major income stream – the oil and gas industry, this section will more
particularly consider the functionality or otherwise of these laws in curbing environmental
degradation, the level of compliance with the regulations, and the resulting impact on the
environment.
In maintaining control over the petroleum industry as well as creating an atmosphere void of sharp
practices, Nigeria has developed an extensive legal and regulatory framework for the industry.
Various laws currently regulate different areas and sectors of the oil and gas industry. The
remainder of this section explains the laws and policies that make up Nigeria’s legal and regulatory
framework. A few important observations can be drawn from this analysis, including the new
Petroleum Industry Act 2021 which repealed several laws in the oil sector and provided a legal,
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governance, regulatory and fiscal framework for the Nigerian petroleum industry, and the
development of host communities.
•

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 199987 – Ownership of Natural
Resources

The Nigerian Constitution is considered the country’s grundnorm88 and is the principal legislation
from which other legislations derive their validity. The constitution contains provisions that laid
the foundation upon which the entire superstructure of the Nigerian oil and gas industry is built.
Importantly, the Constitution vests the total ownership and control of mineral resources, including
oil and gas deposits, in the federal government. Section 44 (3)66 provides that:
“Notwithstanding the foregoing provision of this section, the entire property in and
control of all minerals, mineral oils, and natural gas in, under, or upon any land in
Nigeria or in, under, or upon territorial waters and the Economic Zone of Nigeria
shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.”
Further, the Constitution provides that mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining,
geological surveys, and natural gas are the exclusive preserve of the federal government of Nigeria
Many have asserted that the plausible argument that can be advanced in support of the Federal
Government’s ownership of the country’s natural resources, inclusive of the nation’s oil and gas
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deposits, is that these resources should be viewed as public goods and the government’s
intervention in their exploitation amounts to a case of public use.89 To put it differently, the federal
government is to manage and hold the mineral resources in trust and on behalf of the Nigerian
people.
To further strengthen this position, the Exclusive list or schedule of exclusive powers in the
Constitution allows all matters relating to the regulation and management of the oil and gas
industry exclusively to the Federal Government90. Some of these matters include export duties,
mines, and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geographical surveys, and natural gas),
incorporation and regulation of corporate bodies, and taxation of profits, capital gains, and
incomes.
It is noteworthy that Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
together with the thought that it expresses is replicated in several other legislation such as the
Exclusive Economic Zone Act (Act, {200491}), the Minerals and Mining Act92, and importantly,
the Land Use Act. Ako posits that due to the unique impacts of the Land Use Act on the inhabitants
of the Niger Delta (especially in the expropriation of land by the government), the Act was the
final jigsaw that confirmed the totality of the federal government’s ownership of mineral resources
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in Nigeria93. On the other hand, Ayodele- Akaakar contends that with the enactment of the
Offshore Oil Revenue Decree in 197194, the totality of the Federal Government’s ownership and
control of mineral resources in Nigeria was confirmed. Herein, the Offshore and Oil Decree Act
abrogated the ownership rights of the states over mineral resources in their extant continental
shelves, title to territorial waters, and revenue (rents) accruing from the petroleum or oil and gas
operations in such states.95 Under this law, ownership and control of mineral resources were now
vested in the Federal Government.
Thus, the Nigerian Government as the owner of the mines and natural resources contracts
exploration rights to various stakeholders under the established licensing regimes, while reaping
enormous revenues through royalties and taxes. Under Section 2(1) of the Act, only Nigerian
citizens or companies incorporated in Nigeria can validly partake in the oil and gas industry. Such
participatory activities include oil exploration, drilling, production, storage, refining, and
transportation.80 Under Section 2 of the Act, companies can be granted various rights including
oil exploration licenses to explore for petroleum, a prospecting license, and an oil mining lease.
Arguably, the provisions of the Constitution vesting exclusive ownership on the Federal
Government have been used by the Federal Government to milk the Niger Delta of its wealth.
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Access to oil revenue by states and communities in Nigeria has been one of the triggers of the
unending conflicts in the Niger Delta.
•

The Petroleum Act – Governance of the Industry

Principally, the focus of the Petroleum Act96 is the governance of petroleum matters in Nigeria, its
territorial waters, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Iloba-Aninye). The preamble of the
Act gives an insight into the purpose of the Act when it provided that the Petroleum Act is:
“An Act to provide for the exploration of petroleum from the territorial waters and
the continental shelf of Nigeria, and to vest the ownership of, and all offshore and
onshore revenue from petroleum resources derivable therefrom in the Federal
Government”97.
The Petroleum Act is the principal legislation as far as issues relating to petroleum exploration and
production in Nigeria are concerned. Its provisions cover issues such as oil exploration,
prospecting and mining licenses, the establishment of petroleum refineries, control of petroleum
products, offenses in connection with the marketing of petroleum products, rights of pre-emption,
and price control. It appears that the main thrust of the Act is on the downstream sector of the
petroleum industry. Hence, it dwells on such issues as oil exploration and production, refineries
and their establishment, and the powers of the Honorable Minister of Petroleum in that respect. As
mentioned earlier, the Act is principally focused on the exploration and ownership of petroleum in
the country. It, therefore, made little to no provision for the regulation of gas flaring in Nigeria.
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The Act is structured into 2 parts which are the principal provisions and the schedules. Whilst the
first part deals with all issues relating to ownership and power of assignment of oil exploration
rights and licenses, the schedules contain the laid down procedures for oil exploration licenses. oil
prospecting licenses, oil mining leases and their respective assignments, terminations, revocations
and fees, rents, and royalties.
Providing on the powers of the Minister of Petroleum98, Section 2 (1) (a)-(c) of the Act provides
that the Oil exploration license, Oil prospecting license, and Oil mining lease may be granted by
the Minister subject to the Act. Section 2(2) established a strict framework through which licenses
can be granted, which is to the effect that a license can only be given to a company registered under
the Companies and Allied Matters Act99.
The major feature of the Act is the mode of control exercised over the sector by the Minister of
Petroleum Resources. Some of the powers of the Minister include the right to grant and revoke the
license, as previously highlighted, as well as the power to make regulations, amongst others.100
It is argued on many fronts that these powers have been abused and have also been subject to
litigation in a wide array of cases101).
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The Nigerian courts have also given judicial support to this Act. In the Supreme Court case of
NNPC & Attorney General of the Federation v. FAMFA Oil Ltd 102[2012], the court held that the
Nigerian government must adhere to the process enshrined in the Petroleum Act and the
Constitution when exercising its right to participate in any oil block or well in the oil and gas
industry.
Moving forward, one of the major weaknesses of the Petroleum Act and the procedures it lays
down on licensing and other regulatory measures is the susceptibility of these processes to corrupt
practices. This is attributable to the absence of consultation as well as poor regulation in the
allocation process, an ill that greatly characterized the Nigerian military era. Allocation of oil
licenses and blocks should be more competitive and transparent by allowing the government to
advertise the available blocks, the selection standards, and the number of different bids received
including the selection criteria.
Another significant problem with the Petroleum Act is that it fails to address the environmental
effect of petroleum exploratory activities. Most of the regulations are concerned with the safety of
the personnel working in the oil wells and the safety precautions to be observed during oil
exploration activities, which speak to the issue of gas flaring or its impact on the environment.
This may not be unconnected to the fact that at the time the Act was enacted which was shortly
after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the major focus of the government was revenue
generation and financial rewards with no consideration for the resulting environmental and health
impact.
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•

Oil Pipeline Act – Licensing for Oil Pipelines / Environmental Concerns

Another important legislation within the legal framework for the oil and gas industry in
Nigeria is the Oil Pipeline Act.103 The long title of the Act provides that the Act is to make
provision for licenses to be granted for the establishment and maintenance of pipelines
incidental and supplementary to oilfields and oil mining and purposes ancillary to such
pipelines.
Section 4 (1) of the Act made provisions for the grant of a permit to survey routes for an oil pipeline
that would be used for the transportation of mineral oil, natural gas, and other related products.
Therefore, this Act logically applies to the pipeline necessary for the transportation of natural gas
from oil fields and mining sites but realistically, the application of this Act has been predominantly
focused on the pipeline of crude oil and its liquid refined product.
The Section explicitly provides:
“Any person may make an application to the Minister in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and of any regulations made thereunder for the grant of a
permit to survey the route for an oil pipeline for the transport of mineral oil, natural
gas, or any product of such oil or such gas to any point of destination to which such
person requires such oil, gas or product to be transported for any purpose
connected with petroleum trade or operations.”104
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Although not expressly stated, the Act has as part of its set goals the protection of the environment.
Principally, the holder of a permit to survey is expected to take all reasonable steps to avoid damage
to any land entered upon. Where there is any damage done, the holder is expected to compensate
the owner, the objection can be made by any person whose land or interest in land may be
injuriously affected by the grant of a license but, where a licensee is granted, the holder is expected
to pay compensation to any person whose land or interest in land has been injuriously affected or
any person suffering damage because of or as a consequence of the holder's negligence to make
good damage. Additionally, the Act prohibits the “alteration in the flow of water in a navigable
waterway, or the construction of works, in, under or over any navigable waterway that might
obstruct or interfere with the free arid safe passage of vessels, canoes or other craft”, by an oil
pipeline licensee. In addition, a licensee is also prohibited from making “any construction in,
under or over, or depositing materials in or altering the flow of water required for domestic,
industrial or irrigational use, thereby diminishing or restricting the quantity of water available
for these purposes or constructing works or making deposits in any waterways that would cause
flooding or erosion without the prior permission in writing of the Minister”.
Importantly, the Act in Section 17(4) expressly provides that “every license shall be subject to the
provisions contained in this Act as in force at the date of its grant and to such regulations
concerning public safety, the avoidance of interference with works of public utility in, over and
under the land included in the license and the prevention of pollution of such land or any waters
as may from time to time be force”. Also, the Act contains provisions that grant access to
government officials to carry out routine inspections and ensure that licensees carry out their
activities in strict compliance with the license requirements, most of which are largely about
environmental protection, particularly land and waters.
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Despite containing forward and progressive provisions, the main failure of the Oil Pipeline Act is
that it fails to make restoration of land upon which compensation is paid compulsory105. While
Section 21 of the Act provides for compensation to be paid to families and communities adversely
affected by the activities of a licensee, this approach fails to provide a clear guide as to how this
compensation received would be applied to restoring the land as well. The standard of living as
well as the level of education in local communities where licensees base their operation makes it
such that the restoration of land from the harm done to it is the least of the concern of the
communities or landowners when they eventually receive compensation.
More so, the Act in restricting its environmental control policies and provisions to lands and waters
made no express provision for transmission of oil and gas through pipelines on the air quality of
the environment or gas flaring. However, one must consider the possible outcomes of oil pipelines
which include explosion and fire disaster which affects not just the offenders but also innocent
third parties through the negative impact on the air quality. Indeed, the Act places the duty to
construct, maintain and operate pipelines on the licensee106 with no duty on the licensees to monitor
and protect their pipelines from damages by any third party; or being held strictly liable in the case
of any resulting damage or pollution arising from any act of a third party. This method rarely avails
victims of oil pollution in Nigeria because of the defense of sabotage which the Act defined as
willful damage caused by a third party. This is in addition to the paucity of fines awarded against
the oil companies by the Nigerian courts to protect the economic base of the nation – the petroleum
industry.
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Nigeria could learn from the success of the US Oil Pollution Act 1990 (USOPA)107, being an Act
aimed at establishing liability for damages resulting from oil pollution and also establishing a fund
for the payment of compensation for such damages and other related purposes.108 The USOPA,
although targeted at pollution from tankers, not pipelines, has been successful in reducing oil spill
incidents arising from tankers and vessels because it incorporated not only preventive measures, it
also established research bodies on pollution activities, incorporated preparedness, emergency, and
response plans; and strict liability regimes for payment of compensation of those who were not
only exposed to oil pollution but who would potentially suffer its impact.109
•

Petroleum Profit Tax Act – Tax Regime of the Industry

This is the main Act regulating the taxation of the oil and gas industry. While other Acts are
relevant in the tax regime of the petroleum industry such as the Company Income Tax Act (CITA)
LFN 2004110, the Education Tax Act LFN 2004111 and the Value Added Tax (VAT) LFN 2004,112
the Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA) LFN 2004113 is the cornerstone upon which the tax regime
of the petroleum industry is built.
Some of the methods through which the Nigerian government generates revenue under the regime
of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act include Direct Tax on the profits of Oil Companies; Signature
Bonuses; Rents paid in respect of concessions and grants made to oil companies under the
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Petroleum Act; Premiums; Revenue from Royalties; Bank Charges; and Fees charged and paid in
connection with the application, grant, and assignment of Oil Exploration and OPLs, OMLs,
Permits to Survey the route of proposed oil pipelines, Production Sharing, and Service
Agreements, and Marginal fields allocations.
It is worth mentioning that to determine a company’s profit in a fiscal year under the PPTA regime,
the assessment must be carried out 12 calendar months beginning on 1st January and terminating
on 31st December of the same year. Under the Petroleum Profit Tax Act, every company engaged
in petroleum operations is required by section 281 to “make up accounts of its profits and losses
arising from those operations,” for each accounting period. Under section 31(1), it is stipulated
that not later than two months after the commencement of each accounting period of a company,
the company shall deliver to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (in the form prescribed by the
FIRS) the company's estimated tax for the period. In addition, Section 35(1) of the Act authorizes
the FIRS to make assessments of the tax (in the form and manner provided by it) of a company for
its accounting period based on the amount of chargeable profits, assessable tax, and chargeable
tax.
One of the problems that bedevil taxation in Nigeria is the problem of the falsification of
companies’ account audits. This is a major concern considering that it is the company’s audited
account submitted to the tax authority that is depended on for tax assessment. In other words, it is
the audited accounts submitted by the companies that guide the tax authorities in the assessment
of chargeable taxes due to the company. The PPTA is not exempted from this approach as Section
9 of the Act provides that any company engaged in petroleum operation must submit its audited
accounts showing its profit and losses to the FIRS to enable them to assess chargeable taxes due
to the company.
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The challenge with this approach however is that the PPTA operates under the presumption that
there are regularities in the audited accounts as presented by the companies and the FIRS not being
an auditing firm may not deem it fit to re-audit the already presumed audited accounts submitted
to them but rather merely assess the chargeable taxes due to the company from the information
they have before them whether it is true or false. This is however a challenge that could be turned
around for the betterment of the oil industry. A major concern in the formulation of stringent
regulations on gas flaring in Nigeria is the assumption that the deployment of the required
technology will reduce returns to the government, given the huge capital expended in the sector
development. The regulator can put in place measures to ensure better enforcement of the existing
tax audit and collection regimes to make up for any shortfall resulting from lost revenue because
of more stringent gas flaring regulations.
Another problem with the PPTA is the issue of penalties. The penalty prescribed under the PPTA
is so insignificant in terms of cost in modern-day Nigeria to a company engaged in petroleum
operations. These are all significant issues that must be addressed.
•

Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Local Content Development Act – Indigenous
Participation114
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In addition to the clamor for more resource control, several African countries after independence
also determined that more indigenous people should take ownership and control of their natural
resources for exploitation and transformation into economic growth. In the pursuit of this
objective, several policies and laws have been implemented by governments.
Within the context of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry, some of the laws that have embodied this
idea are the Petroleum (Drilling & Production) Regulations115, Industrial Training Fund, Petroleum
Technology Development Fund116, and National Office of Technology Acquisition Act117. These
laws were however not enough to cover the entire petroleum industry.
The enactment of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act118 seeks to increase
indigenous participation in the Oil and gas industry by prescribing minimum thresholds for the use
of local services and materials and ensuring the transfer of technology and skill to Nigerian
indigenous workers in the oil and gas exploration industry.
Part of the defining feature of the Act is that it is comprehensive, running into 107 sections, and
applies to all operators, contractors, and other entities involved in any project in the oil and gas
industry. In addition, the Act also takes precedence over all other existing enactments and laws in
respect of all matters and operations industry that pertain to Nigerian content carried out in the oil
and gas. A Nigeria Content Development and Monitoring Board (the Board) has been established
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and vested with the responsibility to implement the provisions of the Act, make procedural
guidelines, and monitor compliance by operators within the oil industry.
The Act sets out general obligations which are applicable either by reference to the operators and
participants in the Oil and Gas Industry or activities taking place in the Oil and Gas industry. The
overall local content policy objective and obligation imposed in respect of transactions within the
oil and gas industry are set out in Section 3(1) of the Act which provides that Nigerian independent
operators shall be given first consideration in the award of oil blocks, oil field licenses, oil lifting
licenses and all projects for which contract is to be awarded in the Nigerian oil and gas industry
subject to the fulfillment of such conditions as may be specified by the Minister.
In furtherance of this objective, the Act also gives preferential treatment to all Nigerian companies
operating in the industry. As a basic principle, the Act requires that the promotion of Nigerian
content development shall be a major concern in all projects and operations in the oil industry. It
then goes on to say that Nigerian independent operators shall have first consideration in the award
of oil blocks, lifting licenses, and in all projects for which contracts are to be awarded. This
principle applies to all spheres of the industry not only "contracting" but also the employment of
staff and labor, staff training and procurement of goods, materials, services, etc.
It is also worth mentioning that the Local Content Act and the idea it represents cannot be used to
encourage mediocrity. Section 3(2) of the Act incorporates a significant precondition for getting
the coveted exclusive preferential treatment. It stipulates "demonstrable capacity to perform" as a
key criterion for the preferential award of jobs.
Another advantage that the Act affords Nigerian companies asides from preferential treatment is
the technology transfer. Section 44 stipulates that corporate IOCs are required to have a program
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of incentives to promote the transfer of technology and skills and Section 45 encourages the
formation of joint ventures and other forms of alliances.119
The promotion of 'Nigerian human material' as an aspect of Nigerian Content is dealt with in
Sections 28 to 35 of the Act120. The general clause in this regard is Section 28(1) of the Act which
stipulates that "Nigerians shall be given first consideration for employment and training in any
project executed by any operator or project promoter”. Drawing from this, the Nigerian Content
Plan submitted by operators or project promoters shall include an employment and training plan
which complies with Section 29 of the Act. Section 30 and 31 also make it an obligation for
operators to provide training to Nigerians where Nigerians are not employed because of a lack of
training and to provide a succession plan for a Nigerian to understudy an expatriate for a maximum
period of 4 years.
Finally, Section 34 of the Act provides that a “Labour Clause” be inserted in “projects or
contracts” mandating the use of a minimum percentage of Nigerian workers as may be stipulated
by the board. Finally, all operators and companies operating in the Nigeria oil and gas industry
shall employ only Nigerians in their junior and intermediate cadre. Concerning legal representation
and financial services, Section 51 of the Act provides that actors in the Petroleum industry can
only retain the services of a Nigerian Legal Practitioner or a firm of legal practitioners. In the same
vein, Section 52 provides that all actors in the industry in need of financial services must only
engage the services of Nigerian financial institutions.
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Again, any proposed reform to reduce gas flaring could be vulnerable to the objection that such
reforms would reduce money generated for the government or harm local Nigerian-owned
businesses or employees. It is therefore important to understand the mechanisms that generate
revenues for the government and Nigerians to be able to effectively analyze how more stringent
controls on gas flaring would impact those revenues.
The Petroleum Industry Act 2021 – Moving into the Future
The Nigerian petroleum industry has recorded several setbacks and agitations from reform ranging
from environmental to economic and socio-political concerns. The pre-existing laws have all been
unable to address the recurring menace of gas flaring significantly and effectively in Nigeria. As
a result, over the last 20 years, there have been various attempts at reforming the petroleum
industry in Nigeria. However, none of these attempts has yielded any tangible result until the
National Assembly introduced the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021.
It is worthy of note to state that the oil and gas industry has a significant impact on Nigeria’s
economy. Although the industry contributes less than 10% to the country’s gross domestic product,
it, however, contributes about 90% of the foreign exchange earnings and 60% of total income.
Consequently, any adverse change in the industry will have a big and long-term impact on the
economy. This is the reason why successive governments have remained focused on the sector
despite various discussions on diversifying the economy. The Petroleum Industry Act aims to
establish legal, governance, regulatory and fiscal framework for the Nigerian Petroleum Industry,
the Host Communities, and related matters.
The Petroleum Industry Act is expected to restructure the Nigerian petroleum industry, introducing
a paradigm shift. The bill is to introduce a framework to privatize the Nigerian National Petroleum
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Corporation (NNPC) theoretically enabling external fundraising, although the timing and precise
form of the privatization is unclear121.
The PIA was built on previous attempts that have been made to conclude upon an agreeable draft
of legislation that would be wholesome and cater to every area of the industry, including untested
areas such as host community funding, a viable fiscal regime for gas, and incentives for midstream
and upstream petroleum operations. The Act was first introduced as a Bill in 2008 as a response
to these concerns.
The specific objectives of the Act include the promotion of actions, plans, and policies to:
•

create an efficient regulatory entity,

•

increase petroleum exploration and production,

•

deregulate the downstream sector of the industry,

•

establish a viable national oil company,

•

boost domestic gas supply,

•

enhance transparency and accountability in the industry, among other objectives.

Drawing from the original Petroleum Industry Bill, the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill has
the main objectives as follows:
1. The creation of efficient and effective governing institutions with clear and separate roles
for the petroleum industry.
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2. Establishment of a framework for the creation (out of existing government-owned entities)
of commercially oriented and profit-driven entities that will ensure value-add and
internationalization of the petroleum industry.
3. The promotion of transparency and accountability in the petroleum industry.
4. Creation of a conducive business environment for operators in the petroleum industry.
Summarily, it can be argued that the proponents of the Bill intend to ensure that there is a high
level of transparency in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry whilst at the same time ensuring that the
industry is commercially driven and attractive to potential investors. President Muhammadu
Buhari eventually signed the bill into law on August 16, 2021, marking a new era for the Nigerian
petroleum industry. The new Act will be examined in comprehensive detail in the next section. It
is hoped that this new law regulating the petroleum industry will be in tandem with current climatic
realities to be effective for administrative policies and regulations governing the oil and gas
industry must be clear, transparent, practical, and consistent for them to achieve the intended
purpose.
2.1

The Legal Regime for Gas Flaring Regulation in Nigeria

The prior sections explain the historical development and current laws governing the oil and gas
sector generally in Nigeria within which regulation of gas flaring is also situated, as well as identify
important proposals for legal reform.

This section will now explain in detail the specific

legislations that were made to reduce gas flaring in the oil and gas exploiting industry in Nigeria.
Gas flaring is one of the major hot spots within Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, and for several
reasons. One of them is the role this process plays in the production of oil and gas in the country.
The level of technology in the industry favors gas flaring which is cheaper than reinjection and
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other means that would be beneficial to the environment and the citizens of Nigeria. This has
several implications.122 123
Beyond the impact gas flaring has on the environment, there are also talks about the impact gas
flaring has directly on the health of humans. The toxic gases emitted from flare sites have serious
health impacts which include respiratory illnesses like Asthma, painful breathing, and chronic
bronchitis. Other illnesses that are gas flare-related include cancer and blood disorders like
leukemia124 This paper would extensively examine the problem of gas flaring in Nigeria from the
law-making perspective. Precisely, an examination of the legal framework that addresses and
regulates gas flaring in Nigeria would form the core of this paper.
The conflicting concerns about the health impact of gas flaring seemed to have inspired the legal
and institutional framework for gas flaring in place in Nigeria. Before the enactment of the
regulation on gas flaring, the Petroleum Act 1969125 remained the primary law regulating oil and
gas exploration activities in Nigeria. The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Act 1979 126 made
under the Petroleum Act, provided that the licensee or lessee of an Oil Mining License (OML)
shall, not later than five years after the commencement of production, submit to the Minister of
Petroleum Resources, a feasibility study, program, or proposals that it may have for the utilization
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of any natural gas that has been discovered in the relevant area.127 Regulation 43 of the Petroleum
(Drilling and Production) Act provides thus:
“Not later than five years after the commencement of production from the
relevant area, the licensee or lessee shall submit to the minister, any feasibility
study, programme, or proposals that he may have for the utilization of any
natural gas, whether associated with oil or not, which has been discovered in
the relevant area.”
Unfortunately, this provision of the law which required oil companies to submit their strategies for
gas utilization was not seen to be mandatory and no penalty was provided for defaulters. Again, oil
companies were permitted to flare gas for five years before submitting the feasibility report 128,
because of this lacuna, a concrete step to regulate gas flaring in Nigeria was reached in 1979 with
the enactment of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act.
The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 1979129 (as amended) became the first anti-gas flaring
regulatory framework in Nigeria.130 The primary intent and purpose of the Act were to phase out
gas flaring in Nigeria, it was the statutory response to the environmental impacts of gas flaring. In
its recital, it is stated to be an Act to compel every company producing oil and gas in Nigeria to
submit the preliminary program gas re-injections and detailed plans for implementation of gas re-
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injection. Besides requiring oil and gas producing companies to submit a detailed plan for either
the re-injection or commercial use of all associated gas produced by 1st October 1980, the Act
categorically made gas flaring illegal from 1st January 1984. 131 While one would expect that this
Act brings an end to gas flaring in Nigeria or perhaps reduce it to the barest minimum, the Act
would not survive for long. It has been argued that the Nigerian government was hesitant to enforce
the 1984 flare prohibition deadline since oil revenues contribute about 90% of Nigeria’s foreign
exchange earnings. 132 In place of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 1979, the Associated Gas
Re-Injection Act 1984133 was promulgated. Moving away from the stance of the 1979 Act of the
total prohibition of Gas Flaring in Nigeria, the 1984 Act allowed the petroleum minister to
authorize gas flaring that cannot be re-injected or utilized. This authorization could be granted to
companies upon the payment of fees to be determined by the minister. The penalty for flaring gas
after the 1st of January 1984 without the permission of the Minister was forfeiture of the company's
oil mining concessions. 134
To put things in perspective, the 1984 Act allowed companies to flare gas upon the payment of
fees as determined by the petroleum minister. While these fees have generated some revenue for
the government, the amount received pales insignificant when compared to the millions of dollars
that the country loses annually to gas flaring as previously demonstrated. Statistics from the
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Nigerian Bureau of Public Enterprises also reveal that Nigeria loses between US$500 million and
US$2.5 billion to gas flaring. (World Bank Group).
Progressing, rather than expressly prohibit gas flaring, the Nigerian government, owing to the
country’s lack of infrastructure to capture and utilize the gas flared, instead favored an incentive
approach to reduce gas flaring. The government would proceed to provide a system of incentives
to encourage companies in the oil and gas industry to capture and utilize gas rather than flare it.
This policy was brought to the fore through the Associated Gas-Framework Agreement (AGFA)135
of 1992 which introduced a package of financial incentives for the utilization of natural gas.136
Aside from the incentives of a tax holiday for three years as well as the creation of a contractual
relationship between companies and the government contained in the AGFA 1992. Subsequently,
in 1988 the Nigerian Government also added more incentives to encourage a pro-utilization stance
by oil companies. Some of the additional incentives include exemption on custom duties and VAT
on gas-related development equipment, an increase of the tax holiday from 3 years to another 5 to
7 years, exemption of taxes on dividends earned during the tax holiday, the introduction of
investment capital allowance of 15%, among others.
In the years that followed, successive governments became more focused on eliminating gas
flaring in Nigeria although this has not been met with commensurate planning. Therefore, with
legislation came ultimatums that were never met. As such, while the Associated Gas Re-injection
Act was enacted to prohibit gas flaring on 1 January 1984, the gas flaring ultimatum date was later
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changed to December 2003. The ultimatum was further moved to 2006 and was changed again
from January 2008 to December 2008.137
Still, on ultimatums, the Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Act, 2009,138 was enacted with
a gas flaring time limit fixed for 31 December 2010. As this ultimatum date was no longer feasible,
the deserted Petroleum Industry Governance Bill set a 2012 deadline which together with the bill
was also deserted. Fast forward to 2016, the Gas Flaring Prohibition and Punishment Bill, 2016,
set the ultimatum for gas flaring to December 2016. Also, the deserted PIGB bill of 2012 was
replaced with the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill 2017 which rather than setting deadlines
seeks to outlaw gas flaring. To date, this bill is yet to be passed into law.
Also, about the bills, there is the Associated Gas Re-Injection (Amendment) Bill 2010139, which
does not seem to be any different from the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act of 1984 since it still
allows gas to be flared with the consent of the Minister of Petroleum. In 2018, the Nigerian
President, in his capacity as the Minister of Petroleum resources signed the Flare Gas (Prevention
of Waste and Pollution) Regulations, 2018140 into law. The Regulations seek to minimize the
environmental and social impact caused by flaring natural gas, protect the environment, prevent
waste of natural resources, and create social and economic benefits from gas flare capture. 141 It is
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noteworthy that while the Regulation provides the prohibition against flaring of natural gas, one
must not be misled by the language. The regulations although generally prohibiting gas flaring
make exceptions for producers that are issued certificates by the petroleum minister based on the
provisions of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act.142
The regulation also increased payment for gas flaring. Companies that produce at least 10,000
barrels of oil per day shall be liable to a flare payment of $2 per 28.317 standard cubic meters
(1,000 standard cubic feet (SCF)) of gas flared. However, companies which produce less than
10,000 barrels per day shall be liable to a flare payment of $0.5 per 28.317 standard cubic meters
(1,000 standard cubic feet (SCF)) of gas flared. 143
Moving forward, the Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2020144 is currently before the
Nigerian Senate and seems set to be passed into law soon. One of the highlights of this bill is that
it ensures that natural gas is not flared or vented in any oil and gas production operation, block,
field, onshore or offshore, or any gas facility.145 Clause 11(a) of the bill provides that,
“Any person who flares gas after December 31, 2020, contrary to section 4 of
this Act, commits an offense under this Act, and shall be liable on conviction to
pay a fine which shall not be less than the cost of gas at the international
market.”
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This means that the latest ultimatum for the prohibition of gas flaring in Nigeria was set for
December 31, 2020, by the Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2020.
It is also important at this juncture to consider the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) which underlies
most of the legislation created for the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The principle is traceable to
the words of Plato who asserts that "if anyone intentionally spoils the water of another ... let him
not only pay damages but purify the stream or cistern which contains the water..."146
The principle essentially means that the producer of goods or other items should be responsible
for the cost of preventing or remediating any pollution that the process causes. This includes
environmental costs as well as those involving people or property. 147 Unfortunately, this principle
has not been effectively applied in the country. The Nigerian government particularly has shown
laxity in the enforcement of the PPP which is perhaps due to the country’s dependence on the oil
and gas industry.
Even more, the polluter pays principle is yet to be wholly made applicable to environmental
pollution from gas flaring, with the laws in place giving companies a field day to flare gas in the
exchange for the payment of stipends. This is a major sour point in Nigeria’s legal and institutional
framework to address the country’s gas flaring situation. The Flare Gas Regulations 148 at best
operate a trivialized rendering of the principle. The regulation provides for the payment of a carbon
tax149 which does not candidly represent the essence of the polluter pays principle.
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Also, within the context of gas flaring in Nigeria, certain institutions come to play. The first is the
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) responsible for the creation of all policies that relate to
the oil and gas industry. The responsibilities of the MPR are duly carried out through the
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), which is a body under the Ministry of Petroleum
Resources.
There is also the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) established according to
Section 1, Decree No. 33 of 1973150 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Among others, the NNPC
has an inspectorate and commercial responsibility, which allows it to manage and overlook the
operations of its subsidiaries within the oil and gas industry, like the Nigeria Gas Company (NGC).
Also, the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) is the highest authority in terms of
environmental management in Nigeria. The FMENV oversees the Oil and Gas Pollution Control
Unit of the DPR and as part of its duty, also drafted the National Environmental Management Act
(NEMA Act), which incorporated the policy on gas flaring elimination as well as gas utilization
in Nigeria.
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was set up by the government to replace the
Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 2000. Among other
responsibilities, the NDDC addresses the environmental challenges that are associated with the
activities that are related to engineering and production in Nigeria.
The current situation in the gas industry reveals a clear reluctance on the part of the Nigerian
government to prohibit gas flaring in the country. If nothing, the pattern of unmet deadlines for the
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total prohibition of gas flaring and the inability of the government to mete out appropriate sanctions
to defaulters within the current gas flaring and utilization regime is clear evidence in this regard.
To put it simply, the country’s regulatory and institutional framework on gas flaring is not only
insufficient but also grossly inefficient.
The Acts and Bills
There is an abundance of legislation that addresses the Nigerian gas flaring problem. Some of the
laws that have been enacted in this regard include the 1973 Petroleum Amendment Decree151, the
1979 Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, the 1985 Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment)
Decree, the 2004 Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act, the Petroleum Industry Bill, and
finally, the 2010 Associated Gas Re-injection Bill.152
It is also worth noting that Nigeria is a signatory to several international instruments targeted at
reducing gas flaring globally such as the Nation Framework Convention and Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and Kyoto protocol aimed to reduce gas flaring153. Nigerian courts are also not left
behind in responding to gas flaring as they have made express pronouncements on gas flaring in
cases such as Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co154, where the court “ordered the
respondents and their servants or workers from further flaring of gas in the applicant’s community
(Niger Delta) and to take immediate steps to stop the further flaring of gas.”
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Each of these Nigerian legislations would now be considered serially.
•

The 1999 Nigerian Constitution

While the constitution does not explicitly speak to gas flaring in any of its provisions, some
sections set the tone for more gas flaring-specific legislation. To be precise, Section 33(1) and
34(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and the right to dignity of human persons.
These sections provide:
Section (33)(1) “every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived
intentionally of his life, save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a
criminal offense of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria”
Section (34)(1) “every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his
person…”
It can be argued that these rights are necessarily contingent on the availability of a clean and
healthy environment. For example, where the environment is poisoned and begins to impact the
health of people in the environment, the right to life is clearly under attack. In the same vein, an
atmosphere poisoned by noxious fumes and greenhouses gases is a violation of the right to dignity
of the person.155
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•

The Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Regulation of 1969156

The Petroleum Act 1969 is not only the primary but also the most extensive legislation that
regulates the Nigerian petroleum industry before the Petroleum Industry Act was passed into
law.157 The Petroleum Act 1969 also vests in the state, the entire ownership and control of oil and
gas in, under, or upon any lands including land covered by water, which is in Nigeria; or is under
the territorial waters of Nigeria; or forms part of the continental shelf or Exclusive Economic Zone
of Nigeria.158 It is worth mentioning that this provision on ownership does not impede the right to
receive compensation for damage suffered or that occurred from petroleum exploration activities
in the sector such as gas flaring159.
Importantly, the Act also addressed the accompanying environmental hazards as the act
encouraged oil companies to submit oil-development schemes that specified potential solutions to
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such environmental hazards.160 Quite relevant to this paper is the provision of Section 9 (1)(b) (iii)
of the Act which grants powers to the Minister of Petroleum to make regulations relating to licenses
and leases granted for the prevention of pollution of watercourses and the atmosphere. For this
paper, ‘Pollution of Atmosphere’ could be implied as gas flaring as it’s a source of atmospheric
pollution. However, no other specific provisions on air emissions from gas utilization exist
anywhere under the Petroleum Act.161
In addition, under the regime of the Act, there was a provision for 5 years after commencement of
oil production in an area, after which licensees and leases were to submit a feasibility study
program that speaks to the utilization of natural gas. Unfortunately, this provision as noble as it
was, was defective as it made no provision for any penalty or sanction for defaulters of this
provision. The result is that producers gave no regard to this provision, especially considering that
the industry lacked the infrastructure to utilize natural gas instead of flaring it162.
To put it simply, the oil companies in Nigeria did not comply with the Act, nor has the Act been
implemented by the regulatory agencies in the sector against oil companies for the feasibility plan.
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• Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 1979 and the Associated Gas Re-injection
(Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations of 1985163
Within the context of the legal framework on gas flaring in Nigeria, the Associated Gas ReInjection Act is one of the most important. Unlike the Petroleum Act, the Associated Gas ReInjection Act precisely and specifically addresses gas flaring in Nigeria. The Act was enacted to
regulate the incessant gas flaring carried out by multinational oil corporations within the Nigerian
petroleum industry164. The Act required these companies to mandatorily submit a preliminary gas
re-injection program and implementation plan in their various oil fields.
Most importantly, this Act also provided a deadline on gas flaring in Nigeria, precisely 1 January
1984. After this deadline, the lawmakers intended that gas flaring would become prohibited after
the deadline provided. In addition, a drastic penalty of forfeiture of concession and repair or
restoration of any reservoir in the field per good oilfield practice was imposed on any defaulters
after that date.
In support of these submissions, Section 3 of the Act is very relevant to this paper. It states as
follows:
1. Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no company engaged in the production
of oil or gas shall after 1st January 1984 flare gas produced in association with oil
without the permission of in writing of the minister.
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2. Where the minister is satisfied after 1st January 1984 that utilization or reinjection of the produced gas is not appropriate or feasible in a particular field or
fields, he may issue a certificate in that respect in the production of oil or gas
a. Specifying such terms and conditions, as he may at his discretion choose to
impose, for the continued flaring of gas in the particular field or fields.
b. Permitting the company to continue to flare gas in the particular field or fields if
the company pays such sum as the Minister may from time to time prescribe for
every 28.317 standard cubic meters (SCM) of gas flared”
Unfortunately, the undoing of the Act was the inclusion of the clause that allows the Minister to
issue a certificate to oil companies who are unable to meet up with the target deadline of 1 January
1984, to continue flaring, subject to payment of minimal penalty. The result of this was that all the
oil companies took up the alternative of paying the prescribed fee for gas flaring rather than
undertaking the expensive gas re-injection projects.165 This led to the failure of the Act as the
objective of the Act simply became unachievable.
The problem with the Act was further exacerbated by the fact that the Act contained no provisions
as regard payment of fines by the defaulters and the oil companies were still allowed to flare gas
with the permission of the Minister of Petroleum.
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Seeing that the deadline contained under the Act was no longer feasible, the Act was amended. In
January 1985, the Associated Gas Re-injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations (AGRA
Regulation) were promulgated. These regulations are made according to the powers of the Minister
in Section 5 of the 1979 Act (which relates to the powers of the Minister in respect of the conditions
wherein an oil company may continue the flaring of gas). Section 1 of the AGRA Regulation
regulates the issuance of certificates authorizing the continuation of gas flaring in particular fields
when the following conditions are met:
(a) where more than seventy-five percent of the produced gas is effectively utilized or conserved.
(b) where the produced gas contains more than fifteen percent impurities, such as N2, H2S, C02,
etc. which render the gas unsuitable for industrial purposes.
(c) where an ongoing utilization program is interrupted by equipment failure:
Provided that such failures are not considered too frequent by the Minister and that the period of
anyone interruption is not more than three months.
(d) where the ratio of the volume of gas produced per day to the distance of the field from the
nearest gas line or possible utilization point is less than 50,000 SCF/KM:
Provided that the Gas to Oil ratio of the field is less than 3,500 SCF/bbl that it is not technically
advisable to re-inject the gas in that field.
(e) where the Minister, in appropriate cases as he may deem fit, orders the production of oil from
a field that does not satisfy any of the conditions specified in these Regulations.
Thus, it is arguable that gas flaring is allowed under Nigerian law because the petroleum minister
can legally permit the continuation of gas flaring by oil multinationals if any of the conditions are
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met by oil companies.166 The regulations have emphasized economic benefits rather than ending
the scourge of gas flaring in Nigeria167. Furthermore, Kassim-Momodu argues that “the effect of
these regulations is the possible exemption of over 50% of the oil fields from the provisions of the
Act.”168 Also, the fines provided by the law against gas flaring are minimal (Adeniji, 2012)169 and
the government keeps shifting the gas flaring end date.170 Consequently, gas flaring continues
unabated and particularly as the sanctions do not serve as a deterrent to oil MNCs in Nigeria.171
• Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992 (EIAA)172
The EIA Act was enacted after the 1992 Earth Summit to consolidate the gains of the conference
particularly Principle 17 of Agenda 21173. To be precise, the Act is geared toward regulating the
operational activities of the oil companies which may have an impact on the environment either
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directly or indirectly except exempted by law174. One of the defining features of the Act is that it
makes it mandatory for all companies both in the public and private sector of the economy, before
embarking on any project or activity, to assess the environmental effects of such a project or
activity.
The EIA Act makes it an offense to embark on a project without first carrying out EIA. Upon
conducting EIA, a company is required to submit the report to the National Environmental
Protection Agency. Before a decision is given by the Agency, experts in the relevant area,
government agencies, members of the public, and other interest groups are invited to make their
comments. This participatory model has been termed a “pluralist approach to regulation” because
it promotes the synergy of diverse groups (such as NGOs, ordinary members of the public, and the
government) in the environmental impact assessment discourse in Nigeria175. Also, under Section
25 of the EIAA, in mandatory study activities projects, EIA reports shall be published and made
available to the public in selected places and any person or individual can file comments on the
conclusions and recommendations of such reports.
Under Section 57, a public registry is expected to be established by the Federal Ministry of
Environment containing information and records for enhanced public participation and access to
justice. Furthermore, public participation in environmental assessment is pronounced in the review
panel stage. Under Section 17(1)(c), comments filed by private individuals are taken into
consideration in the review panel. Here, public concerns about the potential environmental impacts
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of a project may prompt the Federal Ministry of Environment to refer such to a review panel or
mediation.176 The Review Panel accentuates public participation in environmental impact
assessments in Nigeria. Under Section 37(b), proceedings in the review panel stage are expected
to be conducted in public “in a manner that offers the public an opportunity to participate in the
assessment.”
Under Section 8 of the EIAA, an adequate period is expected to elapse wherein comments by the
public are expected to be scrutinized before any proposed project is approved or authorized. Also,
under Sections 9(1) – (2), the decisions reached must be in written form and made available to any
interested person or group. Under Section 9(3), if no interested person or group is requested for
the report, the agency can publish it in any form wherein members of the public or interested
parties interested in the project shall be notified.
It is important to observe that a major drawback of the Act is a lack of enforcement. In practice,
EIA Certificates are obtained long after the commencement of production activities thereby
making a mockery of the intention of the EIA. Poor quality of EIA reports and weak participation
of indigenous communities in EIA processes are major challenges of the Act. Most oil and gas
projects in Nigeria commenced before the enactment of the Act, hence the lack of prior EIA. It has
also been argued that the aforementioned provisions on public participation are not strictly adhered
to in the EIA process and it is often at the discretion of the project developer177. For example, the
case of the Latins State/ Huron Project which was an Independent Power Project (IPP) arrangement
between the Lagos State Government (a state in Nigeria), Enron Power Nigeria Limited, and Yinka
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Folawiyo Power Limited.178 The idea of the IPP was to improve the epileptic power supply in
Lagos State. Enron Nigeria Limited requested that the environmental impact assessment, which is
a mandatory requirement in emergency power barges projects, should be jettisoned due to the
urgency of the project179.
Omorogbe avers that it appears an EIA was not conducted during the project.180
Also, the lack of willpower and enforcement deficiencies in Government, coupled with corruption
has made it possible for oil and gas companies flaring gas to obtain EIA certificates despite the
enormous environmental impacts of their activities. This Act has been presented severally before
the National Assembly for amendment.181 The major amendments include replacing the National
Environmental Protection Agency with NESREA. Also, the inclusion of local communities as part
of those to be given notice in their local language is a welcome development. This makes room for
transparency. This is also important because most rural communities where gas flaring occurs
usually use the heat from the gas flare to dry their farm produce and staple foods, ignorant of the
health implication.
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• Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations 2018182
On the 28th of June 2017, the Federal Government of Nigeria, through the Federal Executive
Council, approved the National Gas Policy183 (Templars, 2018). The background to this policy is
the government’s attempt to arrest the country’s gas flaring problem, especially the oil and gas
producing fields in the country.
The situation becomes even more real when in 2017, the country ranked as the 6th largest gas
flaring country in the world, flaring 7.6 billion cubic meters of gas in that year. Gas flaring
constitutes an egregious energy waste practice in the Nigerian petroleum industry and has
significant detrimental effects on the environment and the Nigerian economy.
The Policy criticized the gas flaring regime as incentivizing gas flaring overutilization as the
negligible flare charge of NGN10/MsCf (which is less than 1cent per MsCf) under the current gas
flaring regime provided a cheaper option for operators compared to gas commercialization. In
reacting to routine gas flaring, the Policy advocates a vision of 2020 to stop flaring, A target that
will be enabled by the development of flare capture projects and the enforcement of applicable
sanctions.
In 2018, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in his capacity as the Minister of
Petroleum Resources and reliance on section 9(1) of the Petroleum Act issued the Flare Gas
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(Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations of 2018, being part of the pursuits of the
objectives of the National Gas Policy.
The Regulations focus on the reduction of the environmental and social impacts of gas flaring,
preventing waste of natural gas resources, and creating social and economic benefits from gas flare
capture. The Regulations aim to incentivize the commercialization of flare gas because of the
zero-royalty regime but disincentivize continued gas flaring through the imposition of a new
flaring fee regime.184 The Regulations also underpin the implementation of the NGFCP, especially
the permit bidding process. If properly implemented and enforced, this piece of subsidiary
legislation will erase the historical narrative of Nigeria’s associated gas wastage.
Section 3 of the Regulation provides that the Minister may authorize a “Qualified Applicant”
selected further to a bid process to take flare gas on behalf of the Federal Government. Sub-section
2 further provides that a Producer may apply to the Minister to utilize Flare Gas for
commercialization after satisfying some conditions, one of which is that such application must be
made by the producer on behalf of a midstream subsidiary corporate entity. In other words, a
producer (which would most likely be an upstream company) must incorporate a midstream
company to enable it to apply to utilize flare gas for commercialization from its exploration and
production activities.
However, the regulation creates a lacuna here, as there are no further provisions on the application
process after a mid-stream entity has been incorporated. After incorporation of the mid-stream
entity, does such an entity apply and go through the same bid process as other third-party investors

184

Notwithstanding the fact that the production of flare gas is borne out of the E&P efforts of an upstream

concessionaire, an upstream producer who intends to commercialize the flare gas may only undertake this through
its midstream subsidiary (existing or prospective) or under the aegis of an approved flare-out project.

83

or is there another application regime to be followed? The regulations do not provide these details
and hence the lacuna. This is a minor omission and can easily be addressed by releasing further
guidelines on the application process for Permit Holders and Producers alike. Another condition
that must be satisfied by a producer applying to utilize flare gas is that the producer must show
that such application will not affect any flare gas volume that is being offered in a bid process
conducted by the Federal Government or assigned to a Permit Holder.
Reg. 3(3) goes on to provide that a Producer is free to utilize associated gas for its purposes
provided that such utilization shall not reduce the flare gas volume that is subject to a bid processor
has been assigned to a permit holder. This provision implies that it infringes on the rights of
operators of OMLs and Marginal Fields to associated gas produced from the oil wells. As a holder
of an OML or Marginal Field Operator, one should be able to utilize all gas produced if it has not
been directed to the flare site. Perhaps this provision is targeted at flare gas alone and not associated
gas.
However, if the regulation has been correctly drafted, it creates a problem. The purpose of this
provision is to protect the Permit Holder who has acquired an interest in a specific volume of flare
gas after acquiring permits and signing the necessary contractual documentation. It is possible that
in the future a producer may want to utilize associated gas, which he/she is entitled to as the holder
of an OML or Marginal Field Operator. Such utilization of associated gas could reduce the amount
of flare gas volume a Permit Holder is entitled to, especially if the associated gas being utilized by
the producer was previously being diverted to a flare site for flaring. If such a scenario becomes a
reality, how can it be resolved? These are the issues that the government and regulatory authorities
must closely look at to come up with further guidelines to address this issue.
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Reg. 14 of the Regulation also refers to another avenue where a producer may commercialize flare
gas under a “Producer’s Approved Flare Out Project”. This provision seems to create a different
platform where a producer can commercialize flare gas different from the one provided for under
Reg. 3(2) of the Regulation. Thus, a producer seeking to utilize flare gas for commercial purposes
has two options to pursue: such producer can apply to the Minister under Reg. 3(2) of this
Regulation or can pursue the option of undertaking a Producer’s Approved Flare Out Project. This
Project is intended to be commenced by the Producer, which approval is subject to certain criteria
by the Department of Petroleum Resources. This development permits the bidders to choose which
flare site out of the 178 flare sites in the country to bid for, the gas price, the end market or gas
product and the technology to be employed.
Section 8 of the Regulation provides for a “Permit to Access Flare Gas” which is issued on an
exclusive basis by the Minister. The Permit authorizes a Permit Holder to take flare gas from one
or more flare sites as designated on the Permit on behalf of the Federal Government to utilize or
dispose of it in any manner authorized by the Federal Government. The Permit specifies the
amount/volume of flare gas that the permit holder is entitled to. Furthermore, subsection 3 provides
that a Permit to Access Flare Gas will only be issued to a Nigerian Company that is not a Producer.
This means that holders of oil mining leases and marginal fields are not eligible to access or utilize
flare gas. The result of this provision is that it creates a new class of participants in the oil and gas
industry and confirms the Federal Government’s intention to treat gas as a separate commodity
from crude oil. In addition to the issuance of the permits, the Regulation also provides for the
validity and revocation of permits if certain terms and conditions are not satisfied.
Section 12 of the Regulation in clear terms prohibits the routine flaring of gas by producers or
permit holders unless according to a certificate issued by the Minister further to the provisions of
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the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act. Section 12 also provides that there shall be no gas flaring
from any Greenfield project (i.e., projects where no oil & gas production has commenced).
Interestingly, the Regulations provide for revocation of certificate for continued flaring and permit
to access gas flare The Minister reserves the right to revoke any issued Gas Flare Certificate for
failure by the Producer to comply with the Regulations. In addition, Permit to Access Gas Flare
can be withdrawn under certain circumstances. These include situations where it is determined
that the Permit Holder had obtained the Permit based on inaccurate information or declared
bankrupt or where the Gas Supply Agreement to be signed between the FG and the Permit Holder
is terminated under its terms.
The Regulations also established a regime for payment for gas flaring. In keeping with the
“Polluter pays principle”, producers who produce 10,000 barrels of oil or more per day will be
liable to the Federal Government for a gas flare payment of $2.00(N613)/28.317 standard cubic
meters (one thousand cubic feet) of gas flared within any OML or designated marginal field. Where
production is less than 10,000 barrels, the gas flare payment is $0.50 28.317 standard cubic meters.
These new gas flare payments represent a significant increase on the previous gas flare payment
of N10/Mscf. The Federal Government hopes to de-incentivize the practice of gas flaring through
the imposition of significantly higher payments. It is expected that this will be a veritable tool to
not only disincentivize gas flaring but further ensure a significantly improved rating of Nigeria
when compared to the world’s top gas flaring countries.
Another important aspect of the Regulations is the penalties put in place. The Regulations stipulate
a penalty of N50,000 or an imprisonment term of not more than six months where an authorized
agent of a Producer supplies inaccurate or incomplete Flare Gas Data to the Department of
Petroleum Resources. The Regulations also impose an additional daily penalty of $2.50 per 1,000
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SCF of gas flared or vented within the OML, where a Producer fails to meet the following
requirements:
(a) provide Flare Gas Data
(b) supply accurate complete Flare Gas Data
(c) provide a Qualified Applicant with access to any flare site
(d) provide a Permit Holder with access to any flare site
(e) prepare, maintain, or submit the logs or records, or reports as required in the Regulations
(f) install metering equipment within the time required to do so by the DPR
(g) agree to enter into a Connection Agreement with a Permit Holder.
The Regulations have been issued to govern and implement the Nigeria Gas Flare
Commercialization Programme (NGFCP), which is aimed at harnessing Nigeria’s flare gas for
sustainable value and wealth creation. According to the Group Managing Director of the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), about 7% of Nigeria’s gas is currently being flared at
178 sites. Given the mandatory payments imposed by the Regulations, there is a strong incentive
for Producers to comply and significantly reduce the amount of gas flared. There is also the risk
that continuing non-compliance can result in the suspension of operations or termination of the
mining license of a Producer.
However, there are some concerns as to whether Government can realize its desired objectives,
given the claim by some Producers that a significant amount of the gas currently being flared is
due to safety reasons, which the Regulations allow. There are also concerns regarding
implementation. Most of these regulations on gas commercialization are still a mirage in the
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Nigerian oil industry owing to the lack of implementation. As of February 2021, the Speaker of
the Federal House of Representatives, Mr. Femi Gbajabiamila, was still saying that the government
is working on ensuring strict compliance with the 2018 flare gas prevention of waste and pollution
regulations and implementation of the Nigeria Gas Flare Commercialization Programme.
• The

National

Environmental

Standard

Regulation

Enforcement

Agency

(Establishment) Act (NESREA) 2007185
The objectives of this Act include the protection and development of the environment, the
protection of its biodiversity, and facilitating the sustainability of its extractive resources. In
carrying out this objective, Sections 7 and 8 of the Act set up mobile courts for the speedy trial of
those that violate its provisions. Unfortunately, a fundamental problem of the Act was that it
excluded oil companies from their operations. Another shortcoming of the Act was that it restricted
the penalties for violations of its rules to only penal sanctions and therefore made no room for civil
remedies for victims of environmental laws infringements.
Under the Act, oil companies are also excluded from environmental audits and from establishing
a repository for the implementation of mechanisms on environmental standards. It is unclear what
the reason for this action is. To be precise, the exclusion of oil and gas companies’ environmental
degradation and pollution from the scope of the agency appears to be a serious legislative setback
in combating gas flaring in Nigeria’s mid-stream and upstream petroleum sector.
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It is however important to note that the Act made provision for combating gas flaring by oil
companies by providing for the sanction of incarceration, no more than ten (10) for individuals in
companies responsible for gas flaring. It is however submitted that this sanction is inadequate
considering the damaging effects of gas flaring in Nigeria.
Section 20(4)(5) of the Act empowers the Minister of Petroleum to combat gas flaring. In
performing his duties, the Minister may award a special license to flare for a short period. Failure
to conform to the Act attracts punishment, not above the sum of N500,000,000.00. This penalty
sum is expected to be very much effective, compared to the penalty sums of N50,000 or N500,000
in other laws on gas flaring.
Also, Section 27(2) of the Act prohibits the release of deleterious substances into the air, land, and
water in Nigeria with a fine not above N100,000 or one-year incarceration if committed by a legal
entity upon conviction, and the agency can impose a supplementary fine of N50,000 on defaulters
for each day that the infringement continues. These penalties appear too meager to combat the
environmental degradation in the sector.
An additional remedy such as restoration should be added to the remedies to discourage
environmental abuses and gas flaring by oil companies.
The Bills
Aside from the current laws that regulate gas flaring in the country, some bills speak to gas flaring
in Nigeria. For the sake of this paper, the Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2017 will
be briefly considered, while the new Petroleum Industry Act will be examined in comprehensive
detail.
• Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2017
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The focus of the bill is to abolish the flaring of gas by 1 January 2030. The Gas Flaring (Prohibition
and Punishment) contains provisions like those of the PIB and they both are after the same
objective in the context of gas flaring. The Bill is being enacted with wider participation from
stakeholders.

The Bill also provides a legal framework for the National Gas Flare

Commercialization program.
The bill consists of 22 sections and includes sections on sanctions for inaccurate data collation and
submission by the lessee, gas flaring fee, powers of the minister to make regulations, as well as
the repeal of the Associated Gas Re-injection Act 2004186 The bill also seeks to ensure that natural
gas shall not be flared or vented in any oil and gas production operation, block or field, onshore or
onshore, or gas facility which shall commence operations after the commencement of the Act187
(Umoru, 2019).
Also, the Bill provides incentives for gas reinjection and penalties for flaring. However, the
weakness of the Bill is the lack of clarity of the perimeter for the tax incentives which leaves room
for ambiguous interpretations.
2.2

An Analysis of The Petroleum Industry Act 2021188

Oil and gas account for about 10% of Nigeria's entire Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with Nigeria
possessing an estimated crude oil reserve of 37 billion reserves and another 200 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas. Still, the path to reforms has never been smooth for the all-important industry. The
modern reforms of Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Industry can be traced back to the Oil and Gas Sector
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Reform Implementation Committee of the Olusegun Obasanjo Administration (OGIC), which was
inaugurated on April 24, 2000. At the end of its deliberations, the Oil and Gas Sector Reform
Implementation Committee (OGIC) recommended the creation of a national oil and gas policy and
the need to separate commercial institutions in the oil and gas sector from the regulatory and
policy-making institutions in Nigeria, among many other salient provisions.
However, due to time constraints, the Olusegun Obasanjo administration was not able to follow
through on the recommendations of the OGIC after its tenure elapsed on May 29, 2007. Upon
arrival to the office on May 29, 2007, the Umaru Musa Yar'adua presidency announced a broad
institutional reform of existing Nigeria's oil and gas policy. This proposed framework was based
on the recommendations of Olusegun Obasanjo's OGIC committee.
On September 7, 2007, the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua administration appointed Dr. Rilwanu Lukman
to chair a reconstituted OGIC with a mandate to transform the broad provisions in the NOGP into
functional institutional structures that can facilitate the propelling of the national economy to a
GDP level comparable to the top 20 largest worldwide economies by 2020. However, due to the
collapse of that administration because of President Umaru Musa Yar'adua's demise, the
administration was not able to follow through on its proposals for Nigeria's oil and gas industry.
In July 2012, the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administration presented a new version of the
Petroleum Industry Bill as prepared by the OGIC committee to the National Assembly for
consideration and eventual enactment. However, while there was a passage of the bill in 2015 at
the level of the House of Representatives of the 7th National Assembly, the bill failed to pass
through the Senate of that same assembly, up until the tenure of the administration ended in May

91

2015. It was often said that naked ambition, machinations of power, and overt self-interest all
prevented the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) from being successful at the 7th Assembly.
In 2015, the Muhammadu Buhari administration proposed passing the Petroleum Industry Bill
(PIB) in four separate bills: Petroleum Industry Governance Bill; Fiscal Regime Bill; Upstream
and Midstream Administration Bill; Petroleum Host Communities Bill.
Internally, the administration prioritized the safe passage of the Petroleum Industry Governance
Bill because it addressed core challenges facing the oil and gas sector, like the establishment of
the Nigerian Petroleum Regulatory Commission, an independent regulatory commission that
subsumed the current functions of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA). The PIGB also proposed the unbundling
of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) into two splinter limited liability
companies with interests in the joint venture assets of the upstream sector and the production
sharing contract assets. The overall objective of the PIGB was to promote transparent and effective
accountability in the oil sector, concerning the new institutions created.
The PIGB was passed by the Nigerian Senate in May 2017 and the House of Representatives
passed the same bill into law on January 25, 2018. However, President Muhammadu Buhari failed
to assent to the bill when it was presented before him in August 2018, citing constitutional and
legal reasons, one of which was the 10% of profits that was proposed to be retained by the
Petroleum Regulatory Commission, which the president cited as being too much and to the
detriment of the revenue of federal, states and local governments in Nigeria.
On July 1, 2021, the House of Representatives passed the Petroleum Industry Bill into law after
President Muhammadu Buhari presented a more comprehensive Petroleum Industry Bill to the
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National Assembly in September 2021. The Nigerian Senate passed the Petroleum Industry Bill
on July 2, 2021, and President Muhammadu Buhari signed the Petroleum Industry Bill into law on
August 16, 2021.
2.2.1 A Review of the Important Provisions in the Petroleum Industry Act (2021)
The explanatory memorandum of the Petroleum Industry Act (2021) states that the Act provides a
legal, governance, regulatory, and fiscal framework for the Nigerian petroleum industry and the
development of host communities.
The Act consists of five chapters, 319 sections, and eight schedules. Chapter one of the Act
maps out the governance of Nigeria’s petroleum industry and the regulatory institutions tasked
with superintending the affairs of petroleum in Nigeria. Part one of chapter one vests petroleum
in the Nigerian state while part two of chapter one codifies the powers of Nigeria’s Minister of
Petroleum. Part three of chapter one establishes the objectives, functions, duties, and powers of
the “Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission” while part four of chapter one establishes
the accompanying “Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority”.
Part five of chapter one establishes the makeup of the “Nigerian National Petroleum Company
Limited”. Chapter two of the Act deals with the ways and means of managing and administering
petroleum resources in Nigeria.
Part one of chapter two highlights the objectives and management of petroleum resources in
Nigeria while part two of chapter two details the legal administration of upstream petroleum
operations in Nigeria, especially as they affect the environment. This part outlines the laws guiding
the creation of a “national grid system”, the granting of a petroleum exploration license, the
bidding and award process of field rounds, and many other related administrative exercises.
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Part three of chapter two enshrines the general administration of midstream and downstream
petroleum operations in Nigeria. This part busies itself with matters relating to license applications,
licensing regulations, compensation for acquisition of land, and other related matters. Part four
of chapter two deals with the administration of midstream and downstream gas operations while
part five of chapter two is about the administration of midstream and downstream petroleum
liquids operations in Nigeria. Part six and seven of chapter two contain provisions about all the
other matters related to midstream and downstream operations in Nigeria and the common
provisions for upstream, midstream, and downstream petroleum operations in Nigeria.
Chapter three of the Act provides a legal and governance framework for the development of host
communities. The objectives and regulations in this chapter speak directly to the development of
oil-producing communities in Nigeria. Chapter four of the Act addresses the fiscal framework of
Nigeria’s petroleum industry. Part one of chapter four contains the objectives and general
administration of the fiscal framework of the petroleum industry. Part two of chapter four
stipulates how hydrocarbon tax should be administered while part three of chapter four legally
delineates how chargeable tax should be ascertained. Part four of chapter four speaks to the
ascertainment of chargeable profits and consolidation for tax purposes while part five of chapter
five addresses the chargeable persons.
Part six of chapter four gives a legal description of the applicability, accounts, and particulars of
entities who have tax liability while part seven addresses the appeals of tax liability. Parts eight,
nine, and ten contain provisions about the collection, recovery, and repayment of tax, the offenses
and penalties for tax-related crimes, and the application of companies’ income tax to petroleum
operations, respectively. Part eleven of chapter four contains general provisions.
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Chapter five of the Act contains miscellaneous provisions, including the processes for
commencement of legal proceedings, the filing of a pre-action notice, the processes for a transfer
of assets, and liability to the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission, among a handful of other
salient provisions.
2.2.2. Analysis of the Consequential Provisions in The Petroleum Industry Act (2021)
2.2.2.1. Chapter 1: Vesting of Oil Interests in The Nigerian State
Section 1, Part one, Chapter one of the Act vests the property and ownership of petroleum within
Nigeria and its territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone in the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria.
A. Minister Of Petroleum
Under Section 3(1) of the Petroleum Industry Act (2021), Nigeria’s Minister of Petroleum has the
power to formulate, monitor, and administer government policy in the petroleum industry;
supervise the affairs and operations of the petroleum industry in Nigeria; report developments in
the petroleum industry to the government; represent Nigeria at international organizations on
petroleum matters; promote an enabling environment for investment in the Nigerian petroleum
industry and negotiate treaties or other international agreements on petroleum on behalf of the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria.
The minister also has to grant, revoke and assign interests in the petroleum prospecting licenses
and petroleum mining leases subject to a recommendation by the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory
Commission and through the processes established in the Act; delegate in writing to the Chief
Executive of the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission any power the Act confers on the
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Minister; approve the regulatory fees of the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission and
Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority and direct the suspension
of petroleum operations in any area in Nigeria in the case of a threat to life or violation of the Act.
Other powers of the Minister of Petroleum as granted to him by Section 3 (2) of the Act includes
the fact that he can order a cutback of crude oil or condensate production in Nigeria in the context
of international oil pricing agreements supported by Nigeria.
The Minister can also prevent petroleum or petroleum products from being marketed in any part
of Nigeria in a national emergency and he has the power to give general policy directives to the
Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission and the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream
Petroleum Regulatory Authority. Section 3 (5) of the Act provides that any general policy directive
that the Minister issues must be published under the Federal Government Gazette.
B. The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission (“The Commission”)
Section 4 - 28 of the Act clearly outlines the roles, functions, powers, administrative composition,
and operational makeup of the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission ("The Commission").
Section 4(1) of the Petroleum Industry Act (2021) establishes the “Nigerian Upstream Petroleum
Regulatory Commission” which shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a
common seal.
The Commission shall have the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to sue and be
sued in its name. The Commission shall be responsible for the technical and commercial regulation
of upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria. Section 6 of the Act provides that the objectives of
the Commission include regulating the technical, operational, and commercial upstream petroleum
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operations in Nigeria; ensuring compliance with all applicable laws and regulations governing
upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria; ensuring that upstream operations are carried out in a
manner to minimize waste and achieve optimal government revenues; promoting healthy, safe,
efficient and effective conduct of upstream operations in an environmentally safe manner and
ensuring the implementation of the technical standards and practices applicable to the upstream
petroleum sector.
The Commission has the duty of implementing government policies for upstream petroleum
operations in Nigeria as directed by the Minister of Petroleum; promoting an enabling environment
for investment in upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria; ensuring strict implementation of
environmental laws that guide upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria; ensure the
implementation of national policies that guide upstream operations and ensure the implementation
of other policies that are consistent with the provisions of the Act.
C. The Technical Regulatory Functions of The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission
Section 7 of the Act outlines the technical regulatory functions of the Commission. The technical
regulatory functions of the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission include: enforcing and
implementing laws that relate to upstream oil operations; ensuring compliance with national and
international upstream petroleum operations; monitoring and regulating safety and environmental
standards relating to upstream petroleum operations, which includes the management of petroleum
reserves, installations, and the development and production activities within the onshore, frontier,
shallow water and deep offshore acreages of Nigeria.
Other technical regulatory functions of the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission include
administering, monitoring, and enforcing compliance with the terms and conditions of leases and
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licenses granted to a company carrying out upstream oil operations; setting and enforcing
regulations for the construction of plants and facilities to be used in the upstream petroleum
operations; keeping all the relevant public registers of licenses, leases, beneficial ownership and
awards of upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria; carrying out tests and investigations to
monitor the activities of upstream petroleum operation licensees and establishing and enforcing
standards relating to upstream oil operations.
The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission also has technical regulatory functions to
undertake an evaluation and management of national reserves; maintain a Nigerian petroleum
industry data bank; require licenses, leases, and permit holders to provide and publish information
relating to their operations in line with the provisions of the Act and the National Data Repository
Regulation of 2020; supervise and ensure accurate certification of the equipment used for metering
upstream petroleum operations and publish reports and statistics on upstream oil operations in
Nigeria.
The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission must advise the Minister on fiscal, operational,
technical, and related matters affecting upstream oil operations in Nigeria; issue permits and other
authorizations necessary under an upstream license or lease; establish special laboratories to
provide data storage, testing, quality assurance and certification for upstream petroleum
operations; perform technical evaluation of submissions made to the Commission by licensees,
and permit holders in the upstream oil industry and keep records, data, and reports obtained from
upstream oil operations.
The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission must manage and administer data regarding
unallocated acreage; conduct bidding rounds for the award of petroleum prospecting licenses and
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petroleum mining leases; provide assistance for companies operating in the upstream petroleum
industry where the companies ask for it and the commission deems it fit to assist; approve field
development plans for upstream petroleum operations and monitor its execution and determine the
payment of royalties and all the other charges for upstream operations in Nigeria.
The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission also has the technical duty to compute and ensure
the payment of royalties, fees, and other charges for upstream petroleum operations under the Act
or any other regulation; establish parameters and codes of conduct for licensees, lessees, and permit
holders in the upstream petroleum operations; monitor the financial viability of licensees, lessees
and permit holders in the upstream petroleum operations and develop, maintain and publish a
database of upstream petroleum operations.
D. The Commercial Regulatory Functions Of The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory
Commission (“The Commission”)
Section 8 of the Act outlines the commercial regulatory functions of the Commission. The
Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission has commercial regulatory functions to review and
approve the commercial aspects of field development plans in the upstream petroleum operations;
develop cost studies and benchmarks for the evaluation of upstream petroleum operations and
allocate petroleum production quotas in conjunction with NNPC Limited. Section 8 (d) of the Act
also grants the Commission powers to be in charge in a case where fixed vessels provide fully
integrated upstream and midstream petroleum operations.
E. The Functions of The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission ("The Commission")
Concerning Frontier Basins
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Section 9 of the Act lists out the functions of the Commission concerning frontier basins. These
functions include promoting the exploration of frontier basins in Nigeria; developing exploration
strategies for the exploration of unassigned frontier acreages in Nigeria; identifying opportunities
and increasing information about the petroleum resources base in frontier basins in Nigeria;
undertaking studies, analyzing, and evaluating unassigned frontier basins in Nigeria.
Section 9 (4) of the Act states that The Commission shall maintain a "Frontier Exploration
Fund" which shall be 30% of NNPC Limited's profit oil and profit gas in the production
sharing, profit sharing, and risk service contracts. Section 9 (5) of the Act provides that the
NNPC Limited shall transfer the 30% of profit oil and gas under subsection 4 of the Act to the
"Frontier Exploration Fund" escrow account dedicated for the development of frontier acreages
and utilize the funds to carry out exploration and development activities in the frontier acreages,
subject to appropriation by the National Assembly.
Section 10 of the Act outlines the general powers of The Commission. They include; enforcing
the provisions of any regulation that concerns upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria; sealing
up premises engaging in upstream petroleum operations in contravention of the Act; ensuring
compliance with nuclear safety and radiation, in line with the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Act;
requires lessees, licensees and permit holders to public specific information about upstream oil
operations and issuing guidelines following the Act as they matter to upstream oil operations.
Other powers of The Commission include recommending to the Minister the revocation or
suspension of licenses or leases following the Act; possessing access to the right of way of offices
and installations where data is stored or upstream activities are carried out, to inspect the facility.
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The Commission also has the power to impose special terms on a petroleum prospecting license,
petroleum exploration license, or any petroleum mining lease at the grant of a renewal of the
license or lease.
F. The Governing Board of The Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission ("The Board Of
The Commission")
Section 11 of the Act provides that there is established a Governing Board responsible for the
general administration of the Commission. Section 11 (2) of the Act provides that the board shall
consist of: one non-executive chairman, two non-executive commissioners, the chief executive of
the Commission, two other executive commissioners who are responsible for finance and accounts
and exploration and acreage, one representative of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream
Petroleum Regulatory Authority not below the rank of Director, one representative of the Ministry
of Petroleum not below the rank of Director, one representative of the Ministry of Finance not
below the rank of Director.
Section 11 (3) - (7) stipulates the terms of appointment, qualification, tenure, and mode of
delegating powers required of members on the board, including the fact that all appointments to
the board shall be made by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate, except for the exofficio members on the board.
Section 12 of the Act describes the functions of the board, including the fact that the board shall
be responsible for the formulation of policy, supervision, and giving strategic direction to the
Commission. Section 13 - 24 of the Act outlines the critical operational workings of the Board of
the Commission and the Commission. Section 24 (1) of the Act provides that the board of the
Commission shall maintain a fund known as the "Commission fund" into which all the money
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accruing to the Commission shall be paid and all expenditures of the Commission shall be subject
to appropriation by the National Assembly. The fund of the Commission shall be used to meet
approved budgetary obligations of the Commission.
Section 26 (1) of the Act expressly gives the Commission special powers to investigate any
business relating to upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria where it believes that illegal
upstream operations are going on; conduct surveillance on crude oil and natural gas installations
where it believes that illegal upstream petroleum activities are going on; enter any upstream facility
where the crude oil or natural gas is produced or treated and enter any premises at a reasonable
time where data records of upstream petroleum operations are stored.
Section 27 of the Act provides that the special powers of the Commission shall be performed by
the Special Investigation Unit of the Commission, or anyone authorized by the Commission.
G. The Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority
Section 29 (1) establishes the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory
Authority. The Authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal.
Section 29 (2) of the Act states that the Authority shall have the power to acquire, hold and dispose
of property, and sue and be sued in its name.
Section 29 (3) of the Act states that the Authority shall be responsible for the technical and
commercial regulation of the midstream and downstream petroleum operations in the petroleum
industry. Section 31 of the Act states that one of the key objectives of the Authority shall be to
regulate midstream and downstream operations, including technical, operational, and commercial
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activities; ensure safety in the midstream and downstream petroleum operations, and promote a
competitive market for midstream and downstream petroleum operations.
Section 32 of the Act states that the functions of the Authority shall be to regulate and monitor
technical and commercial operations in the midstream and downstream petroleum operations in
Nigeria. Section 32(b) details all the functions of the Authority, including the fact that the
Authority shall provide a pricing and tariff framework for all processing, transportation, and
storage of crude oil and natural gas in Nigeria.
Section 34 of the Act establishes a Governing Board for the Authority, which consists of nine
members, as enshrined in Section 34 (2). Section 47 (1) of the Act provides that the Authority
shall maintain a fund, referred to as the “Authority Fund” into which all the funds of the
Commission shall be paid. The Authority Fund shall be applied to meet budgetary obligations of
the Authority, as enshrined in Section 47 (3).
Section 49 (1) of the Act states that the Authority shall have special powers to inspect and examine
any business or activity relating to midstream or downstream petroleum operations under the Act,
especially where it believes that illegal midstream or downstream petroleum operations are going
on.
Section 52 (1) of the Act provides for a “Midstream and Downstream Gas Infrastructure
Fund”, chaired by the Minister of Petroleum, which shall acquire, hold, dispose of property, and
sue and be sued in its name. Section 52 (7) of the Act provides that the source of the Midstream
and Downstream Infrastructure Fund shall be 0.5% of the wholesale price of petroleum products
and natural gas sold in Nigeria, which shall be collected from customers.
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Per Section 52 (7) (d) of the Act, money received from gas flaring penalties shall be under Section
104 (4) of the Act and the money shall be used for environmental remediation and the benefit of
the host communities that the settlor has violated.
H. Part 5 — Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Limited
Part five of the Act introduces the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Limited ("NNPC
Limited"). Section 53 (1) of the Act provides that the Minister shall within six months of the
commencement of the Act cause to be incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act
a limited liability company which shall be called Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited.
Section 53 (3) of the Act provides that ownership of all shares in NNPC Limited shall be vested
in the Government at incorporation and held by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Power
equally, on behalf of the Federation.
According to Section 53 (5), shares of the NNPC Limited held by the Government are not
transferable under any means possible unless approved by the Government and endorsed by the
National Economic Council on behalf of the Federation. By Section 53 (6) of the Act, any sale or
transfer of shares of NNPC Limited can only be through an open, transparent, and competitive
process, and the shares to be sold by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum shall
be of equal proportion.
Section 53 (7) of the Act states that NNPC Limited shall conduct its affairs on a commercial basis
and efficiently and profitably without using government funds. They must also declare dividends
as a public company and retain 20% of their earnings to grow the business. Section 53 (8) of the
Act states that where NNPC Limited has a participating interest or 100% license in a lease or
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license, NNPC limited shall pay its requirement of all fees relating to the lease or license to the
Government as a company. Section 54 (1) of the Act states that the Minister of Petroleum shall
determine the assets that should be transferred to NNPC Limited within 18 months (18) of the
commencement of the Act and shall transfer them within that time.
Section 54 (3) provides that NNPC shall cease to exist when all the assets that were not transferred
to NNPC Limited have been extinguished or have been transferred to the Government. Section 58
of the Act provides that there shall be a Board for NNPC Limited which shall perform its duties
according to the Petroleum Industry Act, Companies and Allied Matters Act, and the Articles of
Association of the company.
According to section 59 (2) of the Act, the board of the NNPC shall be appointed by the President
and they shall consist of 11 members, including a non-executive Chairman and the Chief Executive
of NNPC Limited. Under section 63 (1), the board of the NNPC shall be responsible for the
strategic guidance and determining the business structure of NNPC Limited. Section 64 of the Act
states that one of the key objectives of NNPC Limited shall be to carry out petroleum operations
on a commercial basis, comparable to that of private companies operating similar businesses,
including an exemption to the Public Procurement Act, the Fiscal Responsibility Act, and the
Treasury Single Account.
Section 64 (b) of the Act states that NNPC Limited shall be vested as the concessionaire of all
Production Sharing Contracts (PSC), Profit Sharing, and Risk Service Contracts as the national oil
company on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria, in line with its competencies. The
NNPC Limited is also to lift and sell royalty oil and tax oil on behalf of the Commission and the
Service respectively for an agreed commercial fee, according to Section 64 (c) of the Act.
105

NNPC Limited must engage in the business of renewables and other energy investments, according
to Section 64 (h) of the Act, and it must maintain the role of NNPC under Section 54 of the Act,
as enshrined in Section 64 (j) of the Act.
2.2.2.2. CHAPTER 2 — GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
Section 66 (of Chapter 2 of the Act outlines the broad objectives of the general administration of
petroleum operations in Nigeria. Section 66 (1) of the Act states that the objectives of the General
Administration in the petroleum industry shall be to promote the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum resources in Nigeria for the benefit of the Nigerian people.
The objectives of the general administration in Nigeria's petroleum industry must promote the
efficient, effective, and sustainable development of the petroleum industry, liberalization of the
downstream Petroleum industry, and an orderly, fair, and competitive commercial environment
within the petroleum industry. Section 66 (2) of the Act provides that the provisions in this chapter
apply to the persons and activities connected to the petroleum industry in Nigeria.
2.2.2.3. CHAPTER 3—Petroleum Host Community Development (PHCD)
Chapter 3 introduces the Petroleum Host Community Development (PHCD) which has the
following objectives:
•

To foster sustainable prosperity within host communities.

•

To provide direct social and economic benefits from petroleum operations to host
communities.

•

To enhance peaceful and harmonious co-existence between licensees or lessees and host
communities; and
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•

To create a framework to support the development of host communities.

•

The PHCD is expected to improve the quality of life of the host communities’ population
and improve accountability in the management of the host communities’ development trust
(HCDT or “the Trust”) fund.

Some of the significant provisions of the framework of PIA for the Trust are as follows:
Section 235 of the Act requires a settlor or a group of settlors under a joint operating agreement to
incorporate an HCDT. The Trust is to aid the development of the economic and social
infrastructure of the communities within the petroleum-producing area. Where the HCDT is
incorporated by a group of settlors under a joint operation, the operator under the agreement will
be responsible for the Trust on behalf of the other parties. Section 234 of the Act requires the
Commission to make regulations that will govern the implementation of the HCD. Section 240 of
the PIA requires each settlor to contribute 3% of its actual operating expenditure in the upstream
petroleum operations in the preceding calendar year to a fund established by the Trust. The CDT
may also be funded by donations, gifts, grants, or honoraria (received to achieve its objectives)
and interests accruing to the Trust’s reserve fund. Section 236 pegs the timeframe within which to
inaugurate the HCDT failing which the implication will be revocation of the lease or license after
being informed in writing by the Commission or Authority (Section 238).
Section 257(2) of the Act foist responsibility and accountability amongst the host communities
regarding petroleum assets operated in their respective communities by providing for the forfeiture
of the host community’s entitlement to any contribution to the extent of the cost to repair damages
to the petroleum and designated facilities or disruption to production activities within the host
community caused by an act of vandalism, sabotage, or civil unrest. Therefore, the amount to be
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contributed by the settlor to the Trust shall exclude the computed cost of such repairs or disruption
in petroleum productions. It is believed that the contribution made towards the HCDT will help in
assuaging the repercussions of gas flaring on the host communities while also arresting the
incessant vandalism and unrest that usually flows from the agitations of the host communities.
2.2.2.4. CHAPTER 4: Petroleum Industry Fiscal Framework (PIFF)
It introduces the following objectives:
Fiscal Provisions:
•

To establish a progressive fiscal framework that encourages investment in the Nigerian
petroleum industry, balancing rewards with risk and enhancing revenues to the Federal
Government (FG).

•

To provide a forward-looking fiscal framework that is based on core principles of clarity,
dynamism, and fiscal rules of general application.

•

To establish a fiscal framework that expands the revenue base of the FG, while ensuring a
fair return for investors.

•

To simplify the administration of petroleum tax; and

•

To promote equity and transparency in the petroleum industry fiscal regime.

The Act amends and repeals various laws that have implications for the oil and gas industry. It
provides for the current Petroleum Profits Tax (PPT) to be split into two namely: Hydrocarbon
Tax (HT) and Companies Income Tax (CIT). The HT, together with CIT, will apply to companies
engaged in upstream petroleum operations. The fiscal and tax amendments in the PIB will apply
upon:
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•

conversion of existing Oil Prospecting Licenses (OPLs) and Oil Mining Leases (OMLs) to
Petroleum Prospecting Licenses (PPLs) and Petroleum Mining Licenses (PMLs).

•

termination or expiration of unconverted licenses, and c. renewal of OMLs. Consequently,
holders of OPLs and OMLs that do not convert to PMLs will continue to be taxed under
the current PPT Act pending the expiration of their licenses.

Introduction of HT Regime: The Act introduces the Hydrocarbon Tax (HT), which will be
chargeable on the profits of upstream petroleum companies in the onshore and shallow water.
The HT applies to crude oil, field condensates, and natural gas liquids from associated gas.
The PIA seeks to amend the sections on deductions allowed and deductions not allowed
thereby canceling certain costs as allowable deductions such as bad debts, gas flare fees,
penalties, etc. (Section 264). The Act also restricts the allowable deductions claimable in each
accounting period for the determination of the HT payable to 65% of the gross revenues
determined at the measurement points.

2.2.2.5. Chapter 5 Miscellaneous Provisions
This chapter provides generally legal proceedings, pre-action notice, savings provisions,
interpretation, transfer of assets, and projects amongst others. Some highlights of this chapter
are provided below:
•

Legal Proceedings & Pre-Action Notice: The Act provides that the provisions of the
Public Officers Protection Act (POPA) will apply concerning any suit instituted against
the Commission or the Authority or any of its executives, directors, officers, or
employees. In addition, all actions or claims to be brought against the foregoing persons
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under the PIA must be brought within three months of the accrual of the cause of action
(Section 308).
•

Repeals and Consequential Amendments:

The Act provides that the provisions of the PIA are subject to the Constitution but will
however prevail if found to be inconsistent with the provisions of other laws. Specifically,
the Act provides for the repeal of the following laws•

Associated Gas Re-Injection Act

•

Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act

•

Motor Spirits (Returns) Act

•

Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Projects) Act

•

Nigerian National Petroleum (NNPC) Act

•

Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory

•

Agency (Establishment) Act

•

Petroleum Profit Tax Act (upon the completion of the conversion process under Section
92 of the PIA)

•

Deep Offshore Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract Act (upon the completion of
the conversion process under Section 92 of the PIA)

Savings Provisions: The Act provides that any existing Act, subsidiary legislation or regulation,
guideline directive, and Order made under any law which has been repealed or amended by the
PIA will continue to subsist to the extent that it does not contravene the provisions of the PIA until
it is revoked or replaced by an amendment or another subsidiary legislation.
Furthermore, any OPL or OML granted under the Petroleum Act, 1969 which is subsisting as of
the effective date of the PIA will continue to subsist only subject to the fulfillment of certain terms
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and conditions listed under the PIA. Hence, the Act specifically states that the following laws will
remain applicable concerning the affected OPLs and OMLs until the termination or expiration of
their tenures.
•

Petroleum Act

•

Petroleum Profit Tax Act

•

Oil Pipelines Act

•

Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act

•

Any other laws or regulations that are consistent with the principle in Section 92(6) of the
PIA.

In addition, any other licenses, leases, certificates, authority, or permits which was issued by the
Department of Petroleum Resources, Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Agency, or
Petroleum Equalization Fund, which had effect before the effective date of the PIA will continue
to have effect for the remainder of its period of validity.
Transfer of Assets, Liabilities, Employees, Projects, etc.: The Act provides for the transfer of all
rights, obligations, assets, and liabilities vested in the Petroleum Inspectorate and the Department
of Petroleum Resources to the Commission, and for employees in these institutions to become
employees of the Commission under no less favorable terms. Also, rights, obligations, assets, and
liabilities held by the DPR, Petroleum Pricing and Product Regulatory Agency, and the Petroleum
Equalization Fund (Management Board) will be transferred to the Authority. More so, any existing
host community development project being handled by any Settlor will be transferred to a host
community development trust, which will be established according to the provisions of the Act.

111

2.3

Gas Flaring Management Under the Petroleum Industry Act 2021 (‘PIA’)

An age-long concern for host communities is the continuous degradation of their environment and
habitat from gas flaring associated with oil drilling. Gas flaring has been attributed to unfavorable
cost-benefit outcomes to the operators in the sector that may choose to harness and monetize
associated gas. The cost of processing gas for sale is generally adjudged higher than the benefits
that would be derived from commercializing the processed gas. As such, associated gas is preferred
to be flared or vented by operators.189
The Federal Government set up policies to reduce gas flaring and improve the petroleum sector
but faced slow growth. There were still gaps in the governance, infrastructure, and accountability.
It became necessary to reform the entire petroleum sector in Nigeria. Better regulations, better
returns on investment. The national move led to the birth of the Petroleum Industry Bill in 2000.
Several attempts to pass the bill into law were unsuccessful for two decades until it was finally
passed into law in August 2021 as the Petroleum Industry Act (2021).
The PIA made Provisions to Curb Gas Flaringand also compensated Host Communities.
Considering the environmental impact of gas flaring, the PIA has upheld the prohibition of gas
flaring in previous laws, except for a few circumstances in which there is no other reasonable
option than to flare gas. As part of the efforts to manage the flaring of gas, the Commission requires
upstream operators that produce natural gas to submit, within 12 months of the effective date of
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the PIA, a natural gas flare elimination and monetization plan to the Commission. This is expected
to be prepared in accordance with regulations made by the Commission under the PIA.190
The PIA makes provision for the Nigeria Upstream Regulatory Commission, which will be
responsible for commercial and technical regulation of upstream petroleum operations. The
Upstream refers to the identification, extraction, and production of raw materials. A report191 by
the Africa Energy Portal stated that Nigeria loses 2.5 billion dollars yearly because of severe gas
flaring from 178 flare sites nationwide. To curb the continuation of this wanton waste by the
elimination of natural gas flaring and venting is one of the key goals of the upstream commission.
According to Section 104(1) of the PIA, there are a few cases where gas flaring is permissible:
•

in the event of a disaster

•

under the terms of a Commission-issued exception.

•

in accordance with existing regulations, as an acceptable safety practice.

Section 107 provides for exemptions from the provision of section 104 which penalize gas flaring.
Section 107 provides that the Commission or the Authority may grant a permit to a Licensee or
Lessee to allow the flaring or venting of natural gas for a specific period a) where it is required for facility start-up; or
b) for strategic operational reasons, including testing.
The PIA imposes penalties on companies for gas flaring from upstream operations and allocates
the revenue generated to be used for environmental remediation and relief of the impacted host
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communities. The fiscal framework of the PIA provides for penalties for gas flaring arising from
midstream operations. Revenues from these penalties will accrue to the Midstream and
Downstream Infrastructure Fund and will be used to finance midstream and downstream
infrastructure investment. The objective is to compensate the host community for the
environmental damage caused by the flaring or venting.
This is a good development; however, the penalty must be steep enough to achieve its intended
purpose. If it is not, oil companies will continue to flare gas if doing so minimizes their cost more
than the penalty adds to it. Under the PIA, the sole power to grant, issue, modify, cancel, or
terminate all licenses, permits, and authorizations for midstream and downstream petroleum
operations is vested in the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority
(‘the Authority’), which means the imposition of sanctions for gas flaring in the midstream and
downstream sector is solely vested in the Authority.
The income from penalties of gas flaring is now an additional fund created under the PIA for the
midstream and downstream gas operations known as the Midstream and Downstream Gas
Infrastructure Fund (MDGIF). The MDGIF seeks to ensure equity investments of Governmentowned participating or shareholder interests in the infrastructure of midstream and downstream
gas operations. Also, Section 106 of the PIA provides for the licensee to install metering equipment
in every facility from which natural gas may be flared for measuring the amount of gas being
flared. This is expected to track the amount of gas been flared. However, this will be inadequate
to compute and regulate the amount of gas been flared on these sites.
In addition to the usual disallowable expenses, section 104(3) of the Act introduces Penalties and
gas flare fees as non-deductible expenses and ineligible for cost recovery barring oil companies
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from deducting the financial cost of gas flaring fees and penalties from the calculation of Company
Income tax to be remitted.
The PIA like previous legislations prohibited gas flaring and made provisions to that effect but
was not without its shortcomings. Some of the major shortcomings are:
a) Failed to outrightly prohibit gas flaring, instead, it creates room for continuation of gas
flaring under exceptions with discretionary granting of a license by the Minister to oil
companies to continue flaring turning gas flaring into discretionary permit-granting.
b) There is no evidence of adequate commitment to climate change and energy transition in
line with the Paris Agreement.
c) The provisions, which criminalize and penalize gas flaring, do not adequately take into
consideration the state of Nigeria’s gas infrastructure.
d) There is no timeline for the elimination of gas flaring.
e) Flaring penalties are now solely left to the Minister to determine through regulation.
f) These provisions are too vague to suitably police gas flaring; an area equally vital to the
economic/environmental state of the nation.
g) The inclusion of provisions on environmental pollution (gas flaring) and penalties against
polluters is a welcome development, however, it is a let-down that the PIA does not fully
address the hitherto weak implementation of sanctions which many Nigerian regulations
and statutes are victims of.
Also, while the creation of the Environmental Remediation Fund is a step in the right direction as
regards remediation of communities that host gas flare sites, however, the PIA failed to adequately
address the environmental concerns of the host communities as there are no effective guidelines
or structure on how the funds will be applied for the remedial process.
115

2.4

A Brief Comparison of The Petroleum Industry Act and The Previously Existing
Laws That Control The Oil And Gas Industry In Nigeria

The Petroleum Industry Act is the principal statute that beams a searchlight on the overall operation
and judicious administration of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. However, there are adjacent
laws that play a tangential role in the administration of oil and gas in Nigeria. The Petroleum
Industry Act repeals 10 statutes previously in force in Nigeria. The Act also amends some other
statutes that speak directly to the oil and gas industry in Nigeria while it upholds the provision of
a few statutes that give solid legal backing to the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.
These are all the laws that previously affected the petroleum industry in Nigeria before the
enactment of the Petroleum Industry Act (2021):
1. The Nigerian Constitution
2. The Petroleum Industry Act (2004)
3. The Land Use Act
4. The Petroleum Profits Tax Act
5. The Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act
6. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act
7. The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act
8. The Environmental Impact Assessment Act
9. The Companies and Allied Matters Act
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10. The Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act
11. The Education Tax Act
12. The Niger Delta Development Commission (Establishment) Act192
13. The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act
14. The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act
15. The National Oil Spill Detection and Regulation Agency (Establishment) Act
16. The Petroleum industry act and The Oil Pipelines Act
17. The Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act
18. The Harmful Waste (Special Provisions) Act
19. The Petroleum Industry Act and The NNPC (projects) Act
20. The Petroleum Industry Act and The Motor Spiritual Act
The Petroleum Industry Act (2021) however maintains the relevance of significant laws like the
Nigerian Constitution (1999), the Land Use Act, the Companies and Allied Matters Act (2021),
the Federal Inland Revenue Service Act (2007), the Education Tax Act (2004), the Niger Delta
Development Commission Act (2004) and all such other relevant statutes in Nigeria.
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2.5

Brief Critique of What Could Have Been Better in the Petroleum Industry Act (2021)

a)

Reduction of Over-Regulation

There is the prospect of overregulation in the Nigerian petroleum industry with the creation of the
Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission ("Commission") and the Nigerian
Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority ("Authority").
The Act could have established only one regulatory authority in the Nigerian petroleum industry.
That way, stakeholders can be certain that the era of needless bureaucratic processes is behind the
Nigerian petroleum industry.
b)

Increase in Allocation to The Host Communities Trust

A significant number of Nigerians believe that the 3% of operating expenses of settlors allocated
to the petroleum host communities under the act is too little. This view is also strongly held by
indigenes of the host communities themselves.
The Act could have earmarked 5% of each settlors operating expenses to the host communities’
trust. This way, host communities will have no course to maintain any doubt about the sincerity of
the government's interests for them, and their well-being.
c)

Reduction In Allocation to The Frontier Exploration Fund

The 30% allocation of Commission profit oil to the frontier exploration fund is too much. While
it is agreed that frontier exploration is important, 10% of the Commission profit oil would have
still done a stellar job at helping Nigeria achieve the discovery of new petroleum sites.
d)

Reduction in the Monopolistic Tendencies of the Provisions of the Act
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Certain provisions in the Act, like Section 109(3) and Section 317 (8) of the Act which deal with
a license to refine crude oil and to import crude oil shortfalls into the domestic market stand to
benefit only well-established refiners in the petroleum industry. The Act could have been more
circumspect of these provisions to avoid tilting the already lopsided nature of Nigeria's petroleum
industry into the hands of a few monopolists.
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CHAPTER 3
3.0. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ACCOMPANYING TREATIES
3.1.

Introduction

Climate Change is the defining issue of our time, and we are at a defining moment. From shifting
weather patterns that threaten food production to rising sea levels that increase the risk of
catastrophic flooding, the impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented in
scale. This situation however did not begin in recent times, it had always been a front-burner issue
in the previous century, with concerned individuals, organizations, and bodies raising awareness
of the degradation of the environment and the need to protect the climate. Each year, mankind
injects approximately six billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels
(IPCC, 1992),193 as well as a substantial (although still uncertain) amount from deforestation. Since
the advent of the industrial revolution, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have risen by
more than twenty-five percent, from 280 to more than 350 parts per million (ppm). Scientists
estimate that if current patterns of emissions continue unchecked, the increasing concentrations of
carbon dioxide, together with parallel increases in other trace gases such as methane and nitrous
oxide, will cause the average global warming in the range of 0.2 to 0.50 C per decade, or 2 to 50
C (3.6 to 90 F) by the end of the century.194 Such a temperature rise, more rapid than at any time
in human history, could have severe effects on coastal areas, agriculture, forests, and human health.
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In response to this threat, the U.N. General Assembly established the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) in December
1990, with the mandate to negotiate a convention containing "appropriate commitments" in time
for signature at the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992.
The INC met six times between February 1991 and May 1992 and adopted the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change on May 9, 1992. The Convention was opened for signature at
UNCED, where it was signed by 154 states and the European Community.
Given the complexity of both negotiations, which involved more than 140 states with very different
interests and ideologies, and the causes, effects, and policy implications of global warming,
reaching an agreement at all in such a limited period was a considerable achievement. The final
text is significantly more substantive than either the bare-bones convention advocated by some
delegations or previous framework conventions dealing with transboundary air pollution195 and
depletion of the ozone layer.196
This part of the paper will give an overview of the Convention and consider its impacts on the
environment particularly its efficacy in addressing issues surrounding the reduction of greenhouse
emissions, climate change, and general environmental degradation. In so doing, we will examine
the accompanying treaties like the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, which also constitute
the world’s response to climate change. This work will also understudy the initial and continuing
responsibility of the various countries of the world to the Convention and evaluate its significance
in the developing corpus of international environmental law.
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3.2.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC” or the
“Convention”) is an international environmental treaty produced at the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio
de Janeiro from June 3 to 14, 1992. It is one of the three Rio Conventions adopted at the Rio Earth
Summit – the others being the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to
Combat Desertification. Signed in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, the UNFCCC constitutes the foundational climate agreement that has provided the
platform for most subsequent international climate agreements. The Convention is an international
mechanism for addressing climate change and has been ratified by a broad cross-section of both
developed and developing countries, including the United States. The goal of the convention is to
“prevent dangerous human interference in the climate system.” Achieving this goal is controversial
despite the broad international consensus behind the convention.
The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994 and has been ratified by 197 countries. In
structure and content, the UNFCCC is styled as a framework convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer and the Convention. While the Convention does not commit states to specific
limitations on greenhouse gas emissions, it recognizes climate change as a serious threat and
establishes a basis for future action. First, it defines as a common long-term objective the
stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases "at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."197 Second, to guide future work,
it sets forth principles relating to inter-and intra-generational equity, the needs of developing
countries, precaution, cost-effectiveness, sustainable development, and the international
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economy.198 More importantly, it establishes a process designed to improve our information base
and reduce uncertainties, encourage national planning, and produce more substantive international
standards should scientific evidence continue to mount that human activities are changing the
Earth's climate.
The parties announced a goal of stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system and developed
country parties agreed to adopt national policies to mitigate climate change with the “aim” of
returning to their 1990 levels of anthropogenic emissions of GHGs. The UNFCCC was designed
primarily to begin and support a process for future, and more detailed, agreements about how to
respond to climate change.199
“Multilateral treaties are now routinely developed in a process that begins with a ‘framework’
agreement, where the parties acknowledge the existence of a problem or threat, and commit to
cooperative action, without undertaking substantive obligations. As knowledge and consensus
grow within this framework, the agreement is supplemented by a series of protocols and
amendments imposing progressively more specific and more stringent obligations on the treaty
parties”200. Owing to the increasing scientific evidence about the risks of climate change, the need
for a further negotiated agreement became necessary. This led to the UNFCCC’s birthing of both
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the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement which will be discussed in more detail in the latter part
of this work.
The UNFCCC is also the name of the United Nations Secretariat charged with supporting the
operation of the Convention, with offices in Haus Carstanjen, Bonn, Germany. From 2006 to 2010
the head of the secretariat was Yvo de Boer; on May 17, 2010, his successor, Christiana Figueres
from Costa Rica was named. On 18 May 2016, United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon
(as he then was) appointed Patricia Espinosa of Mexico as Executive Secretary of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Secretariat, augmented
through the parallel efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)201, aims to
gain consensus through meetings and the discussion of various strategies.
•

The Annex I, Annex II, and Developing Countries

Parties to the UNFCCC are classified as:
i.

Annex I countries – industrialized countries and economies in transition.

ii.

Annex II countries – developed countries which pay for costs of developing countries: and

iii.

Non-Annex I countries - Developing countries.
i.Annex I Countries

There are 41 Annex I countries including the European Union. These countries are classified as
industrialized countries and countries in transition: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, India, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
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Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States
of America.
Annex I countries that have ratified the Protocol have committed to reducing their emission levels
of greenhouse gasses to targets that are mainly set below their 1990 levels. They may do this by
allocating reduced annual allowances to the major operators within their borders. These operators
can only exceed their allocations if they buy emission allowances or offset their excesses through
a mechanism that is agreed by all the parties to UNFCCC.
ii.Annex II Countries
Annex II countries are a sub-group of the Annex I countries. They comprise the OECD members,
excluding those that were economies in transition in 1992. There are 23 Annex II countries and
the European Union. Turkey was removed from the Annex II list in 2001 at its request to recognize
its economy as a transition economy. These countries are classified as developed countries that
pay for the costs of developing countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of
America
iii.Developing Countries
Developing countries are not required to reduce emission levels unless developed countries supply
enough funding and technology. Setting no immediate restrictions under UNFCCC serves three
purposes- (a) it avoids restrictions on their development because emissions are strongly linked to
industrial capacity; (b) they can sell emissions credits to nations whose operators have difficulty
meeting their emissions targets, and (c) they get money and technologies for low-carbon
investments from Annex II countries.
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Nigeria has also been categorized into this group because of its developing status. Nigeria and all
African nations are also categorized in this group. In essence, countries that produce half of the
world`s fossil fuel which is a major cause of global warming are not required to reduce their
emissions even if it comes from gas flaring from oil mining fields.
Developing countries may volunteer to become Annex I countries when they are sufficiently
developed. Some opponents of the Convention argue that the split between Annex I and developing
countries is unfair and that both developing countries and developed countries need to reduce their
emissions unilaterally. Some countries claim that the costs of following the Convention
requirements will stress their economy. Other countries point to research, such as the Stern
Review202, that calculates the cost of compliance to be less than the cost of the consequences of
doing nothing.
3.2.1. Prologue to the UNFCCC
In the latter half of the 1980s, as more scientists and policymakers began to see climate change as
an imminent threat rather than a distant possibility, a consensus gradually developed that those
states should negotiate a legally binding convention to address the problem203. Global warming is
the type of collective action problem that is often thought to require international collaboration for
a solution. Given the global nature of the problem, unilateral action will not provide significant
benefits if others continue to pollute. Thus, states are likely to take potentially costly action to curb
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greenhouse gas emissions only if they have some assurance that other states will take similar
actions. An international agreement helps to provide that assurance, particularly if it has strong
mechanisms to encourage compliance204.
Initially, two legal models were suggested. One approach, advocated by Canada, was to develop
a general framework agreement on the "law of the atmosphere,"205 and then address specific
atmospheric issues such as global warming, acid rain, and ozone depletion in subsidiary
protocols206. The rationale for this approach was that it recognized the interdependence of various
global atmospheric problems. The Toronto Conference Statement supported this approach, calling
for the development of "a comprehensive global convention as a framework for protocols on the
protection of the atmosphere."207 In February 1989, Canada sponsored a meeting in Ottawa of legal
and policy experts on the law of the atmosphere, with the hope of beginning discussions on a
framework convention. 208 (Hereinafter Ottawa Statement).
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The second approach called for a convention specifically on climate change. At the opening of the
Ottawa meeting, Mostafa Tolba, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), strongly criticized the "law of the atmosphere" model as politically
unrealistic, arguing instead for a more narrowly focused convention on global warming209.
Although the elements of a framework convention on the law of the atmosphere were discussed at
the Ottawa meeting, attention turned to this alternative approach. The Ottawa meeting discussed
the possible elements of a climate change convention, recommended the use of the Vienna Ozone
Convention format for guidance, and suggested consideration of protocols on the various
greenhouse gases, deforestation/reforestation, and a world climate trust fund.
However, neither the Toronto nor Ottawa meetings were governmental, and as of early 1989, a
governmental decision had not yet been made to negotiate a climate change convention. The 1988
U.N. General Assembly resolution on climate change had spoken merely of "a possible future
international convention on climate," but it had not authorized negotiation of a convention 210. In
the IPCC, the United States forestalled the creation of a separate legal group, questioning the need
for negotiations and arguing for more scientific study instead.'211.
In the spring of 1989, pressure intensified on the United States to negotiate a climate
convention212.' After a White House attempt to dilute the Congressional testimony of a NASA

209

Tolba, M. (1989). A Step-by-step Approach to Protection of the Atmosphere. International Environmental Law

Journal, 304.
210

Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 43rd

Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 133, 134, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988)
211

Weisskopf, M. (1989, May 6). Sununu Blocked Plan to Seek Convention on Global Warming. Washington Post,

p. A2.
212

Peterson, C. (1989, May 9). Experts, OMB Spar on Global Warming. Washington Post, p. A1.

128

scientist resulted in public embarrassment,213 the United States finally reversed its position and
announced on May 12 that it would support the negotiation of a framework convention on climate
change.214 Several weeks later, the UNEP Governing Council adopted a resolution requesting
UNEP to begin preparations for the negotiations and recommending that the negotiations begin as
quickly as possible after the adoption of the IPCC's First Assessment Report.215
In October 1989, the United States, in its capacity as chair of IPCC's Response Strategies Working
Group, organized a multi-disciplinary workshop on implementation measures attended by
representatives from forty-three governments.216 Participants recognized the inadequacy of
existing legal instruments and the need for a framework convention on climate change, modeled
on the Vienna Ozone Convention and framed to gain the adherence of the largest number of states.
They also agreed that the convention should include, at a minimum, general principles of
cooperation and a legal and institutional framework for "monitoring and assessing climate change
and for developing and implementing responses. Some delegations suggested that the convention
should include binding commitments and control measures, as well as a clear mechanism for
providing financial assistance, but they could not obtain a consensus on these points. Without
deciding which elements should be included in the convention, the workshop elaborated a list of
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possible elements, which were refined and ultimately included in the Response Strategies Working
Group report the following year.217
In December 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting the UNEP
decision to begin preparations for the negotiations. The following September, UNEP, and World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) convened an open-ended ad hoc working group of
government representatives to consider the ways, means, and modalities for the negotiations.218
The group recommended, inter alia, that a single negotiating process be established to discuss both
policy issues and legal instruments. However, participants could not agree on whether protocols
should be negotiated simultaneously with the Convention219 or on who should organize and
conduct the negotiations: a negotiating committee under the auspices of WMO and UNEP, in
essence, carrying forward the IPCC process, or a special conference under the authority of the
U.N. General Assembly.220 Western countries tended to support the former option, while many
developing countries, who felt excluded from the IPCC, preferred the second option.221
Developing countries tended to see climate change in developmental as well as environmental
terms, given its implications for industry, transportation, and agriculture. Moreover, they argued
that climate change is a political and not merely a technical issue. For both reasons, they felt that
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it should be addressed under the auspices of a political body - namely the U.N. General Assembly
- rather than by more technical agencies like UNEP and WMO.
At its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly implicitly accepted this position by stating in a
resolution that the General Assembly was "the appropriate forum for concerted political action on
global environmental problems.222 On December 21, 1990, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
Resolution 45/212, establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC) as "a single intergovernmental negotiating process under
the auspices of the General Assembly.223 While the General Assembly directed the INC to "take
into account" the work of the IPCC, and invited UNEP and WMO to make "appropriate
contributions" to the negotiation process, it nevertheless called for the establishment of an ad hoc
secretariat.
Moving forward, between February 1991 and May 1992, the INC held five sessions. Under the
terms of the U.N. General Assembly resolution establishing the INC, each negotiating session
could last only two weeks, and the INC was to complete its work in time for the Convention to be
signed at UNCED. The discussions in the INC followed a pattern common to international
negotiations. At first, little progress was apparent. During most of 1991, states debated procedural
issues and enunciated and reiterated their positions instead of bridging their differences by finding
compromise formulations or engaging in tradeoffs or deals. Where they disagreed about a
provision, participants simply bracketed the language in question (to indicate the disagreement) or
added alternative formulations. At the end of the year, much if not most of the text remained
bracketed - sometimes in brackets within brackets within brackets.224 This sparring process,
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although frustrating to those seeking rapid progress, played a necessary role by allowing states to
voice their views and concerns. They learned about and gauged the strength of other states' views.
They sent up trial balloons and explored possible areas of compromise. Indeed, without this mutual
learning process, it is hard to imagine that agreement would have been possible.
Real negotiations, however, began only in the final months before UNCED. Given the public
visibility of the UNCED process, most delegations wished to have a convention to sign in Rio.225
As one critic quipped, "The INC was doomed to succeed." Thus, when it became clear in the spring
of 1992 that the United States would not accept definitive targets and timetables, that Western
states would insist on some role for the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and that developing
countries would not accept strong commitments or implementation machinery, delegations finally
got down to the hard work of crafting compromise language and produced a text that the INC
adopted on the final night of the negotiations. After several INC sessions and following a general
discussion on the final text, the Convention was finally adopted by acclamation on the evening of
May 9, 1992.
3.2.2 Effects of the UNFCCC on International Climate Negotiations
Some of the most significant ways that the UNFCCC has influenced and continues to shape,
international climate negotiations are described below.
3.2.3 The Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference Benchmark
Biology is central to the agreed goals of the UNFCCC. Indeed, article 2 of the Convention reads:
The ultimate objective of this Convention goes thus:
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“… stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such
a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to
enable economic development to proceed sustainably.”
The UNFCCC recognizes the importance of biological systems in assessing when climate change
must be stopped. The convention benchmark of “dangerous interference” is measured against three
areas of impact which are sustainable development, agricultural productivity, and ecosystem
response. The convention wants climate change to be arrested in a time frame that allows
ecosystems to “adapt naturally” to climate change, in a manner that does not impede sustainable
development and maintains agricultural productivity.226
3.2.4 Interpreting Article 2 of the UNFCCC
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to prevent "dangerous" anthropogenic (i.e., human)
interference in the climate system. As is stated in Article 2 of the Convention, this requires that
GHG concentrations are stabilized in the atmosphere at a level where ecosystems can adapt
naturally to climate change, food production is not threatened, and economic development can
proceed sustainably. By recognizing the need to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases, the objective acknowledges climate change as a problem and helps legitimize it
as a matter of international concern. Some commentators have interpreted Article 2 as favoring
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prevention of, over adaptation to, climate change.227 The text, however, appears to be neutral on
this question, since it condemns only those interferences with the climate system that are
"dangerous." To the extent that adaptation to climate change is possible, such change could be
viewed as benign.
The exact legal status of the Convention's stabilization objective has been the subject of varying
discussions. Some early proposals relating to the objective phrased it as a collective commitment,
binding on all the parties.228 Although the Secretariat categorized the proposals on objectives as
"general obligations" in a compilation document229 as ultimately adopted, Article 2 uses
declarative language and does not characterize the objective as a commitment. Also unclear is
whether Article 2 falls under the category of "object and purpose" contained in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.230 If so, signatories to the Climate Change Convention would
have a duty not to defeat the stabilization objective231 In what may have been an attempt to prevent
"objective" from being equated with "object and purpose," the Convention adds the qualification
"ultimate."
Furthermore, scholars have maintained that Article 2 confirms the claim that the UNFCCC was
not meant for the reduction of aviation emissions but general emissions that could lead to climate
change. The scholars also observed that since the idea behind the drafting of this Convention did
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not foresee the need to include aviation emissions in the articles of the Convention and there has
been no explicit provision for the aviation sector throughout the Convention, it means the
convention lacks jurisdiction for effective control over the reduction of aviation emission. 232 233
They claim that the need to improve on this limitation led to the emergence of the Kyoto protocol
1997, as a more specific regulatory regime on greenhouse gases with Article 2 (2) which transfers
sectoral regulation of aviation emission to the international civil aviation organization (ICAO).
Therefore, the absence of explicit jurisdiction for aviation emissions denied the UNFCCC the
power to effectively contribute to the reduction of aviation emissions.
Also, the vagueness of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is put forward as a factor affecting
the contribution of UNFCCC to the reduction of aviation emissions. As noted in the article (2) of
the convention, the ultimate objective is to “stabilize all greenhouse gases concentration in the
atmosphere at a certain safe level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system”. Stabilization as a term of objective is considered too vague because it is devoid of
qualification and specific measures. This stabilization does not also state the quantity of level to
which aviation emissions shall be reduced but rather gives a general statement. This aspect of the
vague term of objective has led to a problem of agreeing on a specific long-term mitigation target,
in the subsequent negotiations by a member state to the convention.234 Therefore, many have
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considered the vagueness of the objective set out in article 2 of the UNFCC as a barrier to progress
in achieving a reduction in aviation emissions.
3.2.5 Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
The UNFCCC endorses the concept of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) in the
climate context. This means that while developing country parties are expected to contribute to
climate mitigation, because of superior capacity to undertake mitigation and greater contribution
to the problem of climate change as a result of historical emissions, developed countries are
expected to “take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”235 The
Convention repeatedly references the need to promote sustainable economic growth, particularly
in developing countries; developing countries are subject to less stringent reporting and other
requirements than developed countries under the Convention, and the performance of developing
country parties is expressly conditioned on the adequate provision of financial support and
technology transfer from developed country parties.
The principle has, from the beginning, underpinned the international efforts to address climate
change236. The principle is a defining feature of the international climate change regime given that
it recognizes that parties vary both in their levels of responsibility for climate change and in their
capacities to cope with it. As a universally accepted principle, CBDR provides a basis for
differentiating among parties237 (Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015). Its origin dates
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from 1990 at the Second World Climate Conference, where countries recognized the principle of
equity and the common but differentiated responsibility of countries at different levels of
development238, and in the Rio Declaration of 1992; its principle 7 states that:
“In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States
have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global
environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.”239.
The CBDR, as articulated above, anticipates the concept of capability, when referring to finance
and technology240. Whilst, in parallel, the UNFCCC uses similar languages and includes explicitly
the aforementioned concept; Article 3.1 reads:
“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof. The CBDR principle is also mentioned in Article 4.1 of the Convention;
where it stated ‘their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and
circumstances’ when referring to the commitments of the Parties. The addition of the term
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‘respective capabilities’ infers that there are two bases for differentiation: one based on capability,
and another based on the contribution to environmental harm (Rio Principle 7). The principle can
also be found in numerous UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) decisions, including the Bali
Action Plan of 2007241, the Copenhagen Accord of 2009,242 and the Cancun Agreements of
2010.243
Also, the CBDR principle was the basis for the burden-sharing disposition under the Kyoto
Protocol244.
3.2.6 Data Gathering and Reporting
The UNFCCC instituted a process for countries to generate and share data about domestic GHG
emissions. Under the UNFCCC, all parties are required to submit national GHG inventories, and
developed country parties are required to submit more detailed descriptions of mitigation policies
and projections of the projected impact of these policies on GHG emissions.245 The data collected
through the UNFCCC have proved important to developing a scientific understanding of the
climate problem, and later agreements have built upon the UNFCCC’s reporting requirements.
3.2.7 Administrative Institutions, Structure, and Process
The UNFCCC has provided the basic institutional structure for the negotiation and adoption of a
series of protocols, modifications, and agreements related to the Convention's mandate, most
recently the Paris Agreement. The Convention established a Conference of the Parties, a
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secretariat, and subsidiary bodies that oversee the implementation of the Convention and related
instruments within its mandate.
3.3 The Conference of Parties (“The COP”)
The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. All States that are Parties to
the Convention are represented at the COP, at which they review the implementation of the
Convention and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts and take decisions necessary to
promote the effective implementation of the Convention, including institutional and administrative
arrangements.246
The COP brings together signatories of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate
Change (UNFCCC) every year to discuss how to address the climate change menace. The parties
to the Convention have met annually since 1995 in COP to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol to
establish legally binding obligations for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions and to assess progress in dealing with climate change. Since 2005 the Conferences have
met in conjunction with Meetings of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (MOP), and parties to the
Convention that are not parties to the Protocol can participate in Protocol-related meetings as
observers. The various COPs will be succinctly discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
The first UNFCCC Conference of Parties took place in March 1995 in Berlin, Germany. It voiced
concerns about the adequacy of countries' abilities to meet commitments under the Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).
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COP 2 took place in July 1996 in Geneva, Switzerland. It predominantly reflected a U.S. position
statement presented by Timothy Wirth, former Under Secretary for Global Affairs for the U.S.
State Department at that meeting, which 1. Accepted the scientific findings on climate change proffered by the IPCC in its second
assessment (1995).
2. Rejected uniform "harmonized policies" in favor of flexibility; and
3. Called for "legally binding mid-term targets.
The COP 3 which took place in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan outlined the greenhouse gas
emissions reduction obligation for Annex I countries, along with what came to be known as Kyoto
mechanisms such as emissions trading, clean development mechanism, and joint implementation.
Most industrialized countries and some central European economies in transition (all defined as
Annex B countries) agreed to legally binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of an average
of 6 to 8% below 1990 levels between the years 2008–2012, defined as the first emissions budget
period.
COP 4 witnesses the adoption of a 2-year "Plan of Action" to advance efforts and to devise
mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, to be completed by 2000. During COP4,
Argentina and Kazakhstan expressed their commitment to take on the greenhouse gas emissions
reduction obligation, the first two non-Annex countries to do so.
Whilst COP 5 did not reach a major conclusion, COP 6 centered on discussions and controversy
over the United States' proposal to allow credit for carbon "sinks" in forests and agricultural lands,
satisfying a major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over
consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission reduction targets;
and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain financial assistance to deal
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with adverse effects of climate change and meet their obligations to plan for measuring and
possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. At COP 6, parties were able to reach agreements on:
a) Flexible Mechanisms: The "flexibility" mechanisms that the United States had strongly
favored when the Protocol was initially put together, including emissions trading; Joint
Implementation (JI); and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which allow
industrialized countries to fund emissions reduction activities in developing countries as
an alternative to domestic emission reductions. One of the key elements of this agreement
was that there would be no quantitative limit on the credit a country could claim from the
use of these mechanisms provided domestic action constituted a significant element of the
efforts of each Annex B country to meet their targets.
b) Carbon sinks: It was agreed that credit would be granted for broad activities that absorb
carbon from the atmosphere or store it, including forest and cropland management, and revegetation, with no overall cap on the amount of credit that a country could claim for sinks
activities. In the case of forest management, Appendix Z establishes country-specific caps
for each Annex I country. Thus, a cap of 13 million tons could be credited to Japan (which
represents about 4% of its base-year emissions). For cropland management, countries could
receive credit only for carbon sequestration increases above 1990 levels.
c) Compliance: Final action on compliance procedures and mechanisms that would address
non-compliance with Protocol provisions was deferred to COP 7 but included broad
outlines of consequences for failing to meet emissions targets that would include a
requirement to "make up" shortfalls at 1.3 tons to 1, suspension of the right to sell credits
for surplus emissions reductions, and a required compliance action plan for those not
meeting their targets.
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d) Financing: There was agreement on the establishment of three new funds to help with needs
associated with climate change: (1) a fund for climate change that supports a series of
climate measures; (2) a least-developed-country fund to support National Adaptation
Programs of Action; and (3) a Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund supported by a CDM levy
and voluntary contributions.
At the COP 7 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco from October 29 to November 10, 2001, negotiators
wrapped up the work on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, finalizing most of the operational details
and setting the stage for nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The completed package of decisions
is known as the Marrakech Accords which included:
a) Operational rules for international emissions trading among parties to the Protocol and for
the CDM and joint implementation.
b) A compliance regime that outlined consequences for failure to meet emissions targets but
deferred to the parties to the Protocol, once it came into force, the decision on whether
those consequences would be legally binding.
c) Accounting procedures for the flexibility mechanisms.
d) A decision to consider at COP 8 was how to achieve a review of the adequacy of
commitments that might lead to discussions on future commitments by developing
countries
COP8 took place from October 23, – to November 1, 2002. It adopted the Delhi Ministerial
Declaration247 that, amongst others, called for efforts by developed countries to transfer technology
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and minimize the impact of climate change on developing countries. It is also approved the New
Delhi work program248 on Article 6 of the Convention.249
COP9 took place between December 1 to 12, 2003. The parties agreed to use the Adaptation Fund
established at COP7 in 2001 primarily in supporting developing countries better adapt to climate
change. The fund would also be used for capacity-building through technology transfer.
COP10 discussed the progress made since the first Conference of the Parties 10 years
earlier and its future challenges, with special emphasis on climate change mitigation and
adaptation. To promote developing countries better adapt to climate change, the Buenos Aires Plan
of Action was adopted. The parties also began discussing the post-Kyoto mechanism, on how to
allocate emission reduction obligations following 2012, when the first commitment period ends.
COP 11 (or COP 11/MOP 1) took place between November 28 and December 9, 2005, in
Montreal, Quebec, Canada. It was the first meeting of the Parties (MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol
since their initial meeting in Kyoto in 1997. It was therefore one of the largest intergovernmental
conferences on climate change ever. The event marked the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.
Hosting more than 10,000 delegates. The Montreal Action Plan is an agreement hammered out at
the end of the conference to "extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its 2012 expiration date
and negotiate deeper cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions."
COP 12/MOP 2 took place between November 6 and 17, 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. The
discussions avoided any mention of reducing emissions. There was a disconnect between the
political process and the scientific imperative, however, certain strides were made at COP12,
including in the areas of support for developing countries and clean development mechanisms.
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The parties adopted a five-year plan of work to support climate change adaptation by developing
countries and agreed on the procedures and modalities for the Adaptation Fund. They also agreed
to improve the projects for a clean development mechanism.
COP 13/MOP 3 followed between December 3 and December 15, 2007, at Nusa Dua, in
Bali, Indonesia. Agreement on a timeline and structured negotiation on the post-2012 framework
(the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol) was achieved with the adoption of
the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP.13). COP 14/MOP 4 took place from December 1 to12, 2008
in Poznań, Poland. Delegates agreed on principles for the financing of a fund to help the poorest
nations cope with the effects of climate change and they approved a mechanism to incorporate
forest protection into the efforts of the international community to combat climate change.
Negotiations on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol were the primary focus of the conference.
COP 15 adopted the Copenhagen Accord in which countries put forward political
declarations to continue working towards addressing climate change and reducing emissions. One
of the key elements was the recognition of the long-term goal of limiting the global average
temperature increase to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Parties agreed
that this goal would be reviewed in 2015, also to consider the strengthening of the long-term goal
to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Several parties, including all the major economies, put forward pledges to
reduce emissions by 2020. Developed countries promised to provide USD 30 billion for the period
2010-2012, and to mobilize long-term finance of a further USD 100 billion a year by 2020 from
various sources, to fund mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries.
The Copenhagen accord called for the establishment of the Green Climate Fund, a Technology
Mechanism, and a REDD+ mechanism, and reiterated the need for improved MRV of actions by
developed and developing countries in line with the existing and future COP guidelines.
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The COP 17 took place from 28 November to 9 December 2011 in Durban, South Africa.
It aimed to establish a firm set of commitments among participating countries to reduce countrylevel carbon emissions and to agree to the mechanisms that were required to achieve carbon
emissions reductions as a global effort to contain the disastrous effects of anthropogenic climate
change. It ended with an agreement to work towards preparing and adopting a comprehensive
greenhouse gas reduction “protocol, legal instrument or another outcome with legal force by 2015
applicable from 2020” (the Paris Agreement). The meeting also included negotiations on bridging
the gap between the pledges made by parties so far and the level of reductions needed to limit the
rise of global temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Parties agreed to carry out a
fresh review of the long-term global goal (LTGG), based on the most recent scientific evidence
and data, and to ascertain the pertinence of a 1.5-degree threshold and what needs to be done
collectively to prevent the rise of temperature above the agreed level. Parties recognized the need
for a greater ambition of reduction pledges compared to those put forward in the Cancun
Agreements. Parties agreed to close negotiations under two then existing tracks: long-term
cooperative action and further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, and to continue working
together under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)
to achieve the ultimate objective defined in Article 2 of the Convention. COP17 further agreed on
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and its commencement on 1 January 2013.
At COP 18, governments concluded the work that had begun in Bali in 2007 on Long-Term
Cooperative Action under the Convention and agreed on a firm timetable for the adoption of a
universal climate change agreement by 2015, to come into force in 2020. At COP 19, Parties
agreed on a firm timetable to secure the adoption of a new global climate change agreement in
2015, to come into force in 2020. During negotiations at COP 20 in Lima, Peru, parties agreed on
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loose arrangements for bringing forward their “intended nationally determined contributions” to
the Paris agreement. They also forwarded “elements for a draft negotiating text,” compiling issues
and options put forward, but explicitly disclaiming any “convergence,” and leaving the door open
to further proposals. The Lima decision reiterated an invitation from Warsaw to each UNFCCC
Party to submit to the Secretariat its INDC towards achieving the objective of the Convention. All
INDCs250 are to be communicated in a clear, transparent, and understandable way. Without clarity,
transparency, and understanding of INDCs, it would not be possible to quantify and judge the
proposed contributions. However, it is for each Party to decide what these qualifiers do mean in
their case.
The decision also specified that the information provided by Parties together with their INDC (the
upfront information, or UFI) may include (for each Party to decide) as appropriate in the light of
different national circumstances several specific information. Inter alia, countries are invited to
provide, if they wish (since the decision specifies that they may do so), quantifiable information
on the reference point including, as appropriate, a base year, time frame for implementation, or
period of implementation proposed for their contributions, scope and coverage of proposed
INDCs, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches, including those for
estimating and accounting for anthropogenic GHG emissions, and, as appropriate, removals.
At COP 21 in Paris, parties to the UNFCCC reached a landmark agreement to combat
climate change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable
low carbon future. The Paris Agreement builds upon the Convention and – for the first time –
brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change
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and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. As such, it
charts a new course in the global climate effort.
At COP 22, there was a meeting to discuss the implementation of the Paris Agreement; and an
occasion for policymakers, countries, and organizations to announce new strategy plans,
initiatives, and finance changes. In Marrakech, the Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full
implementation of the Paris Agreement and agreed to finalize the detailed rules for its
implementation within two years. To demonstrate an unwavering commitment to the full
implementation of the Paris Agreement and help to achieve the goals set out therein, countries
took ambitious parallel action outside of the negotiation halls. Those actions included –
a) The UNFCCC and the Parties to the Convention announced their reaffirmed resolve for
international climate action with the release of the Marrakech Action Proclamation. The
Proclamation is a celebration of the momentum of political commitment to climate change
and the mobilization of non-state actors. As this COP was nicknamed the “implementation”
COP, the document concludes with an emphasis on this being the time for action.
b) Parties to the UNFCCC also announced the establishment of a new fund called the
Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT). As its name suggests, the trust fund
with US$50 million pledged will go to strengthening the capacity of developing countries
to meet the enhanced transparency requirements of the Paris Agreement.
c) Another outcome was the announcement of the UNFCCC’s 2050 Pathways Platform.
Following the Paris Agreement, Parties should express long-term, low-carbon
development strategies, and the platform is meant to facilitate the sharing of resources,
knowledge, and experiences of deep decarbonization planning.
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d) Meanwhile, the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) was assembled. The CVF is a global
partnership of 48 of the least-developed and low- and middle-income developing
countries—all of which are disproportionately affected by the consequences of climate
change. The CVF was also formed to hold industrialized countries accountable for the
consequences of climate change.
e) Finally, the launch of the NDC Partnership brought together 33 countries and 9
international institutions to accelerate climate action on the ground and advance sustainable
development.
COP 23 made progress on implementing the Paris Agreement and agreed on a work plan for 2018.
It also gave a strong signal that countries remain committed to the UN climate process, despite the
United States' intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Key outcomes of the 2-weeks
deliberation include –
a) The Fiji Momentum for Implementation, which confirms the goal to adopt the Paris

Rulebook at COP24 in Katowice, Poland, also sets out the design of the facilitative
dialogue – now renamed the Talanoa dialogue251 – which launched in January 2018. This
also clarifies that global stock takes on pre-2020 efforts will occur at both COP24 and
COP25.
b) The Talanoa dialogue will be structured around three main questions: where are we; where

do we want to go; and how will we get there?
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c) A mandate for the chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

(SBSTA) to prepare an informal document for the three components of Article 6 –
essentially a draft negotiating text – ahead of SBSTA 48 in April/May 2018.
d) The option to add an extra negotiating session in September/October 2018; will be decided

at SBSTA 48.
e) Adoption of the Gender Action Plan, which aims to ensure a role for women in all climate

change decisions and projects, both at a national and international level.
f) The establishment of the Local Communities and Indigenous People’s Platform, to both

support the role of indigenous communities in the climate change response and recognize
the responsibility of governments to respect their rights when deciding climate policies.
The COP 24 had one main objective: to conclude the discussions on the implementation of the
Paris Agreement by formally adopting a set of rules (dubbed the “Paris rulebook”) detailing how
to apply the provisions of this treaty. Parties, therefore, agreed on a deadline for hashing out the
Paris rulebook, which is the operating manual needed for when the global deal enters into force in
2020; starting a new international climate regime under which all countries will have to report
their emissions and progress in cutting them every two years from 2024. A compilation of the Paris
rulebook documents (without rules for carbon trading) was adopted at COP 24 along with other
decisions and action points that bring minor progress in specific areas such as finance, gender, and
indigenous peoples. The text provides a single set of rules for all countries while allowing
developing countries to apply them flexibly. The major highlights of the text include:
a) Clarity and Transparency: the rulebook indicates what information parties should
communicate to facilitate the clarity, transparency, and understanding of the nationally
determined contributions (NDCs) they must submit every five years as provided by Article
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4 of the Paris Agreement. Further, it specifies what information parties should report
demonstrating progress toward the achievement of their NDCs and their commitment to
climate finance, and how the information communicated will be reviewed under the
transparency framework established by Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.
b) Conducting the Global stocktake: The rulebook also clarifies how the periodic assessment
of collective progress toward the achievement of the goal of the Paris Agreement – known
as the “global stocktake” — will be conducted, and how the implementation and
compliance mechanism of the Paris Agreement will fulfill its mandate. As stated in Article
15, this mechanism, which consists of an expert-based committee, has the function of
facilitating the implementation of, and promoting compliance with, the provisions of the
Paris Agreement in a transparent, non-adversarial, and non-punitive manner.
The final decision adopted by the COP24 only “invited parties to consider the outcome” of the
Talanoa Dialogue in preparing their next NDCs. The text did not explicitly indicate that parties
should increase their ambition by 2020. Even though roughly 50 parties — including Canada —
have already expressed their willingness to submit increased climate pledges in 2020, the results
of COP24 suggest that many parties are still reluctant to agree on a text that could in any way call
into question their autonomy under the Paris Agreement. Overall, COP 24 failed to deliver on the
most fundamental issues such as raising the ambition of national contributions, implementing
human rights in the Paris Rulebook, and ensuring fair and reliable support for developing countries
to assist them in their efforts to combat global warming and its accompanying effects.252
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The 25th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC was held in Madrid, Spain from 2nd to 13th
December 2019. COP25 was intended to be the launchpad for the full implementation of the Paris
Agreement post-2020. At COP25, countries agreed to table their new and improved carbon curbing
plans at COP26 in 2020. Developed nations agreed to honor their commitments on climate change
before the end of 2020. Countries and several non-state actors committed to net zero emissions by
2050 – the new Climate Ambition Alliance.253 Parties also agreed on a new 5-year Gender Action
Plan expected to support the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates in the
UNFCCC.
However, countries failed to reach a consensus on several more-contentious (technical and nontechnical) issues including, among others, negotiations related to Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement,
financing of the global climate action, transparency reporting requirements, and (common)
timeframes for climate commitments. They agreed that the issues will be resolved at the next COP.
Overall, COP25 did not make any progress on both technical and important issues such as Art. 6
and the ambitious climate action plans.
COP26 was held in Glasgow, Scotland, from 31 October to 13 November 2021. It brought together
world leaders to discuss ways of ensuring limiting warming temperatures to 1.5 degrees, reducing
global emissions by half in 2030, and reaching net Zero by 2050. The summit also analyzed the
promise to raise $100 billion per year to tackle issues around climate change globally. 254 The
meeting saw the emergence of the Glasgow Climate Compact. The agreement - although not
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legally binding - will set the global agenda on climate change for the next decade. By the end of
COP26, 151 countries had submitted new climate plans (known as nationally determined
contributions, or NDCs) to slash their emissions by 2030. Nigeria submitted its own in 2016 with
an updated version submitted in 2021.
The Glasgow decision calls on countries to “revisit and strengthen” their 2030 targets by the end
of 2022 to align them with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals. It also asks all countries that
have not yet done so to submit long-term strategies to 2050, aiming for a just transition to net-zero
emissions around mid-century. “In addition, the Pact asks nations to consider further actions to
curb potent non-CO2 gases, such as methane, and includes language emphasizing the need to
“phase down unabated coal” and “phase-out fossil fuel subsidies.” This marked the first-time
negotiators have explicitly referenced shifting away from coal and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies
in the COP decision text. The summit recognized the importance of nature for both reducing
emissions and building resilience to the impacts of climate change, both in the formal text and
through a raft of initiatives announced on the sidelines.
At COP26, countries also made bold collective commitments to curb methane emissions, halt and
reverse forest loss, align the finance sector with net-zero by 2050, ditch the internal combustion
engine, accelerate the phase-out of coal, and end international financing for fossil fuels, to name
just a few. Glasgow was a platform for launching innovative sectoral partnerships and new funding
to support these, to reshape every sector of the economy at the scale necessary to deliver a netzero future.255
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3.3.1 Nigeria’s Contribution to COP26
At Glasgow, President Muhammadu Buhari led the Nigerian delegation to the Glasgow summit
and made three presentations – one at the main conference and two during side events. Although
the contents of the three presentations seem to differ slightly from the revised or updated INDCs
submitted to the COP26 Secretariat earlier in July 2021, they are bold, far-reaching, and ambitious,
especially coming from a leading crude oil (fossil energy) producing an exporting developing
country from Africa. Hence, Nigeria is at a crossroads of international climate change policy.
President Buhari committed that Nigeria will cut its carbon emission to net zero by 2060. The
President told world leaders that the goal of transitioning from fossil fuel to clean energy, reaching
a net-zero ambition for greenhouse gas emissions would require critical infrastructure to be in
place in developing countries. Nigeria’s major contribution to the summit was its pledge of
becoming Net Zero Emissions compliant by the year 2060.
Significantly, the President spoke against the background of the Climate Change Bill passed by
the National Assembly to provide a legal and inclusive framework for achieving low carbon
emissions, green growth, and ultimately sustainable economic development. Concretely, the
President invited international partners of Nigeria to invest in gas as part of the efforts to achieve
a just energy transition. From the tone and tenor of President Buhari’s statement, which is typical
of the leaders of developing countries, some arduous negotiations still lie ahead to achieve a
significant reduction in carbon emission.
While China and India managed to tone down the COP26 outcome on coal, South Africa is already
gaining concessions of over $8 billion on “phasing out” or “phasing down” coal. Compared to

climate-talks-glasgow?utm_campaign=wriclimate&utm_source=climatedigest_2021-1122&utm_medium=email&utm_content=title > [Accessed 14 December 2021].

153

some other countries that seek concessions on the necessary energy transition, Nigeria sounded
more constructive and responsive in the difficult situation facing the world.
As a takeaway from COP26, Nigeria needs to promote environmental awareness at home while
taking the leadership steps to forge a continental position for African countries to negotiate with
rich countries on the matter of climate change. African countries direly need the funds to mitigate
the impacts of climate change on the continent.
3.3.2

Impact of the COPs on Gas Flaring in Nigeria

Demonstrating its commitment to the various climate protection policies and decisions, Nigeria is
a signatory to the 2001 Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership principles that aim at a flare-out
date of 2030. In compliance with the UNFCCC, Nigeria submitted its Nationally Determined
Contribution which amongst other things pledged to end gas flaring by 2030. Nigeria and the
NNPC have committed to the “Zero Routine Flaring by 2030” initiative of the World Bank. It has
unequivocally recognized gas flaring as unsustainable from resource management and
environmental perspective and agreed to co-operate to eliminate routine flaring no later than 2030.
Now, recent Gas flaring satellite data reveals that Nigeria has remained one of the top seven
countries since 2012. Between 2016 and 2020, Nigeria flared 1 252.26 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas into the atmosphere. In 2005, Nigeria’s courts ruled that oil companies stop flaring gas in the
Niger Delta. The judgment was made in a case filed by the Iwherekan community against Shell
Petroleum Development Company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and Nigeria’s
Attorney General. The court held that gas flaring was unconstitutional as it violated people’s right
to life and dignity. However, oil companies continue to be the leading offenders, despite gas
flaring being illegal since 2005.
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Despite many commitments to act, the race to Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 in Nigeria is
undermined by inconsistent policies, weak implementation, and an apparent lack of political will
by successive administrations. Between 1969 and 2020, 10 deadlines to end gas flaring in the Niger
Delta were changed. oil companies would rather pay a fine of $3.50 per 1 000 standard cubic feet
for gas flaring than stop the practice.
Nigeria has now enacted the PIA and provided in its section 104(4) environmental remedy and
relief to host communities affected by gas flaring. But what’s needed is a commitment to an
environmental management plan that reduces the damaging practice in the Niger Delta. Whilst
these legal frameworks are commendable, as a stakeholder in oil-producing Africa, Nigeria still
has a long way to go to actualizing its NDCs and going beyond paying mere lip service to
international environmental protection commitments. She must find better infrastructure to
accommodate excess natural gas through conversion and utilization. One way is to convert
excessive gas to generate electricity. The action will, among others, increase government revenue
and help meet Goal 13 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and pledge of Zero Routine
Flaring – all by 2030.
3.4

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

As mentioned earlier, considering increasing scientific evidence about the risks of climate change,
it soon became evident to policymakers that a further negotiated agreement might be necessary.
The UNFCCC set no mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and
contains no enforcement mechanisms. In that sense, the Convention is considered legally nonbinding. Instead, it provides for updates (called "protocols") that would set mandatory emission
limits. The principal update is the Kyoto Protocol, which has become much better known than the
UNFCCC itself.
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The Kyoto Protocol is the first implementing agreement of the UNFCCC. Fundamentally, the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, enshrined in the UNFCCC resulted from
a common understanding that the industrialized nations were then the principal actors responsible
for climate change occurring because of industrial emissions. In line with this principle, a group
of developed countries and economies in transition (EITs) agreed to take up binding emission
reduction targets under a protocol that was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997. The
Kyoto Protocol was first agreed upon in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, although ongoing
discussions were needed between 1998 and 2004 to finalize the “fine print” of the agreement.
In December 1997, delegates at The Third Conference of the parties to the UNFCCC (COP 3) in
Kyoto, Japan, agreed to a Protocol to the UNFCCC that commits developed countries and
countries in transition to a market economy to achieve quantified emission reduction targets. These
industrialized countries and countries of the former Soviet bloc (known collectively as “Annex I
Parties” under the UNFCCC) agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases by
an average of 5% below 1990 levels between 2008-2012 (the first commitment period), with
specific targets varying from country to country. The Protocol also established three flexible
mechanisms to assist Annex I parties in meeting their national targets cost-effectively: an
emissions trading system; joint implementation (JI) of emission reduction projects between Annex
I parties; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows for emission reduction
projects to be implemented in non-Annex I Parties (developing countries). Following COP 3,
parties began negotiating many of the rules and operational details governing how countries will
implement and measure their emission reductions.
Under the terms agreed in Kyoto, the Protocol only enters into force following ratification by 55
Parties to the UNFCCC, and if these 55 countries included enough Annex, I Parties that at least
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55% of that group’s total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 were represented. The Protocol finally
entered into force as a legally binding document on 16 February 2005 with the ratification of
Russia. Kyoto set emissions reductions targets for 37 industrialized countries including Annex I
parties representing 63.7% of Annex I greenhouse gas emissions in 1990. By December 2007, the
Protocol had been ratified by 177 countries. The carbon market established on its ratification has
provided a strong precedent for trading in emissions reductions. The emissions reductions of Kyoto
are modest—generally, less than 10% of 1990 levels—but the agreement and its widespread
acceptance (184 countries have ratified) provide important international momentum for action on
climate change.
Kyoto Protocol calls for relatively modest reductions in GHG emissions, setting an average goal
of 5% below 1990 levels for developed countries. The protocol does not set reduction targets for
developing countries on the principle that the developed countries that have created the problem
should take the first steps to clean it up. However, rapidly developing economies such as those of
China and India will have a huge impact on GHG emissions in the future. The Kyoto Protocol
committed most of the Annex I signatories to the UNFCCC (consisting of members of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and several countries with “economies
in transition”) to mandatory emission-reduction targets, which varied depending on the unique
circumstances of each country. Other signatories to the UNFCCC and the protocol, consisting
mostly of developing countries, were not required to restrict their emissions.
The protocol provided several means for countries to reach their targets. One approach was to
make use of natural processes, called “sinks,” that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.
The planting of trees, which take up carbon dioxide from the air, would be an example. Another
approach was the international program called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which
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encouraged developed countries to invest in technology and infrastructure in less-developed
countries, where there were often significant opportunities to reduce emissions. Under the CDM,
the investing country could claim the effective reduction in emissions as a credit for meeting its
obligations under the protocol. An example would be an investment in a clean-burning natural gas
power plant to replace a proposed coal-fired plant. A third approach was emissions trading, which
allowed participating countries to buy and sell emissions rights and thereby placed an economic
value on greenhouse gas emissions. European countries initiated an emissions-trading market as a
mechanism to work toward meeting their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries that
failed to meet their emissions targets would be required to make up the difference between their
targeted and actual emissions, plus a penalty amount of 30 percent, in the subsequent commitment
period, beginning in 2012; they would also be prevented from engaging in emissions trading until
they were judged to comply with the protocol. The emission targets for commitment periods after
2012 were to be established in future protocols.
3.4.1. Challenges of The Kyoto Protocol
Although the Kyoto Protocol represented a landmark diplomatic accomplishment, its success was
far from assured. Indeed, reports issued in the first two years after the treaty took effect indicated
that most participants would fail to meet their emission targets. Even if the targets were met,
however, the ultimate benefit to the environment would not be significant, according to some
critics, since China, the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases, and the United States, the
world’s second-largest emitter, were not bound by the protocol (China because of its status as a
developing country and the United States because it had not ratified the protocol). Other critics
claimed that the emission reductions called for in the protocol were too modest to make a
detectable difference in global temperatures in the subsequent several decades, even if fully

158

achieved with U.S. participation. Meanwhile, some developing countries argued that improving
adaptation to climate variability and change was just as important as reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
At COP18 held in Doha, Qatar, in 2012, delegates agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020.
They also reaffirmed their pledge from COP17, which had been held in Durban, South Africa, in
2011, to create a new, comprehensive, legally binding climate treaty by 2015 that would require
greenhouse-gas-producing countries—including major carbon emitters not abiding by the Kyoto
Protocol (such as China, India, and the United States)—to limit and reduce their emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. The new treaty, planned for implementation in 2020,
would fully replace the Kyoto Protocol. The landmark Paris Agreement, signed by all 196
signatories of the UNFCCC in 2015, effectively replaced the Kyoto Protocol.
3.5 THE PARIS AGREEMENT
At COP 17 in Durban, parties to the UNFCCC agreed to work towards developing, a protocol,
another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all Parties (to the
UNFCCC)". In December 2015, 196 countries subscribed to the Paris Agreement – a legally
binding agreement that sets out the pathway towards a climate-neutral, resilient future for the
globe. In the run-up to the Paris COP, 186 countries submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat their
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), outlining steps that these countries intend
to take to participate in the joint global effort of limiting temperature rise to well below 2°C and
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. The Agreement will enter into force
when at least 55 Parties to the Convention, accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 percent
of the total global greenhouse gas emissions [will] have deposited their instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession” to the UNFCCC.
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Whilst parties still had to work out the details - and this would be done not only in the run-up to
the next COP in Marrakesh but also in the following years until the new agreement kicked in from
2021. The Paris Agreement offers a clear direction towards a long-term goal, a decision to monitor
and regularly strengthen joint action, a commitment to transparency of action, and support for
countries in need concerning finance, technology, and capacity building to bring about real change.
Developed countries will continue to provide and mobilize climate finance to support developing
countries, mobilizing USD 100 billion a year until 2025. A new, higher, collective financial goal
will be adopted from 2026 onwards.
Parties agreed to five-year cycles` of action. In continuation of their INDCs, all parties to the
Agreement are expected to undertake and communicate ambitious (new or updated) action plans
with a view of achieving jointly the purpose of this Agreement. Each party’s successive NDC will
represent a progression beyond that party’s current NDC and reflect its higher ambition in the light
of different national circumstances. A global stocktake will enable parties to judge whether these
joint efforts are on track and inform the implementation of their action plans. This is the first global
agreement that provides a common framework for the global efforts to fight climate change for
developed and developing countries. These efforts will take into account such crucial issues as
equity, sustainable development, and poverty, with the provision of support and developing
countries taking the lead.
The preamble of the Agreement highlights a broad set of issues and priorities to be considered
when implementing the Agreement and undertaking climate action. This includes the
acknowledgment that Parties should when taking action to address climate change, respect,
promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, as well as the rights of
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Indigenous peoples. The preamble also considers the importance of a just transition of the
workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs.
The Paris Agreement’s central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate
change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees
Celsius. Additionally, the agreement aims to increase the ability of countries to deal with the
impacts of climate change, and at making finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and
climate-resilient pathways. To reach these ambitious goals, appropriate mobilization and provision
of financial resources, a new technology framework, and enhanced capacity-building are to be put
in place, thus supporting action by developing countries and the most vulnerable countries, in line
with their national objectives. The Agreement also provides for an enhanced transparency
framework for action and support.
The Paris Agreement differs from the Kyoto Protocol in that concerning the joining threshold, it
does not discriminate between developed and developing countries. Based on intended nationally
determined contributions (INDCs) submitted by 187 out of 196 countries - Parties to the UNFCCC.
All parties to the Paris Agreement undertake to mitigate GHG emissions, with progressive
ambition and a regular global stocktake every five years to check the collective progress on the
pathway to achieve the global goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to
well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, making efforts to keep the rise of global
temperature below 1,5 degrees Celsius (PA, Art. 2.1). To achieve that, all Parties should strive to
formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies,
mindful of Article 2 considering their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.” (PA, Art. 4.19)
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The Agreement envisages that a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of GHG will be achieved in the second half of this century, with global peaking
of GHG emissions and rapid reductions thereafter (PA, Art. 4.1). In their INDCs, developed
countries „should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission
reduction targets”, while developing countries are encouraged to move over time towards
economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national
circumstances.” Actions of developing countries will continue to be conditional on support, as it
is under the Convention. The Agreement envisages ratcheting up the ambition of the INDCs every
five years, in line with recommendations of the global stocktake. This will be possible with
transparency as one of the building blocks of the Agreement, and with all countries accounting for
their emissions.
The Paris Agreement recognizes adaptation as a global issue. Parties agreed on one global
adaptation goal (PA, Art.7.1). On adaptation issues, countries agreed to strengthen cooperation,
improve the effectiveness and durability of action results, and formally recognize the adaptation
efforts of developing countries. Countries will periodically communicate their adaptation plans.
Many details of the implementation will have to be decided by countries, beginning in May 2016.
The Decision Adopting the Paris Agreement includes a work plan for the period before entry into
force of the Agreement. The Agreement underlines the importance of adaptation and support to
the most vulnerable countries. Adaptation is treated with an importance that previously was
attributed to mitigation only. It introduced a cycle of action for strengthening adaptation efforts
which is like the cycle of mitigation action.
The Paris Agreement is a key element under the UNFCCC, and it contains several principles and
initiatives that will help countries reach the Paris Agreement goals, including-
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a) Mitigation of GHGs: All Parties must submit GHG emission reduction targets (referred to
as nationally determined contributions or NDCs) and update these targets every five years.
Each country determines its own NDC to reflect its most ambitious effort following its
national circumstances.
b) Adaptation and Loss and Damage: The Paris Agreement calls for all countries to strengthen
cooperation to enhance adaptation efforts, build resilience, and reduce vulnerability to
climate change. It calls for all Parties to engage in adaptation planning processes and
encourages them to submit and periodically update an adaptation communication outlining
their priorities, implementation, and support needs, plans, and actions.
c) The Paris Agreement also recognizes the importance of averting, minimizing, and
addressing loss and damage associated with climate impacts, and urges Parties to work
cooperatively, along with other bodies and expert groups, to enhance understanding, action,
and support related to losses and damages.
d) Carbon Markets: it provides a framework for countries to participate in international carbon
markets using Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), whereby
emission reductions or removals that occur in one country are transferred for use towards
another country’s NDC. Such international cooperation can allow for higher ambition in
reducing global emissions, unlock new emission reduction opportunities, and mobilize
investments in low-carbon solutions from both government and the private sector.
e) Support for developing countries: The provision of financial and other support to help
developing countries implement climate policies is an issue of central importance in
multilateral climate negotiations. In support of the Paris Agreement, Canada pledged
C$2.65 billion over five years in climate finance to pursue ambitious action on climate
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change in developing countries. The provision of climate finance will continue to be a key
element for promoting continued global action on climate change.
f) Global stocktake: A global stocktake will take place every five years starting in 2023 to
assess the collective progress in implementing the provisions of the Agreement. The
stocktake will consider mitigation and adaptation actions undertaken by all countries, and
the adequacy of financial, technical, and capacity-building support.
g) Transparency framework: The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to regularly report on
and undergo a review of their GHG emissions, climate action, and progress towards their
targets. This transparency system is essential to building trust amongst countries and
fostering accountability, as well as tracking collective progress and gathering necessary
data to strengthen the global response to climate change. Donor countries are also required
to provide regular reporting on their provision of climate finance.
To make the Paris Agreement fully operational, a work program was launched in Paris to develop
modalities, procedures, and guidelines on a broad array of issues. Since 2016, Parties work
together in the subsidiary bodies (APA, SBSTA, and SBI) and various constituted bodies. The
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) met
for the first time in conjunction with COP 22 in Marrakesh (in November 2016) and adopted its
first two decisions.
The Paris Agreement, adopted through Decision 1/CP.21, also addresses crucial areas necessary
to combat climate change. Some of the key aspects of the Agreement are set out below:
a) Long-term temperature goal (Art. 2) – The Paris Agreement, in seeking to strengthen the
global response to climate change, reaffirms the goal of limiting global temperature
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increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius while pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5
degrees.
b) Global peaking and 'climate neutrality' (Art. 4) –To achieve this temperature goal, Parties
aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) as soon as possible,
recognizing peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, to achieve a balance
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in the second
half of the century.
c) Mitigation (Art. 4) – The Paris Agreement establishes binding commitments by all Parties
to prepare, communicate and maintain a nationally determined contribution (NDC) and to
pursue domestic measures to achieve them. It also prescribes that Parties shall
communicate their NDCs every 5 years and provide information necessary for clarity and
transparency. To set a firm foundation for higher ambition, each successive NDC will
represent a progression beyond the previous one and reflect the highest possible ambition
towards enhancing their mitigation efforts.
d) Sinks and reservoirs (Art.5) –The Paris Agreement also encourages Parties to conserve and
enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of GHGs as referred to in Article 4, paragraph
1(d) of the Convention, including forests.
e) Voluntary cooperation/Market- and non-market-based approaches (Art. 6) – The Paris
Agreement recognizes the possibility of voluntary cooperation among Parties to allow for
higher ambition and sets out principles – including environmental integrity, transparency,
and robust accounting – for any cooperation that involves internationally transferal of
mitigation outcomes. It establishes a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of GHG
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emissions and support sustainable development and defines a framework for non-market
approaches to sustainable development.
f) Adaptation (Art. 7) – The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation – of
enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to
climate change in the context of the temperature goal of the Agreement. The adaptation
efforts of developing countries should be recognized.
g) Loss and damage (Art. 8) – The Paris Agreement recognizes the importance of averting,
minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate
change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable
development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.
h) Finance, technology, and capacity-building support (Art. 9, 10, and 11) – The Paris
Agreement reaffirms the obligations of developed countries to support the efforts of
developing country Parties to build clean, climate-resilient futures, while for the first time
encouraging voluntary contributions by other Parties. The agreement also provides that the
Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including the Green Climate Fund (GCF), shall
serve the Agreement. International cooperation on climate-safe technology development
and transfer and building capacity in the developing world are also strengthened: a
technology framework is established under the Agreement and capacity-building activities
will be strengthened through, inter alia, enhanced support for capacity-building actions in
developing country Parties and appropriate institutional arrangements. Climate change
education, training as well as public awareness, participation, and access to information
(Art 12) are also to be enhanced under the Agreement.
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i) Climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation, and public
access to information (Art 12) are also to be enhanced under the Agreement.
j) Transparency (Art. 13), implementation, and compliance (Art. 15) – The Paris Agreement
relies on a robust transparency and accounting system to provide clarity on action and
support by Parties, with flexibility for their differing capabilities of Parties. In addition to
reporting information on mitigation, adaptation, and support, the Agreement requires that
the information submitted by each Party undergoes international technical expert review.
The Agreement also includes a mechanism that will facilitate implementation and promote
compliance in a non-adversarial and non-punitive manner and will report annually to the
CMA.
k) Global Stocktake (Art. 14) – A “global stocktake”, to take place in 2023 and every 5 years
thereafter, will assess collective progress toward achieving the purpose of the Agreement
in a comprehensive and facilitative manner.
Parties also recognized the need to strengthen the knowledge, technologies, practices, and efforts
of local communities and indigenous peoples, as well as the important role of providing incentives
through tools such as domestic policies and carbon pricing. The signatories of the UNFCCC meet
annually at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to confer on further reductions of GHG emissions
and increase environmental protection. Through the UNFCCC there have been two agreements
signed by nations in the UN to formally declare emission reduction goals. These are the Kyoto
Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015). While the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement
both set out to address climate change, there are some notable differences between them. Unlike
the Kyoto Protocol, which established top-down legally binding emissions reduction targets (as
well as penalties for non-compliance) for developed nations only, the Paris Agreement requires
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that all countries—rich, poor, developed, and developing—do their part and slash greenhouse gas
emissions. To that end, greater flexibility and national ownership are built into the Paris
Agreement: No language is included about the commitments countries should make; nations can
set their own emissions targets (NDCs) consistent with their level of development and
technological advancement.
While the Paris Agreement does not have harsh penalties for countries not meeting their targets, it
does have a robust system of monitoring, reporting, and reassessing individual and collective
country targets over time to move the world closer to the broader objectives of the deal. And the
agreement sets forth a requirement for countries to announce their next round of targets every five
years—unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which aimed for that objective but didn’t include a specific
requirement to achieve it. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the original commitment was to decrease
overall emissions by 5% from 1990 levels while the Paris Agreement’s overall goal was to limit
global temperatures to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
3.5.1

Influence of the Paris Agreement on Nigeria’s Climate Policies

In 2015, Nigeria prepared its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)256. Following
approval by President Buhari and submission to the UNFCCC, Nigeria presented its INDC at the
COP21 in Paris in December 2015. In March 2017, President Buhari ratified the Paris Agreement,
paving the way for a new era of action on climate change. As a party to the Paris agreement and
as part of its NDCs, Nigeria committed to cutting its carbon emissions unconditionally by 20
percent or conditionally by 45 percent with international support by 2030. In March 2021, Nigeria
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In her NDC, Nigeria has unconditionally pledged a 20% emissions reduction below Business as Usual (BAU) by

2030, and a 45% conditional commitment which can be achieved with financial assistance, technology transfer and
capacity building from the more advanced and more willing international partners that care a lot about issues of
climate change.
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revised its NDCs to include clean cooking as a way of ensuring a conversion from cooking fuels
such as kerosene and charcoal to eco-friendly cooking gas and efficient wood stoves.
Nigeria has developed several policies as part of its climate action, including the national climate
change policy and response strategy, which took effect in 2012 to respond to the negative impacts
of climate change and foster economic development to help achieve a climate-resilient country;
the national climate change policy adopted by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) in 2013 to
form the basis for a climate change law; and the short-lived national climate pollutant action plan
approved in 2019 to improve air quality and fight climate change.
All these policies were geared towards a single purpose — to mitigate and fight the challenges of
climate change. At the inception of the current administration, the President had committed to
tackling climate change to help Nigeria grow a sustainable economy while cutting down on its
carbon emission. However, it has not been such a smooth ride for the federal government. Climate
change still poses grievous threats to the country. This has significantly affected her economic
development in areas such as agriculture and food security, drought in arid regions in northern
Nigeria, flooding and sea-level rise in coastal communities, soil erosion, and landslides in the
southern part of the country.
Having set up its NDCs as stipulated under the Paris agreement, these factors still show that
Nigeria needs to step up in its climate action if it means business. In response to this, the Nigerian
Government has enacted several laws and climate policies. A widely notable of these laws is the
newly enacted Petroleum Industry Act 2021. Before the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2017,
Nigeria had been a signatory to the UNFCCC since 1994. President Buhari’s assent to the
Petroleum Industry Bill was met with fanfare, especially by rights groups and advocates who had
expended time and resources calling for its passage. The Act holds lots of promises as it ends a
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20-year effort to reform Nigeria’s oil and gas sector, intending to create an environment more
conducive for the growth of the sector and address legitimate grievances of communities most
impacted by extractive industries.
The Act attempts to address a key number of issues bedeviling the Nigerian petroleum and the
consequential effects on the climate, one of such is the persisting menace of gas flaring. The Act
has upheld the prohibition of gas flaring, except for a few circumstances in which there is no other
reasonable option than to flare gas. The only recognized few instances where gas flaring may be
allowed by the Act are as follows:
i.

In the case of an emergency

ii.

Pursuant to an exemption granted by the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission (the
“Commission”).

iii.

As an acceptable safety practice under established regulations.

Section 104 of the Act in a bid to fulfill its obligations under the UNFCC and similar Conventions,
demands strict adherence to a gas flaring plan. A licensee or lessee producing natural gas is
expected to, within 12 months of the effective date, submit a natural gas flare elimination and
monetization plan to the Commission, which shall be prepared under regulations made by the
Commission under the Act. A Licensee or Lessee who fails to adhere to the provision shall pay a
penalty prescribed according to the Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations.
Monies received in respect of gas flaring penalties for upstream petroleum operations are to be
utilized for environmental remediation and relief of the host communities impacted. However, gas
flare penalties in respect of midstream operations are to be transferred to the Midstream and
Downstream Gas Infrastructure Fund to be used for midstream and downstream gas infrastructure
investment in the affected host communities.
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It is worthy of note that the prescribed penalty on gas flaring comes with a proviso, “the
Commission may, however, grant a permit to a Licensee or Lessee to allow the flaring or venting
of natural gas for a specific period where it is required for facility start-up or strategic operational
reasons, including testing.”
Before the passage of the Act, recommendations were made by experts, and reports were
submitted. One of such is ‘Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill: A Missed Opportunity to Prepare for
the Zero-Carbon Future’257 by the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) which
followed up on an earlier report ‘Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
for the Low-Carbon Transition: How Are Other National Oil Companies Adapting?’258, that
explored how to reform NNPC, building on international best practices and lessons learned from
other National Oil Companies (NOCs). The latter report gave recommendations bordering on
“diversifying away from oil, investing in clean energy sources, and improving governance” as
essential steps for Nigeria to effectively break free from its oil dependence. The latter also
recommended the development of an energy transition plan and including principles of climate
change governance in the petroleum industry reform agenda.
However, it appears that the National Assembly passed the bill and the President assented to same
without considering much of the recommendations made in the latter report, thereby shutting the
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door to one of the most effective ways of reducing Nigeria’s reliance on income from fossil fuels
for its much-needed economic and infrastructural development. Indeed, in its overview of the
Petroleum Industry Bill which eventually translated into the Act, the Columbia Centre for
Sustainable Development described the legal framework as a “small step when Nigeria needs a
leap” and observed that “it ultimately fails to account for climate change, acknowledge the Paris
Agreement, and address the need for diversification to adequately prepare Nigeria for the energy
transition that is already underway”.
Nigeria had earlier committed to the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in addition to the National Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency Policy259 with the vision to generate 30,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity by
2030 from renewable energy contributing 30% of the generation mix. Ahead of COP 26 at
Glasgow, Nigeria submitted an updated NDC on 30 July 2021260. In the updated NDC, the Nigerian
government proposed to mitigate four greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), as against the three GHG (CO2, CH4, and
N2O) indicated in the earlier submitted NDC. The updated NDC reflects higher ambition, higher
quality, and higher national buy-in. Notable revisions include
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a) update of baseline business as usual (BAU) projections, using more accurate and recent
economic growth projections; estimated BAU 2030 emissions are now at 453 MTCO2e,
increasing 31 percent from a 2018 baseline of 347 MTCO2e;
b) raising economy-wide mitigation targets to 47 percent, with 20 percent of emissions
unconditional. The updated ambition includes improved reduction projections for the waste
sector and new gases, including short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) and
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Nigeria recommitted to its unconditional contribution of
reducing carbon emissions by 20 percent below Business-as-Usual by 2030.
However, commendable as these revisions may be, the Petroleum Industry Act 2021 (“PIA”) failed
to acknowledge these projections. It may be argued that the Petroleum Industry Bill already passed
the third reading at the National Assembly and is ready for the President’s assent at the time the
NDCs were reviewed. But the 2017 NDC was in existence at the time the Bill was drafted, yet it
failed to address the decarbonizing of the energy industry- renewables, carbon capture, hydrogen,
and the upgrading of power infrastructure. While other countries are consciously planning for life
beyond fossil fuels, Nigeria’s PIA is obsessed with applying 10 percent of revenue from acreage
rents to subsidize petroleum exploration in frontier basins for reserves that may not be worth much
after 2030. If the comprehensive legal framework for the petroleum industry (a major contributor
to climate change) could make this omission, it would be hard to determine the country’s
determination to implement its updated NDC so-called.
The Yale Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 2020 rates Nigeria 151 among 180 countries in
the world and 25 in Sub-Saharan Africa in environmental performance in 2020. This puts Nigeria
among the nations that must redouble national sustainability efforts along all fronts. The low EPI
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scores indicate the need for greater attention to the spectrum of sustainability requirements, with a
high priority focus on critical issues such as air and water quality, biodiversity, and climate change.
Following the submission of the updated NDC, the Nigerian government claimed to have
demonstrated its intention to accelerate the implementation of the NDC, stating that it has “through
the Department of Climate Change sought Climate Action Enhancement Package’s support to
make sure the country was ready to operationalize its updated NDC. With Islamic Development
Bank’s support, sub-national officials across all 36 States were trained to plan for climate action
at the local level and raise community awareness of the NDC and the national climate agenda.
With the Environmental Resources Centre, the Federal Ministry of Environment organized a Legal
Working Group of legislative experts and policymakers to strengthen the national climate agenda’s
policy framework, including revisions to the Climate Change Bill. Additionally, the African
Development Bank ensured the private sector is equipped with the tools and information necessary
to invest in putting the NDC to work”.261
Recently, the Department of Climate Change under the Federal Ministry of Environment sought
the passing of the climate change bill into law to establish “a legal instrument that would address
the myriads of climate change actions and challenges in the country”. The Climate Change Bill
was earlier presented to the presidency but was refused assent in 2019. The president’s reason was
that the scope and guiding principle of the bill “replicate the function of the federal ministry of the
environment which is charged with mainstreaming climate responses and actions into government
policies but does not suggest the scrapping of the ministry”.
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On Thursday, 18 September 2021, President Muhammadu Buhari signed the Climate Change Bill
into law. The Act provides for amongst other things, the mainstreaming of climate change actions
and the establishment of a National Council on Climate Change. It also paves the way for
environmental and economic accounting and a push for a net-zero emission deadline plan in the
country. This is a commendable development as the President had earlier committed during the
world leaders’ summit of the just concluded United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP26,
in Glasgow, the UK that Nigeria will cut its carbon emission to net zero by 2060.
A notable aspect of the Act includes its provision for nature-based solutions such as REDD+ and
environmental-economic accounting and the push for a net-zero emissions deadline for Nigeria.
In the context of REDD+, the Act, in section 28, provides for the establishment of the REDD+
registry at sub-national levels for “capturing REDD+ activities in Nigeria, including updates on
Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL).” It also makes provision for the National Council on
Climate Change to provide fiscal support for REDD+ activities in Nigeria. Also, in furtherance of
its projection for sustainable development anchored on climate and biodiversity responsibilities,
the Act in Section 29 provides for the development of natural capital accounts by the National
Bureau of Statistics and the use of the data from the accounts in making National Development
Plans.
This is the first time that a legal text mentions REDD+ and environmental-economic accounting
in Nigeria.262 The provisions are reproduced below:
Section 27: Nature-based solutions
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“The Council shall promote and adopt nature-based solutions to reducing GHG
emissions and mitigating climate change issues in Nigeria”
Section 28: Establishment of the REDD+ Registry
“(1) The Federal Ministry responsible for Environment shall set up a registry with
sub-national nodes, for capturing REDD+ activities in Nigeria, including updates
on Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL).
(2) In this section, “REDD+” means Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of
forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
(3) The Council may in fulfillment of Nigeria’s climate change obligations, provide
financial support for REDD+ activities.”
Other key aspects of the Climate Change Act are modeled after those of the UK and Ireland,
although it also has many innovative aspects specially designed to adapt to the unique Nigerian
situation. The Act provides that the government shall set five-year carbon budgets in the context
of a National Climate Change Action Plan which should be ratified by the Federal Executive
Council. The budgets are supposed to advance efforts to achieve net-zero GHG emission reduction
between 2050 – and 2070. The five-year budget shall be broken down into the annual carbon
budget for each of the years that make up the five-year cycle. President Buhari has, at COP26,
already committed Nigeria to a net-zero carbon target by 2060. The first carbon budget is to be
submitted for approval not later than 12 months from the date that the bill is signed by the
President, so now no later than 18th November 2022. Subsequent carbon budgets are to be
submitted for approval not later than 12 months to the date of the expiration of the current budget
cycle. While the Federal Ministry of Environment is tasked with setting the carbon budget, the
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new law provides for a National Council on Climate Change that will oversee the implementation
of the National Climate Change Action Plan.
The National Climate Council is a major innovation in the Act intended to suit the largely
bureaucratic nature of governance in Nigeria. Headed by the President who will serve as the
Chairman, the Council will supervise the activities and help the Environment Ministry to
coordinate the implementation of sectoral targets and guidelines needed to achieve the National
Climate Change Action Plan. The Council shall administer a Climate Change Fund established
under the new Act and play a key role in mobilizing financial resources to support climate change
actions throughout the country. This reflects an understanding of the security implications of
climate change in Nigeria and the central role that finance will play in facilitating climate action
and green transition in the country. It is instructive to note that the Act seeks to democratize climate
governance through the inclusion of representatives of the private sector, youth, women groups,
people with disabilities, and civil society organizations in the Council.
The Council will be served by a Secretariat situated at the Presidency that is headed by a DirectorGeneral who shall serve as the Secretary to the Council. Secretariat shall advise and assist the
Council in the performance of the Council’s functions and duties including the monitoring,
verification, and reporting on the extent to which the national emission profile is consistent with
the carbon budget.
The new climate change law is significant in many ways. It sends a strong positive message to the
world that Nigeria understands the enormity and urgency of the climate change challenge and is
serious to implement the net-zero carbon pledge made by President Buhari at COP26 in Glasgow.
A high-level body such as the National Council on Climate Change is about the only organ in
Nigeria that can be reasonably expected to facilitate the coordination of the various ministries,
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departments, and agencies whose engagement and active participation would be required to meet
the urgent and enormous task of national deep decarbonization required to achieve the ambitious
climate target, and steer the country on the path of just green transition to ensure climate-resilient
development of the country in the coming decades.
Also, a National Climate Change Council will go a long way in assisting the Federal Ministry of
Environment in the goal of setting a national platform for the mobilization and disbursement of
trillions of climate investments needed to scale up and accelerate the green transition efforts in
Nigeria in the coming months and years.
To succeed in the task of fighting climate change Nigeria will need a large scale of climate finance
from both domestic and international sources. With the implementation of the country’s NDC
projected to cost about USD177 billion by 2030, only a body as high profile as the National
Council on Climate Change can be expected to oversee the task of mobilizing such an amount in
the context of dwindling oil revenue and a world that is moving away from fossil fuel. Nigeria is
in a difficult place in terms of climate change. It is extremely vulnerable to climate change. At the
same time, it is also very dependent on oil for its foreign exchange earnings and therefore also
vulnerable to the transition risks associated with climate change.
Hence, nothing short of a bold institutional arrangement and action will save Nigeria from climate
change. The Climate Act represents such a bold action and if well implemented gives Nigeria a
fighting chance. It is hoped that the country will get to the plenty of work needed to translate this
bold action into concrete policies that will document the emission profiles of the key sectors of the
economy, produce credible decarbonization pathways for the country, strengthen the resilience of
the country against climate change impacts and unlock trillions of dollars in climate investment
needed to secure the transition.
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3.5.2 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
The CDM is one of three flexible mechanisms defined under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
which allows developed countries to undertake GHG emission reduction (or emission removal)
projects, in developing countries, to counteract their domestic emissions. Each CDM project
generates Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) units, where one CER is equivalent to one tonne
of carbon dioxide (CO2) or its equivalent to the other GHGs. The CDM is defined in article 12 of
the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism allows a party with emission reduction commitments, listed
in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, to implement abatement projects in a developing country and,
upon verification, to receive CERs for the abatement. The party obtaining the credits can use them
to obtain compliance with its national or Kyoto Protocol emission reduction objectives.263
The CDM is harnessing the entrepreneurial power of markets and the private sector to meet goals
on sustainable development and climate change. It provided a framework to estimate the impact
of that effort, and attempt to account for and price it, thereby mobilizing financial flows to reduce
emissions in developing countries. It has also contributed to sustainable development and
technology transfer and knowledge between countries.
The CDM not only offers opportunities for sustainable development but also brings important cobenefits, such as poverty reduction, access to energy-efficient lighting and cooking, improvement
of air quality and living conditions, reduction of costs, and generation of jobs and skills. The
rationale behind the CDM is that emission reductions should be undertaken where it costs the least,
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as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions abatement is a global public good and the geographical
location of emission reductions does not matter for the global stock of GHG.
Article 12 imposes further conditions on the emission reductions obtained under the CDM. For
instance, emission reductions are to be obtained through a voluntary agreement that benefits the
non-Annex I country, which in turn should yield real long-term measurable benefits for GHG
mitigation. Also provided in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, is the important condition of
additionality for certified emission reduction (CERs) to be created under the CDM. 264
3.5.3 Gas Flaring CDM Projects– The Nigerian Perspective
As noted earlier, a CDM is a project that allows industrialized countries that are subject to emission
reduction targets to develop or finance projects that reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emission in
non-Annex 1 countries in exchange for emission reduction credits.265 A CDM project thus reduces
carbon emissions through an agreement between an emitter in a developed country and a project
owner in a developing country such that the emitter provides infrastructure and capital to the
project owner in the developing country to the amount of carbon credit generated by the project
owner in the developing country. This credit which is often referred to as a certified emission
reduction or “CER” is then used by the emitter in the developed country.
In terms of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the broad goals of the CDM are to assist developing
countries to the Kyoto Protocol to achieve sustainable development as well as to assist developed
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country parties to the Kyoto Protocol in achieving compliance with part of their emission reduction
commitment under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol (Treck, 2004).
The specific objectives of a CDM project are to aid developing countries in achieving outcomes
such as poverty reduction, cost-effective emissions reductions as well as environmental benefits
thus contributing toward sustainable development.266
In 2015, UNEP confirmed a total number of 12 CDM projects in Nigeria with these projects spread
across different industries and engaged in different project activities (CDM, 2015). Nigeria has
hosted a total of 7 different types of CDM projects within its provinces with the most common
technology being fugitive emissions reduction projects and landfill gas projects. Fugitive emission
reduction projects and landfill gas projects collectively represent 59% of all CDM projects in
Nigeria267. Below is a table of some of the important CDM projects in Nigeria 268
S/N

Project

Project Summary

1.

Recovery of associated gas that The capture and utilization of the majority of associated gas
would otherwise be flared at previously sent to flaring at the Kwale plant (Kwale OGPP)
Kwale oil gas processing plant,
Nigeria
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2.

Pan

Ocean

Gas

Utilization The purpose of the project is to eliminate gas flaring at the Ovade-

Project

Ogharefe oil field
operated by Pan Ocean Oil Corporation (Nigeria) in a Joint
Venture

Partnership

with

Nigerian

National

Petroleum

Corporation (NNPC).
3.

Efficient Fuel Wood Stoves for The purpose of the project activity is the dissemination of up to
Nigeria

12,500 efficient fuel wood stoves (SAVE80) and heat-retaining
polypropylene boxes (hereafter referred to as the SAVE80 system)
in different states located in the Guinea Savannah Zone of Nigeria,
at subsidized prices.

4.

Recovery of gas at the Asuokpu The purpose of this project activity is to recover gas that is
/Umutu Field, Nigeria

currently, and in the future would be, flared at Asuokpu/Umutu
Marginal Field located in block OML 38 in Nigeria and to deliver
it to the domestic market for productive use as an energy product.

5.

Municipal Solid Waste (MSW)

The project activity involves the production of high-quality

compositing facility

compost from Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) by using advanced
composting technology.

6.

Afam

Combined

Cycle

Turbine Power Project

Gas The “project activity”, called Afam VI (“the project”) is a 650 MW
grid-connected combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) fueled by
natural gas.

7.

LFG project in Nigeria

The project activity is to build, operate and maintain a landfill gas
collection and flaring system on landfills in Lagos
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8.

Kainji

9.

Hydropower The project covers the rehabilitation of units 5, 6

Rehabilitation Project, Nigeria

and 12 of the Kainji Hydropower powerhouse

Recovery and Utilization of

The purpose of this project activity is to implement the

Associated

Gas

from

the infrastructure to allow for the utilization of the associated gas that

Obodugwa and neighboring oil is currently flared from two oil fields in OML561 in Delta State
fields in Nigeria

Nigeria thereby reducing the flaring of associated natural gas and
thus emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere.

10.

Lafarge

WAPCO

Partial The project activity will partially replace fossil fuels used in pyro-

Substitution of Alternative Fuels processing with lower-carbon alternative fuels, primarily biomass
in Cement Facilities Project in residue, thus resulting in measurable reductions of GHG (CO2)
Nigeria

emissions in Nigeria.

3.5.4 Impact of CDM on gas flaring in Nigeria
All projects in the sample showed a clear goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The methods
of reducing emissions include the reduction in flaring as well as the replacement of fossil fuels.
The benefits were classified as direct for 90% of the projects since the primary objective of the
projects was to reduce emissions.269 (Pillay, 2016).
However, these CDMs cannot tackle the problem of gas flaring in Nigeria under the existing
scenarios. Despite its intuitive theoretical appeal and potential economic prospects and
environmental benefit, it appears somewhat difficult to fathom the real impact of CDM projects in
the Nigerian context. For example, combined emission reduction from the 4 CDM projects in the
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oil and gas industry in Nigeria based on the project design document for a country that flared the
most gas in the world behind the Russian Federation is a paltry 4,880,462 tons of C02 per annum.
Furthermore, the presence of CDM is very insignificant when compared to the estimated 43 million
tons of C02 emission from routine gas flaring alone annually.270 Consequently, argued that based
on simple numerical analysis, Africa and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have been
lagging far behind in CDM projects.271
Against this backdrop,272 Figueres et.al theorized that the CDM project is a deliberate measure and
a false market solution to environmental protection that permits polluters to earn carbon credits
and at the same time, to continue to flare gas. Ostensibly, these kinds of arrangements encourage
the MNOCs to be rewarded bountifully for halting action that in the first instance is illegal. In the
simplest of terms, it is political gimmicks that further encouraged the MNOCs not to invest in
green technologies such as gas re-injection that can eliminate routine gas flaring. It is the priority
of the MNOCs in Nigeria to continue to extract oil and gas with the least possible cost with a
maximum profit, and at the same time to earn CERs from CDM which amount to double
standards273.
Thus, Bassey argued that relying on the CDM initiative as a major solution to solve the flaring in
Nigeria justifies the desire to do nothing to tackle the problem because it takes longer times to
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negotiate CDM project registration274. This is not unconnected to the reason very few projects have
so far been established in the oil and gas sector since inception despite Nigeria being a renowned
gas flaring country. The ultimate victims are the oil and gas-producing communities and the
ecosystem. Therefore, the CDM has not proven to be an effective way to tackle routine gas flaring
but appears to be a way to fund the non-ending of gas flaring in Nigeria, a manifestation that gas
flaring will continue unabated. Olsen K. H. and Fenhann, J. A, 2009 have similarly noted that
CDM blueprint submissions for Nigerian projects point to a picture of challenging economics in
an uncertain policy environment and tense security conditions.
The main objective of CDM is to stimulate growth in green energy and promote sustainable
development. However,275 noted that “the sustainable development goal of the CDM point to the
fact that the CDM has been more effective in reducing mitigation costs for industrialized countries
than in contributing to sustainability in developing countries”. This is consistent with the views
expressed by N. Bassey, 2008 that there is a strong political will to allocate very scarce financial
and human resources to enforce further dispossession of the poor developing countries by the
MNOCs from abroad in the name of CDM. For example, the Kwale-Okpai and Asuokpu/Umutu
gas recovery and utilization CDM projects, whose very existence is decried by environmental
degradation owing to their inability to eliminate routine gas flaring, amount to rewarding unethical
corporate MNOC’s failure in environmental protection. This is in addition to the financial
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investments in small-scale CDM projects that are often insufficient to cover the overall high CDM
transaction costs.276
CDM has proved to be a huge success for climate protection in many parts of the world,
particularly in China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and Malaysia as they possess the key factors that drive
and influence the CDM attractiveness globally. Unfortunately, that is not the case in Nigeria as the
efficacy of the CDM as an instrument of environmental sustainability to curtail the excessive gas
flaring and its attendant environmental consequences in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is still
very much in question. CDM project concept in the Nigerian oil and gas industry ought to be an
intervening vehicle and a solution to the problem of environmental degradation, but it appears to
be scratching the problem of environmental protection on the surface. The foregoing indicates a
strong need for reform. The CDM Projects in Nigeria are nowhere near achieving the NDCs nor
are they contributing any noticeable improvement to the gas flaring menace in the country.
3.5.5. Criticisms of the CDM and its replacement by SDM
Notwithstanding its projected and actual benefits, the effectiveness of the CDM globally has been
subjected to scrutiny and the succeeding items summarily highlight the criticisms, as follows:
a. Over-concentration of reduction projects on industrial gases, such as HFC and N2O, in the
context of the CDM. For instance, the CDM projects are overly concentrated in China and
India, with both nation-states accounting for over 67 percent of all projects. A look at CDM
projects producing and selling credits reveals that nearly two-thirds of emissions reductions
involve neither CO2 nor energy production neglecting forestry and reafforestation project.
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b. False assumptions: One of the challenges of the CDM was keeping up with technological
progression over time. Partly because of these assumptions, a vast majority of carbon
offsets are very likely not additional, measurable, or real - meaning that they would have
happened anyway.
c. The approval process is overly complex and time-consuming. The body administering the
process, the CDM Executive Board, does not have enough resources.
d. The CDM is not promoting enough technology transfer to the developing world; in some
cases, projects were created for the main purpose of generating CER units.
The foregoing bottlenecks have led to agitations that the CDM be scrapped. Hence, in the 2015
Paris Agreement, which sets out the framework for global climate action after 2020, there was the
establishment of the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) in Article 6.4. Since the end of
the second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol in 2020, the CDM regime theoretically ended in
2020 as there remains no legal basis for using the CERs issued by the CDM, however, the CDM
has no expiration date and has in theory, remained operational beyond 2020. The goals of the SDM
are to promote higher ambition that contributes to emission reductions and sustainable
development and deliver overall mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions through incentivizing
successfully mitigated GHG emissions. While it shares several of the characteristics of its
predecessor, the CDM. The SDM operates in a world where all countries have climate mitigation
targets. This is contrary to the design of the CDM which was established as a pure offsetting
mechanism for a bifurcated world.
To address this crucial difference between the two mechanisms, the SDM will have to take the
commitments of all countries into account and re-evaluate the CDMs to learn from the CDM
experience notably its approach to additionality, and how it provides perverse incentives against
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further climate action. Currently, countries are discussing the possibility of migrating registered
CDM activities into the new regime. Critically, the SDM needs to be accompanied by a larger
strategy to implement broader climate policies to help developing countries achieve their targets.
The different legal frameworks of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement led to several
challenges in implementing the SDM. The Kyoto Protocol’s commitment periods ended in 2020.
Parties now need to actively decide how to transition the protocol’s instruments and its institutions,
including the CDM in the Paris framework.
The author believes that transitioning from CDM to SDM will act as a catalyst for advancing the
new mechanism rather than acting as a hurdle to its success. The CDM however will be required
to fill the inevitable void before SDM is in full force; CDM will catalyze the growth of SDM and
put prices on an upward trajectory rather than depress it; finally, by removing the trust deficit of
the CDM, it will strengthen the climate ambition and environmental integrity in the long run.
The new project activities under the SDM are likely to take at least 3 years before they can issue
new credits, just as CDM projects did. In this void, existing CERs will act as an incentive to
continue emission reduction efforts by registered projects until new projects under SDM are
eligible to issue the credits. The analysis also shows that demand from Carbon Offsetting and
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs) commitments post-2020 will be enough to fully absorb the supply of about 2.5 billion
CERs before 2024. The proposed SDM will build itself on the experience gained from CDM and
will have a broader scope in terms of environmental integrity, and the use of carbon credits. If the
SDM builds on existing CDM methodologies, it will strengthen the governance mechanism for
integrity and additionality.
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Lastly, private sector actors have invested heavily in eligible projects under the CDM and are likely
to be the ones investing in SDM. Trust deficit in the market mechanism must be removed to
provide a strong perception of legal certainty to the CDM and SDM so that investments in emission
reduction projects are only increased and not halted.277
3.5.6 Way Forward for Nigeria
From our discussion above, CDM projects in Nigeria are heavily skewed in favor of greenhouse
gas reductions. The by-products of the implementation of technologies to reduce greenhouse gas
reductions would increase employee benefits and economic sustainable development benefits. The
employment benefits would arise out of the employment of skilled staff which is required to
manage and implement the project as well as infrastructure development which would also require
construction work being performed. They are thus seen as indirect benefits arising from the
projects.
However, Nigeria has not recorded much success and sustainable development from its CDM
projects. Going forward, Nigeria needs to put in place realistic policies for the CDM projects. This
may include two options;278 The first is the establishment of international benchmark standards in
respect of sustainable development. An example would be that a project must provide a report on
the improvement of the greenhouse gas emissions, generate some local infrastructure development
as well as generate a certain level of employment in the project area.
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A second option could include the generation of an international list of sustainable development
benefits which could be amended by individual countries for circumstances or situations within
their countries279.
The first option could work in Nigeria provided the benchmarks are both realistic and complete.
The second option would require a considerable amount of effort and cooperation between
countries since they would be required to mutually agree on a comprehensive list of sustainable
development benefits. Since the second option would not wholly be within the control of the
Government of Nigeria the first option would be easier to implement in the short term.
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CHAPTER 4
4.0: The Effect of the UNFCCC on Gas Flaring from Fossil Fuel Mining
Fossil fuels are rock-like, gas, or liquid resources that are burned to generate power. They
include coal, natural gas, and oil, and are used as an energy source in the electricity and
transportation sectors. They’re also a leading source of the world’s global warming pollution.
Natural gas’s climate emissions are not only generated when it’s burned as a fuel at power plants
or in our homes. The full global warming impact of natural gas also includes methane emissions
from drilling wells and pipeline transportation.
Methane, the main component of natural gas, is a much more potent greenhouse gas than carbon
dioxide—some 34 times more effective at trapping heat over a 100-year timescale and 86 times
more effective over a 20-year timescale280. Preliminary studies and field measurements show that
these so-called “fugitive” emissions range from 1 to 9 percent of total natural gas lifecycle
emissions. Methane losses must be kept below 3.2 percent for natural gas power plants to have
lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than coal281. Oil drilling can also produce methane.
Although it can be captured and used as an energy source, the gas is often either vented or flared.
Flaring the gas converts it from methane to carbon dioxide, which reduces its impact but still
releases additional greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The World Bank estimates that 5.3
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the equivalent of 25 percent of total US consumption, is flared

280

G. Myhre., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B.

Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang., 2013. Anthropogenic and Natural
Radiative Forcing.
281

Alvarez, R. S., 2017. Greater focus is needed on methane leakage from natural gas. PNAS 109, 6435-6440.

191

annually worldwide, generating some 400 million tons of unnecessary carbon dioxide
emissions282.
The relationship between fossil fuels and climate change is clear. Anthropogenic climate change
mainly results from the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas (with fossil fuel
combustion accounting for 69% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2010);283 The UNFCCC
which is the embodiment of international agreement on climate policies approaches fossil-fuel
supply issues only obliquely. Article 4.8, however (covering adverse effects of response measures)
mentions countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the
production, processing, and export, and/or on the consumption of fossil fuels and associated
energy-intensive products as one type of actor potentially adversely affected by response measures
that target carbon emissions. It notes funding and technology transfer as potential actions to meet
these countries' specific needs. The Paris Agreement makes no mention of fossil fuels, leaving
states to develop policies and measures tailored to national circumstances.
Fossil fuel supply is not an explicit part of UNFCCC guidance on developing NDCs nor are supplyside strategies a separate category in NDC synthesis reports. This enables producers to remain
‘strategically ignorant’ about the type and pace of change necessary284. The territorial approach
followed by UNFCCC and IPCC in their guidance on inventories is also problematic in failing to
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recognize actions (such as restricting fossil fuel exports) that might have an effect beyond a
country's jurisdiction. However, the call for countries to take supply-side action – both within and
outside the UN climate change process – is growing.285 There is an increasing recognition in
policy and academic circles that to avoid dangerous climate change, most fossil fuel reserves will
need to be left in the ground.286;287 Most fossil fuel reserves will need to be left in the ground if we
are to avoid dangerous climate change and meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping global
warming “well below” 2°C. This is a daunting challenge for as far as many countries are
concerned, fossil fuel extraction and trade are central to energy security and economic
development.
At COP26, more than 40 nations made new commitments to phase out coal power, including
Indonesia, Vietnam, Poland, South Korea, Egypt, Spain, Nepal, Singapore, Chile, and Ukraine. In
a new ‘Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement’, countries also committed to scaling up
clean power and ensuring a just transition away from coal.288 But several of the biggest coal
consumers were notably absent from the accord, including China and India, which together burn
roughly two-thirds of the world’s coal, as well as Australia, the world’s 11th-biggest user of coal
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and a major exporter. The United States, which still generates about one-fifth of its electricity from
coal, also did not sign the pledge. In a separate commitment, 20 countries, including the US,
pledged to end public financing for "unabated" fossil fuel projects abroad by the end of 2022. Such
projects burn fossil fuels, like coal, oil, and natural gas, without using technology to capture the
CO2 emissions. Dozens of organizations also signed up to the pledge, with several major banks
agreeing to stop financing the coal industry.
According to International Energy Agency, the decision to move away from coal would limit
global warming to 1.8C. Countries must of course deliver on their promises for this prediction to
be a reality. “It is an important step but is not enough. We must accelerate climate action to keep
alive the goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees”, said António Guterres in a video
statement released at the close of the two-week meeting. The UN chief added that it is time to go
“into emergency mode”, ending fossil fuel subsidies, phasing out coal, putting a price on carbon,
protecting vulnerable communities, and delivering the $100 billion climate finance commitment.
Also, in a joint statement by signatories to the coal commitment, "investing in unabated fossilrelated energy projects increasingly entails both social and economic risks… and has ensuing
negative impacts on government revenue, local employment, taxpayers, utility ratepayers, and
public health”.
As the world is gradually moving towards sealing coal's fate and embracing the environmental and
economic benefits of building a future that is powered by clean energy, most countries like South
Africa, Poland, Nigeria, and India will need major investments to make their energy sectors
cleaner. None of the energy commitments are binding and there is no big stick to force countries
to do this. We are at a critical stage and the world must embrace solid ambitions to fuel the
movement toward renewable energy. It is hoped that major financers such as China, Japan would
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reconsider investing in clean energy as noted by UK Energy Minister, Greg Hands, “ending
international finance for all unabated fossil fuels is the next critical frontier we must deliver on;
we must put public finance on the right side of history."

4.1 The Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a United Nations panel established by
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) in 1988. Headquartered with the WMO in Geneva, Switzerland, the IPCC assesses peerreviewed literature and industry practices to determine the impact of and possible responses to
climate change associated with global warming. While it produces no research of its own, its
members—divided into three working groups and a task force—assemble reports from hundreds
of scientists and policymakers from around the globe. These are analyzed and distributed as special
papers or as more-comprehensive assessment reports. In 2007 the IPCC shared, with Al Gore, the
Nobel Peace Prize for disseminating knowledge about human-caused climate change.
Between 1990 and 2021 the IPCC released six assessment reports (AR1–AR6) and several special
reports that described the current state of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in Earth’s atmosphere, trends
in greenhouse gas emissions, and their likely effects on atmospheric processes, economies, and
ecosystems. The reports also made projections using a suite of scientific modeling techniques to
predict the state of several variables (average near-surface air temperatures, sea levels, average
ocean pH, sea ice extent, drought frequency, etc.) out to the year 2100.
The special report released in 2018 noted that human beings and human activities are responsible
for a worldwide average temperature increase of between 0.8 and 1.2 °C (1.4 and 2.2 °F) of global
warming above benchmark averages—that is, average global temperature levels set before the start
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of the Industrial Revolution. However, since the fifth assessment report (AR5), published in 2014,
all but a few nations are instituting carbon reduction plans as part of the Paris Agreement, which
endeavors to keep global warming to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) above preindustrial levels. The authors noted
that they had high confidence that the world would reach 1.5 °C above benchmark averages
sometime between 2030 and 2052 should carbon emissions continue at their present rate.
Released in 2021, the sixth assessment report (AR6)289 noted that human beings had produced an
“unequivocal” influence over Earth’s climate system as human-generated GHGs have increased
in Earth’s atmosphere. The report also revealed that global surface temperatures for the years 2000
to 2020 were 0.99 °C (1.8 °F) higher than benchmark averages and that since 1980 a succession
of decadal global temperature averages had been higher than those measured in any preceding
decade. These developments have driven glacial retreat, Arctic Sea ice loss, and a poleward shift
in the planet’s climate zones. The authors noted that even under the very low GHG emissions
scenario (which assumed that GHG emissions stabilize and decline), global surface temperatures
would reach 1.2–2.0 °C (2.1–3.6 °F) by 2050 before declining slightly to 1.0–1.8 °C (1.8–3.2 °F)
above benchmark averages by 2100. However, under the intermediate scenario (which assumed
that GHG emissions would remain steady), global surface temperatures would be expected to reach
2.0 °C (3.6 °F) by mid-century, later increasing to 2.1–3.5 °C (3.8–6.3 °F) by 2100.
Thus, unless there are rapid, sustained, and large-scale reductions of climate change-causing
greenhouse gas emissions, including CO2, methane, and others, the goal of limiting global
warming to 1.5C compared to pre-industrial levels, as enshrined in the Paris Agreement, will be
beyond reach. This assessment of the latest science is a severe warning regarding the well-being
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of human society and all life on Earth. It is testimony to the fact that efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions over the past decades have been wholly insufficient. In a report by the UNFCCC,290
an initial synthesis of submitted new or updated NDCs early in 2021 showed that collective efforts
fall far short of what is required by science to limit global temperature increases by the end of the
century to 2C, let alone the desired objective of less than 1.5C.
The points toward the fact that countries of the world still have a lot to do in sustaining the planet,
and as noted by the UN, “pursuing efforts towards 1.5ºC through the implementation of ambitious
NDCs is essential for our future and future generations’ well-being”.
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CHAPTER 5
5.0.

GAS FLARING VIS-A-VIS DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION

The associated impacts of gas flaring can be divided into direct and indirect contributions which
are evaluated based on their influence on changes to the ecosystem. One of the major indirect
contributions of gas flaring in Nigeria is the deforestation and forest degradation process that occur
because of gas flaring. Despite the enormous benefits of the mangroves such as the supply of
various goods and provision of valuable ecological services to humanity, serving as habitat for
different species of animals, provision of medicinal ornaments, etc, there has been a continuous
depletion of the forest in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria caused primarily by crude oil
exploration and exploitation activities, especially gas flaring and venting. It is worth asking: in
what way has gas flaring contributed to such drastic change in our forest and ecosystem at large?
The impact of land contamination from gas flaring on the mangrove ecosystem is intertwined with
the socio-economic activities and health of local communities in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria.
The effect of oil spillage and acid rain which is a consequence of gas flaring is forest degradation
and deforestation through soil degradation which then affects crop yield and harvest. Gas flaring
and consequent carbon dioxide emissions are one of the major causes of deforestation and forest
degradation causing erratic rainfalls, erosion, flooding, overheating, climate change, etc.291
During gas flaring, the product gas (carbon{iv}oxide) is emitted into the immediate vicinity of the
flare with enormous global warming potential and impacts negatively on the forest bringing about
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biodiversity and vegetation depletion. The CO2 emissions from a complex relationship with other
anthropogenic gases reduce the capacity of the atmosphere to filter out the sun’s harmful ultraviolet
radiations which further impact the photosynthesis process as well as saturate the environment
with carbon dioxide hastening deforestation. Thermal pollution arising from gas flaring can be
seen in the plant, vegetative covers, and mangrove forests in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria
indicating signs of chlorosis and stress. As the plants and trees die off, there is an increased harvest
of them for fuelwood which further leads to deforestation. 292 There is a strong link between
increased demand and supply of fuelwood in Nigeria with gas flaring as the continued failure to
create wealth from Nigeria’s flared gas and the missed opportunity to develop alternative ways of
using the flared gas to meet the energy needs of households in both rural and urban areas is
responsible for the increasing demand of fuelwood. Results from research show that an annual
average of 2040 MJ of fuelwood is consumed in Nigeria, 77.3% of the sourcing is done by
children.293 The gas burned at wells could go a long way towards providing this energy sourced
from fuelwood which will lead to a corresponding reduction in the percent of equivalent carbon
dioxide emissions into the atmosphere from flaring.
According to Shiva Makki, in the 2009 essay, ‘Deforestation: Disastrous Consequences for the
Climate and Food Security:294
Deforestation devastates biodiversity and natural habitats and degrades natural
resources. In the developing world, 1.6 billion people depend on forests for their
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food, fuel, and livelihoods. The real economic value of forests is much greater
than the short-term benefits of logging or clearing land for agriculture. In the
longer run, the loss of biodiversity, habitat, and natural resources will affect food
production… But the most serious consequence of them all may be global
warming.
Besides fuelwood collection, there are many other reasons why deforestation persists including;
indiscriminate logging and the desertification of land which makes land unfit to grow trees as a
result of wastes released into rivers or water bodies by petrochemical industries, leading to soil
erosion. All of these are critical drivers of the persistent increase in greenhouse gas emissions that
create climate change, deforestation, and forest degradation.295
Furthermore, various studies have been carried out on the impact of gas flaring on biodiversity,
especially vegetation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Biological diversity or Biodiversity is
the total variability within all living organisms and the ecological complexes they inhabit. Humans
depend on biodiversity because it is the human life support (the source of our food, medicines,
timber, and many other products). Anthropogenic activities (gas flaring) have endangered most of
this biological diversity. Studies have been carried out by researchers to determine the impact of
air pollution arising from gas flaring which revealed negative effects of the former on species
distribution and composition in the region. Plants and indeed entire vegetation are known to exhibit
physiological responses to environmental stress, such as temperature changes, tramping and
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contamination of air with a high concentration of toxic gaseous and other particulate pollutants
such as dust.296
The study carried out by the HSOA Journal of Environmental Science Current Research297 has
shown that gas flaring has affected vegetation composition in terms of species richness,
dominance, and density. The study reveals variation in the number of species in the control and
the gas flare sites a total of eighty (80) species from sixty quadrats in five (5) sites, with the control
(Igwuruta-Ali) having the highest number of species (22), Oyigbo and Yorla gas flare sites has
sixteen (16) and fifteen (15) species respectively. Bomu and Ebocha gas flare sites have fourteen
(14) and thirteen (13) species respectively. The index of community computed showed
dissimilarity in species composition between the gas flare sites and the control site. The analysis
shows that there is a significant difference between species composition in the gas flare sites and
the control. This difference could be attributed to gas flaring and anthropogenic activities.
The study showed a variation in the vegetation frequency (number of species), number of families,
and density between the control and the gas flare sites. The study also revealed dissimilarity
between species in the gas flare site and the control. Based on these, it is recommended among
others, to stop the flaring of gas and channel it towards small-scale utilization through electricity
and household energy needs such as cooking gas.
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5.1.

Redd+ efforts towards International transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs)
under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

Meeting the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement will not be possible without halting
deforestation, enhancing forest restoration, and reducing agricultural emissions. The land sector
can contribute about 25–30 percent of the progress needed to meet the 1.5°C goals formulated
under the Paris Agreement. The entry into force of the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC brings
new opportunities for countries to cooperate in protecting tropical forests. Its article 5.6 gives full
recognition to activities that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conserve
forests, sustainably manage forests or enhance forest carbon stocks (together referred to as
REDD+), as part of a long-term framework of international climate action.298
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes the role of voluntary cooperation to achieve global
climate goals and raise the level of ambition to tackle climate change. Specifically, Article 6.2
allows for new forms of bilateral or plurilateral cooperation among countries. Article 6.4 offers an
opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from a variety of processes and
mechanisms. One of such co-operative approaches provided for by Article 6 is the internationally
transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), geared at increasing ambition and promoting
sustainable development. However, rules involving the use of ITMOs have yet to be agreed upon
by the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Under the Paris Agreement, the term Mitigation Outcomes (MOs) replaces most forms of
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international carbon credits. MOs generated in a country could be transferred to another country,
thereby becoming Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs).
Creating mitigation outcomes involves four main steps:
•

the application of a methodology to quantify mitigation outcomes from a project.

•

the establishment of monitoring, reporting, and verification systems.

•

validation or independent assessment of the quality of the mitigation activity.

•

and an institutional process for authorization and trade of mitigation outcomes.

ITMOs are not specifically defined yet and could take many forms, including linking emission
trading systems (ETSs) across jurisdictions, investment in emission reduction projects, technology
transfers, and even credits from REDD+ schemes. Article 6 could therefore be a useful way to
channel technology, finance, and capacity building from developed to developing countries.
REDD projects deliver significant benefits to both communities and the environment. 5.5 million
hectares of tropical forest area are lost each year. Emissions from deforestation and land
degradation are cumulatively responsible for up to 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions. While
forests are critical in contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation, they also play a
role in water provision, biodiversity conservation, and cultural heritage and community
livelihoods. REDD+ projects are geared toward reducng emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation, conserving, and enhancing the forest carbon stocks, and sustainably managing forests.
The values gleaned from REDD+ projects are:
a) Mitigation of climate change by supporting forest-friendly projects that improve
livelihoods.
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b) Support targeted projects that reduce deforestation pressures and use local resources more
sustainably in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
c) Incentivize behavioral changes for poor migrants, slash-and-burn farmers, and forest-based
communities.
d) Provide training and capacity building to improve resource use, harvesting methods, and
effective resource management.
e) Protect habitats for hundreds of forest species including endangered primates, birds, and
medicinal plant species.
An article 6 collaboration is an opportunity to reduce emissions cost-effectively
since mitigation can be performed where costs are lower.299 In simple terms, the first mechanism
would allow a country that has beaten its Paris climate pledge to sell any overachievement to a
nation that has fallen short of its own goals. This overachievement could be in terms of emissions
cuts but might also cover other types of targets, for example, some countries have set goals for
renewable energy capacity or forest expansion. Carbon credits could, for example, be generated
by an emissions-saving factory upgrade or the restoration of an area of forest.
REDD+ has the potential to deliver social and environmental benefits beyond GHG emission
reductions. These include biodiversity habitat, flood prevention, and other environmental services
provided by forests. REDD+ sets out several safeguards that should be promoted and supported
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by REDD+ projects, including the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity and the
participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities.300
While REDD+ is designed under the UNFCCC as a mechanism for results-based payments, where
the ownership of ERs remains with (or within) the host country, COP decisions do not rule out the
use of carbon markets. In this context, it is also conceivable that Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris
Agreement be used to establish bilateral or plurilateral REDD+ cooperative approaches that rely
on the transfer of REDD+ mitigation outcomes between countries. As Article 6.2 allows for a
broad range of initiatives and provides Parties with greater discretion to determine their terms for
cooperation, REDD+ activities may be able to generate emission reductions recognized as ITMOs.
On the 13th of November 2021, six years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement by 196
countries at COP-21, negotiators finally completed the “Article 6 rulebook,” which allows for
cooperation among countries in meeting and going beyond their NDCs. The implementation
guidance of Article 6.2 defines criteria for ‘cooperative approaches’ and corresponding
adjustments, and the rules and modalities for ‘Article 6.4 activities’ embrace all sectors and do not
exclude any activities or methodologies. In doing so, they retract past discrimination against
nature-based solutions by the CDM.REDD+ activities, such as avoided deforestation or avoided
conversion, afforestation, reforestation, or sustainable forest management, can be developed under
both implementation modalities of Article 6 (Art. 6.2 and 6.4) if they comply with the respective
international and national rules. The Art. 6.4 Supervisory Body will have to approve
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methodologies that account for emission reductions and removals, and any activity must obtain
host country approval to qualify for Article 6 transactions. Since Article 6 treats the land sector
like any other sector, there is no special treatment. REDD+ gets neither discriminatory nor
preferential treatment.
The forest sector, including REDD+ programs, must comply with Article 6 rules, like any other
sectoral mitigation effort. Cooperation under Article 6.2 gives participating Parties significant
flexibility to define the modalities of their engagement. To participate in an Article 6 transaction,
Parties must comply with involved reporting requirements and have the ability to account for
mitigation outcomes, track carbon credits, and make corresponding adjustments.
Countries transfer emission reductions under the modalities of Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement
in return for transfer-based payment. Article 6.2 enables countries to transfer reductions in
emissions and increases in removals that may be used by acquiring countries toward the
achievement or overachievement of their NDCs. Article 6.2 allows countries much flexibility to
cooperate through such “transfer-based finance” according to their terms, as long as the
transactions meet the quality criteria of environmental integrity and transparency, including in
governance. Countries may engage in REDD+ through government-to-government transactions
that transfer emission reductions without issuing them as carbon credits. Once transacted, emission
reductions can no longer count against the transferring country’s NDC. Transfer-based
transactions under Article 6.2 are likely to apply additional accounting and quality criteria that
supplement the rules of the WFR. In turn, forest countries can acquire access to additional markets
and/or demand a higher price for emission reductions.
Countries can use Article 6 to involve private and public entities in REDD+ implementation. The
private sector plays an important role in implementing REDD+, and Article 6 may be used to
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provide additional incentives for private-sector investments. Article 6 enables the issuance of
carbon credits that can link government-to-government cooperation to carbon pricing programs
involving the private sector. This can be part of country-driven instruments under Article 6.2 or be
via the centralized crediting mechanism under Article 6.4. Countries could authorize private and
public entities to develop programs that will generate emission reductions and be “nested” into
national accounting. These programs would earn carbon credits (or payments) that could be used
domestically and/or transferred internationally. Countries may also implement carbon-pricing
instruments (emission trading or carbon tax systems) that allow the use of international REDD+
credits to meet national compliance obligations.
Countries generate emission reductions under Article 6.4 for specific activities nested into
REDD+. Many REDD+ programs form part of comprehensive land-use strategies that include
activities that may be eligible for the generation of emission reductions under Article 6.4. REDD+
transfer-based payments could be linked to such activities that allow the measuring of emission
reductions with a higher degree of certainty. Support for a subset of activities, integrated into
REDD+ accounting, could address concerns relating to environmental integrity while lowering the
risk that the transfer of emission reductions leads to the nonachievement of a country’s NDC.
Countries can negotiate and implement joint NDCs. Under Article 4.16, countries could decide to
elevate the REDD+ emission reduction goals of one or a group of countries to a joint NDC. A joint
REDD+ under NDCs could be formulated among several goals for tropical forest countries that
share a particular forest biome or face similar deforestation threats. While cooperating countries
would still need to meet their targets individually, the jointly implemented actions would not lead
to a transfer of emission reductions between the countries. Further, activities that do not generate
emission reductions or removals cannot generate mitigation outcomes under Article 6. The
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Glasgow decisions clarify that “emissions avoidance”— formulated to respond to proposals to
credit decisions not to extract fossil fuels, but also applicable to protect forests that are not under
immediate threat—cannot generate any eligible mitigation outcomes.301
DEFORESTATION FOR ENERGY
Charcoal production, wood fire cooking, and agricultural activities are the major intentional
activities that contribute to deforestation The impact of gas flaring, oil spillage and other harmful
effects of industrialization and oil mining also contribute substantially to deforestation in Nigeria.
Unfortunately, it is sad to realize that a growing number of Nigerians living below the poverty line
of $2 per day have to rely on wood and charcoal to meet their energy needs despite Nigeria having
so much natural gas that is flared on a daily basis. This flared gas can be utilized to meet the energy
needs of its citizen, and the forest that is gradually being destroyed could help in the carbon sink
effort toward reversing climate change.
Nigeria is the biggest charcoal producer in Sub Saharan Africa. A large amount of wood is
harvested from Nigerian forests for this charcoal production for energy. The Nexus of charcoalland use change-energy imposes a considerable burden on the amount of wood that must be
extracted from the forest for charcoal production. Therefore, charcoal production is linked to
deforestation and forest degradation.302
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There needs to be appropriate sensitization in Nigerians’ rural areas about the harmful effect of
cutting down forests to serve as an energy source. But before such sensitization can be effective,
there is a need for an alternative source of energy for the rural dwellers who need a source of
energy for their domestic needs.
Using the sustainable development mechanism, governments of developed nations can embark on
projects that could divert gas flared into adequate home use.
There have been instances where the open flame from wood fires used for cooking led to bush
fires that destroyed farmlands and forests.
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CHAPTER 6
6.0.

CONCLUSION

The relatively high flaring of gas in Nigeria has been attributed to many factors, including lack of
infrastructure at some oil fields, a limited number of reservoirs suitable for gas re-injection,
expensive nature of developing and installing of pipeline networks, limited local, regional and
international market and difficult terrain of the Niger Delta, which hinder the harnessing of the
product for positive uses. Gas flaring constitutes irresponsible environmental behavior and should
be deterred in the interest of the environmental safety of endangered individuals and communities.
Despite the long list of legal instruments discussed above regulating gas flaring, it is observed that
there is currently no efficient legal framework for gas flare management in Nigeria. The
enforcement of laws needs more efficiency on the part of human, regulatory, and statutory
authorities. It is also observed that the absence of advanced technologies to capture flared gas for
electricity generation and adequate infrastructure, such as storage and processing facilities for
conversion of gas to cashable use, continues to impede the elimination of gas flaring in Nigeria.
Also, the shortcoming of anti-gas flaring laws and the lack of will on the part of those
implementing the laws contribute to the continued state of gas flaring pollution in Nigeria. It is the
view of the writer that for there to be effective regulation of gas flaring, the Acts must be
comprehensive and provide for the computation and reporting of volumes of gas flared and vented,
which would, in turn, provide for precise data about gas flaring and venting volumes to the
regulatory authorities for combating the menace in the sector.
In this Dissertation, we have evaluated several efforts made by the Federal Government of Nigeria
to tackle gas flaring via legislation and the success and failure made so far. Suggestions were made,
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where suitable, for addressing the flaws. It is an expectation that regulatory authorities employ
practical means of monitoring compliance concerning the volume of gas flared or vented, vis-àvis the permissible levels of gas utilization. Further, strict implementation, monitoring, and
enforcement of the Nigeria Gas Flare Commercialization Programme will save the huge revenues
lost to gas flaring which could have been utilized for infrastructure development and to enhance
the power supply in the country. The strict implementation of environmental protection laws would
enhance ecological development and the financial viability of oil-producing communities in
Nigeria, in addition to providing a healthy environment for members of the host communities.
A national gas transmission grid is needed for easy access to gas by potential users in Nigeria to
enhance gas utilization and development through private sector participation projects with detailed
and practicable gas policy for the nation to encourage gas investors and to end over-reliance on
impromptu policy statements by public officials as governing policies in the sector. To make the
regulation efficient, the regulatory authorities must enforce anti-flaring laws without fear or favor
to ensure total compliance with the anti-flaring and other environmental laws to combat gas flaring
in Nigeria’s midstream sector. The optimal development of gas reserves with more advanced
technologies will provide enormous economic benefits to Nigeria and the African continent, if
executed adequately by the regulatory authorities, assigned the responsibilities of enforcing the
laws for combating gas flaring and other environmental degradations in the sector.303
A cursory look at the impact of the newly enacted Petroleum Industry Act in combating the menace
of gas flaring in Nigeria was made, the shortcomings were laid bare, and recommendations were
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made. While the PIA offers a lot in terms of aggregating the regulatory, legal, fiscal, and
management of the Nigerian Petroleum industry, it left a lot of questions unanswered regarding
gas flaring monitoring, management, and elimination as well as the restitution of the host
communities which are the victims of gas flaring. While we recognize the PIA’s provisions on
punitive measures for gas flaring, we reckon a select few paragraphs of the PIA on the
environmental hazards, is an implied indictment of the legislator’s indifference to an important
issue.
6.1.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1.1 Implementation of established treaties and Resolution
This recommendation offers to exhort better enforcement and implementation of existing laws,
treaties, resolutions, and regulations. One significant reform that could enhance the enforcement
and implementation of all environmental laws in Nigeria, including those relating to gas flaring,
would be the adoption of a rights-based approach with opportunities for citizen enforcement.
Nigeria is a signatory to a plethora of treaties, conventions, and international environmental laws.
The Human Rights Council which is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations system
and is responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights around the globe has in
resolution 48/13 established that having a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is a human
right. The United Nations should encourage the domestication of this right and ratification in the
various constitution of member states. Moreso, recognized rights should be implemented and made
justiciable in a way that citizens of a state can enforce this human right through the judicial process.
Nigeria especially would benefit from this. All the fundamental objectives and directive principles
of governance entrenched in the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Nigerian Constitution need to be
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made justiciable and enforceable in Nigerian courts. This would majorly put leaders on their toes
and pay due attention to governance and not mere rulership. The threat of legal action would
incentivize oil corporations, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of petroleum to be culpable
and liable for damages that stem from gas flaring and its associated effect.
The UNFCC has recognized that climate change and environmental destruction affect millions of
people across the world, and it also established that the most vulnerable segments of the population
are more affected by environmental degradation. Since Nigeria is a signatory to most of the
environmental treaties. The National government of Nigeria should be obliged to fulfill its
obligations.
In sixty National constitutions, drafters around the globe have explicitly enshrined some form of
obligation to protect the environment or other people’s environmental rights, one thousand
bilateral and 350 multilateral agreements designed to protect the environment have been entered
into by various nations.
During the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993) More than one hundred
governmental representatives declared that the dumping of toxic waste is a threat to the right to
life. There have been cases at international tribunals that have also confirmed that the duty not to
cause environmental harm is a norm of customary international law. the Trail Smelter arbitration
recognized the principle that international liability may arise from transboundary activity that
causes serious environmental harm. The U.N. Human Rights Committee noted that the scope of
any sovereign's right to pursue economic development is necessarily limited by the state's human
rights obligations under international law. It is one of the established universal norms of customary
international law that taking actions that may be expected to cause lingering and severe harm to
the environment and may prejudice the health or survival of a population is not acceptable and
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likewise is acts that would cause environmental damages and deprive a people of its subsistence.
Furthermore, the World Bank and the international monetary fund are financial organizations that
have an effective influence on Nigeria`s monetary policies, they can help incentivize the Nigeria
Government to enforce this right just as they have helped encourage national governments to desist
from torture.
6.1.2 Recommendations for Nigeria`s Petroleum Industry Act 2020 On Curbing Gas Flaring
The following recommendations will ensure the smooth running of the newly enacted Petroleum
Industry Act:
•

Increased watchfulness of the National Assembly:

The new Petroleum Industry Act provides for actions that must be taken almost immediately,
including the establishment of the NNPC Limited not later than six months after the
commencement of the Act.
To this Act, the 9th National Assembly must be alive to its responsibilities to make sure that salient
provisions of the Act are not flagrantly disobeyed and ensure that erring public servants who do
so are made to face the full wrath of the law.
•

Commercial operations Of NNPC Limited:

To 'compete' with private sector players in the petroleum industry as enshrined by the Petroleum
Industry Act, the NNPC Limited must ensure that it has the technical capacity and the mental
fortitude to undertake this exercise.
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To this wise, the NNPC Limited must stock its ranks with some of the best and the brightest energy
experts in Nigeria and across the globe. Only by doing so can it carry out profitable activities under
its new commercial mandate.
•

Judicious use of the Host Communities Trust

Although host communities are disgruntled with the 3% allocation of the operating expenses of
settlors to the host communities’ trust, nonetheless the allocation is significant. Host communities
must ensure to use the money allocated to them under the Petroleum Industry Act to develop their
communities. Failure to do so will only result in environmental degradation of their homeland,
along with poor living and welfare conditions.
6.3 How Nigeria Can Take Advantage of the Europe Energy Crisis
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, several sanctions were imposed on Russia by Western
nations, thereby threatening the critical supply of Russian gas to European markets. The
withdrawal and disruption of supply channels from Russia, as the second-largest gas producer
globally and the biggest supplier of natural gas to Europe, would not only send Europe into a
deeper energy crisis but also caused price hikes globally.
This poses a great opportunity for Nigeria to expand and improve its global market. It can take
advantage of the outcome to attract the investments required to build infrastructure that would
enable them to expand exploration, production, and exportation to meet the anticipated increase in
demand in Europe. Investing Nations can also earn carbon credit by financing the numerous
projects that would be required to establish transatlantic pipelines.
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Recently, Nigeria with other African producers such as Algeria and Niger, signed the Declaration
of Niamey during the Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS) Mining and
Petroleum Forum (ECOMOF) - paving the way for the construction of the multi-billion, 4,128km
Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which will run through the three countries into Europe. Once
completed, the pipeline is expected to transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas per annum which
Europe will desperately need to meet demand. This is an opportunity for the country to attract
funding for the project rollout and expand its production and exportation capabilities to Europe.
With the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in January 2021, crossborder pipeline networks and gas trade have improved. African countries are now able to enhance
natural gas trade across the continent, with simplified procedures, reduced tariffs, and market
liberalization expanding opportunities.
Nigeria and Africa have significant natural gas reserves that can not only be leveraged to accelerate
socio-economic growth but can be used to supply Europe with much-needed energy. Africa’s
resources have the potential to transform the global energy space, and with the right investment
and development, the continent will emerge as a frontrunner in global gas supply. It is however
misfortunate to see that Nigeria is currently unable to meet the export supply standard and hitherto
unable to take economic advantage of the Europe gas crisis.
Nigeria needs to ramp up its production. The African Energy Chamber (AEC) – in its Q1 2022
Outlook – predicts Nigeria to increase gas production from 2016 by about 1,550 billion cubic feet
to up to 1,780 billion cubic feet in 2022. These production increases if actualized will enable
Nigeria to increase domestic capacity, ensuring energy security both domestically and
continentally, while creating the opportunity to scale-up exports to European markets.
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For one, the Declaration of Niamey is a step in the right direction. For efficiency and results,
Nigeria must leverage the experience gained from CDM projects, to conduct an SDM project that
would tackle gas flaring by leaning towards re-injection of associated gas, whilst also being
another source of gas for Europe and international markets. This of course requires improvement
of policy planning and enactment to make it an attractive market to partner with.
6.4 Action Points
Considering all that has been discussed, this thesis recommends the following cure-alls to the
prevalent issue of gas flaring:
a. A three-year transition period when gas flaring must be phased out altogether. Those that
continue to do it will be doing so under stiff penalty.
b. Operating companies should not only be made to get insurance covers to cover cases of
environmental disasters arising from their operations and this should be a condition precedent
to the granting and renewal of oil mining licenses in Nigeria.
c. To bring gas flaring to an end, facilities for gathering, storing, and processing gas must be
built, and the end products properly harnessed for onward distribution to consumers.
Furthermore, it is not just enough to require oil companies to install measurement equipment
for measuring the amount of gas being flared as contained in Section 201. This must be
matched with a corresponding capacity of regulatory agencies to independently verify, track
and measure gas volumes produced and flared. The findings of the Nuhu Ribadu-led Petroleum
Revenue Special Task Force (PRSTF) show that the agency responsible for collecting gas flare
penalties, the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), is currently unable to independently

217

track and measure gas volumes produced and flared. It depends largely on the information
provided by the operators.
d. The penalty for gas flaring is a penalty for harmful behaviour that hampers the health of the
community, hence, the funds should not be used to build infrastructures in the downstream
sector rather they should be used for remediation, investment, and development in the
communities.
e. Environmental protection laws must have adequate provisions for combating oil and gas
pollution, degradation, and gas flaring. The NESREA Act 2007, should be amended to extend
its purview to oil and gas sector pollution and other environmental degradation in the sector to
combat gas flaring, and the law should provide penalties for defaulters; an unambiguous
effective law is a means to the preservation of law and order.
f. Section 20 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) on the enforcement of environmental
objectives should be overhauled and moved to the Fundamental Human Rights in chapter four
of the 1999 Constitution, thereby making environmental infringements justiciable. This would
thus protect and guarantee a healthy and sustainable environment. The right to a healthy
environment would deter gas flaring by oil companies through the payment of monetary
damages to the Federal Government and the victims of their environmental degradation,
thereby promoting stringent compliance with the anti-flaring policies and other enabling
environmental laws in the sector. And in recognizing the cumbersome process of amending
the constitution, a statute with enforceable environmental objectives should be promulgated to
give section 20 some immediate consequence when violated by defaulters.
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g. The Federal Government should increase electricity generation in Nigeria through the use of
gas to earn more revenues for the Federal Government through the local utilization and
exportation of gas.
h. There is a need for more gas pipeline networks to be created to enhance the domestic usage of
gas and to reduce its flaring. Gas prices should be reasonable and competitive with other forms
of energy, which are dictated by the market forces. This will encourage investors to invest in
the sector, deter the waste of gas resources, and reduce environmental risks.304
i. Award of oil mining licenses to investors should be to establish functioning private modular
crude.
j. Deforestation also impacts the efforts to reach the Paris agreement goals as the forest is
recognised as an important carbon sink that helps in cleaning up the green house gases in the
atmosphere. Therefore REDD+ should be a priority for the Nigerian government in reaching
the goals stated at the last COP in Glasgow. Efforts should be made to ensure that charcoal
production that causes forest degradation and deforestation should be totally outlawed, as a lot
of trees are cut to produce this charcoal.
k. Domestic Energy from deforestation should also be tackled. The government of Nigeria
alongside the international community should make effort to supply cleaner energy form
refined natural gas to poor communities using a sustainable plan in order to reduce the number
of trees cut down to be used as wood fire and other energy sources.
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l. Finally, a sustainable development mechanism (SDM) has to be developed by the Nigeria
government and could be sponsored by a willing Annex 1 country which would be focused on
ensuring that natural gas and other clean energy sources adequate for urban and middle income
homes is produced at a sustainable lower cost that would ensure that wood fire for cooking
becomes unappealing to most Nigerians.
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